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Hitler v. Freud

The sickening spectacle of Nazi barbarity in one of the most highly civilized cities in the world is following the expected pattern. Jewish shops in Vienna are being labeled and in many cases confiscated; employment is being denied to Jews; a non-Jewish woman was driven down the street as a public spectacle because she had bought something in a Jewish store; thousands of Jews have been arrested and sent to jail or concentration camps. Is it any wonder that prominent men and women—including skilled doctors and writers—have killed themselves rather than endure this senseless persecution? It is typical of the pleasure Hitler's followers derive from cruelty that in spite of their hatred of Jews, they will not allow them to leave the country. The Nazis have even confiscated the passports and ready money of Dr. Sigmund Freud and his wife, in spite of the fact that Dr. Freud is one of the most distinguished men in the world and is at present ill. If anyone in the world has given us a hint as to what is the matter with Hitler and how we may prevent the occurrence of such grotesque personalities, it is Freud. Meanwhile, to point a contrast, it was announced on the same day by Dr. Franz Alexander of the Institute for Psychoanalysis in Chicago that the technique founded by Dr. Freud has been used with great success in the treatment of asthma. Can the life-giving forces of the world make rapid enough

progress to save us from the dark and death-dealing ones?

Franco Exhibits Himself

One of the greatest horrors of the war in both China and Spain is the persistent and calculated air bombing of civilians, with no military objective. Franco keeps on murdering women and children wholesale in Barcelona and other Loyalist cities, in spite of the government's offer to end such warfare and in spite of foreign protests. Next to Hitler and Mussolini he has become, and deservedly, probably the most hated man in the world today. The best military strategists oppose this type of ferocity on two grounds: first, that instead of weakening the morale of civilian populations it is likely to harden their resolution and fire their hatred; second, that it leads to reprisal and destruction of the cities of the attacker. In this case the second reason loses some of its force, since in order to execute reprisals, the Loyalists, representing the majority of the Spanish people, have to bomb their own supporters behind the enemy's lines. Real reprisal would consist in bombing Berlin or Rome. But Franco is doing himself injury in another way—he is spreading the conviction, even among those who formerly did not understand what kind of man he was, that he is unfit to wield power. Perhaps even the Vatican will some day awaken to the wickedness of religious support for people who act in this way.

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Dr. Morgan at Thermopylae

Two weeks ago, President Roosevelt conducted an inquiry into the dispute among the directors of the TVA. For six hours, Dr. Arthur Morgan refused to participate "except as a spectator" and declined to offer any substantiation of the serious charges he had made against his fellow directors. One week later, the President repeated the procedure with the same result. Thereafter, he twice in succession asked Dr. Morgan, under a time limit, to substantiate his charges or withdraw them. To this, Dr. Morgan's only reply has been that he wants a congressional investigation. Meanwhile, the other directors, Messrs. David Lilienthal and H. A. Morgan, have given their version of the matters as to which they were criticized by Dr. Arthur Morgan, and their reply seems complete and convincing. Under the circumstances, it seems impossible that Dr. Arthur Morgan should any longer seek to continue as a director. Even if he should be sustained by the courts in his contention that he cannot be removed, it is clear that his usefulness in the TVA is ended.

Mexican Oil and American Money

More than twenty years ago Mexico rewrote her Constitution and reserved to the state ownership of all subsoil mineral rights, including oil. In doing this, she followed the example of most other countries throughout the world; there are few nations so foolish as the United States, which permits the people's heritage to be recklessly squandered for the benefit of private pocketbooks. For various reasons, Mexico never followed up the Constitution by nationalizing the oil wells and pipe lines. Through a series of compromises, foreign companies were permitted to continue to exploit Mexican oil on a lease and royalty basis. Now, however, Mexico is proceeding to take over the industry. No doubt, there will be some individual injustices, and these should be rectified; but in general, no one can doubt that the government has a perfect right to its action. The oil companies have had twenty years' warning; they have profited enormously in the past; other countries have taken parallel action. We are glad to see that thus far, the American government has taken a sensible, realistic and conciliatory view of what Mexico is doing, in great contrast to our arrogant meddling in former years.

No One Shall Go Hungry

Despite the host of reassuring promises that have been made to the unemployed and needy, relief administration in the United States is approaching a breakdown as complete as that in 1932. The number of applicants for direct relief has increased markedly during the past few months as a result of widespread layoffs and payroll cuts, but at the same time the local agencies in charge of administering aid have had their

appropriations reduced to impossibly low levels. The WPA can absorb only a small proportion of those who need jobs, and in many sections WPA wages are inadequate to provide minimum subsistence for large families. A recent survey by the American Association of Social Workers shows that since the federal government left direct relief to the states, the local agencies have been unable to cope with the enormous problem. And as a result, by the slow deterioration that comes from under-nourishment, hundreds of thousands of Americans are actually starving. Mayor LaGuardia has dramatized the situation in New York City—where home relief has just suffered a ten-percent reduction—by demanding a special session of the state legislature to take action on the relief question. The session recently completed failed to deal with the emergency at all. Responsibility for the unemployed must not be tossed from federal government, to state, to local community and, in the end, be met by no one. It is a first duty of all three and they should cooperate in paying the cost.

No Comment Needed

Cardinal O'Connell, in an interview published Saturday, March 19, several days after Franco's airplanes had killed 1,200 and injured 2,000 in Barcelona: "It is a lie. General Franco would not dare do a thing like that. It must have been a military maneuver. . . .

"Why Franco is called a rebel I cannot understand. He is fighting for Christian civilization in Spain. . . . Important people in America say they are on the side of the Valencia government. That is actually no government at all. General Franco's is the only established government."

Youth Lobbies

Washington recently was filled with four thousand amateur lobbyists, members of the American Youth Congress and delegates from schools and colleges all over the country, who had come to let Congress know about the need for job and education opportunities for young people. The principal item on their list of legislative demands is the passage of the American Youth Act, which would broaden the scope of the work now being done by the National Youth Administration in providing jobs, scholarships and vocational training for the millions who cannot otherwise afford even a small part of the education they desire. The bill carries with it authorization of a \$500,000,000 appropriation for this purpose. The young lobbyists testified before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, where they were given a memorable lesson in the technique of Red-baiting cross-examination. They marched down Pennsylvania Avenue carrying placards and singing their demands. President Roosevelt met and talked with their delegation of five. Leaders of the Youth Congress feel that, as a result of their extensive campaign, an administration bill will probably be intro-

duced into Congress in the near future which will incorporate most of the Youth Act's important provisions. In any case, these young people have learned a lot about how our democracy works.

How Not to Fight "Reds"

Governor Lehman has a public duty to perform. It is to veto the McNaboe bill, recently passed by the New York State Legislature, which would bar persons with subversive views from holding public office, civil-service jobs or positions in schools in the state. Subversive views are listed as "communism and criminal anarchy," and the definition of these things is so loose and blundering that almost anybody might be included under it. The bill, for example, defines a communist as one who advocates the suppression of free speech (among other things), which must make communists out of all the legislators who supported the measure. Surely they didn't intend to vote for a bill which disqualifies them from public office. But the amusing contradictions contained in this sloppy piece of legislation ought not to blur its serious implications. It proposes to destroy radical ideas by outlawing them: a method that clashes with the basic tenet of a democracy wherein bad proposals are supposed to be destroyed by lack of voting support. Experience has shown that official suppression of this kind is more than likely to give strength to the ideas it combats by lending them the appeal of an "underground movement." If the groups behind this bill were seriously interested in combating radicalism, and not just indulging in a wild Red hunt, they would have tried to alleviate some of the conditions that give radical ideas their strength.

What Does Hitler Want Next?

While the whole world speculates over the question of when and in what direction Nazi Germany's next attempt at territorial expansion will take place, many well informed Danes feel certain that North Schleswig is the spot. Recently there have been frequent and often violent demonstrations by Nazi sympathizers in North Schleswig of the sort that preceded the German invasion of Austria. Though the German population of North Schleswig is something less than 15 percent of its total and is probably as well treated as any minority group in Europe, the process of "nazifying" the Germans in the area has been carried on with characteristic intensity and fervor. Shortly before Christmas, Dr. Lens Möller, the Berlin-appointed leader of the German Nazi Party in North Schleswig, is reported to have announced to a cheering group of his followers at the Deutsches Haus in Apenrade that "within the next six months" the German troops would be marching over the Danish frontier. North Schleswig was returned to Denmark, according to the terms of the Versailles Treaty, by the plebiscite of 1920 in which the Danish majority was about three to one. Now, if

the observers in Copenhagen are correct, Hitler is about to raise the question once again and, through "negotiations" backed by the force of arms, attempt to reconquer the territory—or at least a substantial part of it, for the Fatherland.

Are the Unemployed Citizens?

Those apprehensive Americans who are keeping a file of "It Can Happen Here" incidents should quickly add the fact that the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce has published its version of a revised Constitution for the state of New York. The pamphlet which the Brooklyn Chamber has published is candid propaganda and the members state quite boldly that their draft of the Constitution is to be placed before the delegates of the forthcoming Constitutional Convention. They propose that millions of persons hitherto regarded as legal citizens shall be disfranchised. In Article II, Section 2, dealing with the qualification of voters, there appears this amazing clause "... and that no person shall be entitled to vote . . . *who shall at the time of registration be receiving any form of public relief.*" It is inconceivable that such a provision should find its way into our new Constitution, but it represents nevertheless another evidence of the fact that fascism might arrive here under the revered name of Democracy.

News Notes of a Week

The Spanish Loyalists, following the Rebel advance toward the sea, showed remarkable powers of resistance and halted the drive, at least temporarily, before Franco had succeeded in cutting the Loyalist territory in two. . . . The fighting in China continued without any outstanding change in the situation. The Japanese continued to find operations far more difficult, prolonged and costly than they had expected. To tighten their belts effectively, the limited liberties of the Japanese people at home were still further restricted. . . . Trouble developed between Brazil and Germany, following restrictions placed on Nazi organizations by Dictator Vargas. He believed the Nazis were plotting against his regime.

The fight against reorganization of the federal government continued in Congress. Those who have a vested interest in the continuance of our needless and wasteful government bureaus charged President Roosevelt with dictatorial ambitions. . . . Congress, having refused to tax family corporations, seemed in a mood to weaken the tax bill in every other way it could find, favorable to the wealthy. . . . The equal-rights amendment was reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee without endorsement, the Committee being divided nine to nine. Among those opposed were Senators Norris and Borah. . . . With the financial plight of the railroads receiving increasing attention, proposals are being aired for combining them into a small number of regional systems, perhaps seven.

An Acid Test for Mr. Hull

SECRETARY HULL'S SPEECH on foreign policy, though phrased in the circumlocution of diplomacy, may be translated into vulgar English somewhat as follows. We intend to keep American citizens and armed forces in the war zones in China. We intend to intervene there and elsewhere not only in behalf of trade and property, but also in behalf of general principles of world order. We do not intend to apply the Neutrality Act. Those who advocate a contrary policy are extreme isolationists who would cut off all trade from the United States and deprive it of all influence in world affairs. The result of this policy would be more disastrous than incurring the risk of war by the measures I endorse.

That the position of Secretary Hull's opponents has thus been unfairly stated may be confirmed by a study of the special section on National Defense which accompanies this issue of *The New Republic*. Avoidance of incidents which breed war is wholly compatible with enlarging peacetime trade through reciprocal treaties. Application of the Neutrality Act is far from complete isolation. Furthermore, the action of the administration itself has in one important particular—we might almost say a crucial one—belied Secretary Hull's noble words about principles and international morality.

We refer to the President's refusal to follow precedent and international law when he embargoed the sale of arms to Loyalist Spain. Mr. Roosevelt had brought pressure to bear to stop shipments at a time when nothing in the Neutrality Act compelled him to do so. There was then nothing in our law about refusing to supply arms in civil wars. On the contrary, the established precedent was that friendly nations should supply the needs of governments dealing with rebellion, while refusing to sell to the rebels. Yet the President asked Congress to amend the law expressly in order to enable him to forbid shipments to the Madrid government. This amendment was requested on January 6, 1937, was passed on January 8, and was immediately applied to Spain by executive order.

Why did he do so? The answer, we believe, is obvious. Great Britain had just persuaded France to adopt a similar policy and the cue in Washington was taken from London. The British Conservatives have, of course, looked with disfavor on the Spanish Loyalists. They preferred the victory of fascism, even at the cost of danger to the Empire. And our government, with all its noble pretensions, meekly followed suit. There are in the State Department in Washington influential men who see eye-to-eye with the British Tories. They are capable of flying into a fury about the destruction of American property in China, and about the rights of American trade, while they ignore the defeat of democracy in Spain. Furthermore, the administration does not want to offend the Catholics.

Subsequently a new Neutrality Act was passed retaining the provision applicable to civil wars. The President did not protest; he signed the Act as amended. And neither Secretary Hull nor any other member of the administration has ever objected to this application of the law, though they have refused to apply its provisions to the great war in China.

The *New Republic* has from the beginning opposed the administration's attitude in this matter. It pointed out the unwisdom and injustice of Britain's action, and criticized our government for imitating it. It opposed the amendment of the Neutrality Act to include civil wars. It pointed out the inconsistency of refusing to sell arms to Spain while incurring the large risks of war inseparable from Secretary Hull's policy in China.

The Neutrality Act is, as we have often observed, not an effort to maintain a mechanical and impossible impartiality, but a means of avoiding some of the dangers of becoming embroiled in foreign wars. The difference between the Spanish case and the Asiatic case is a difference in this danger. If Britain, France and the United States had from the beginning allowed the Loyalist government to buy arms, under the established precedents, there would have been no appreciable risk of their becoming involved in hostilities. Indeed, the Spanish government would probably have had such greatly increased chances of victory that Italy and Germany would not have dared to venture anywhere near so much on Franco. Franco might have sunk a few of our munitions ships, but that would not have meant a European war. Certainly there would have been no trouble with anybody else. In Asia, on the contrary, everything we have done does increase the risk of war with a first-class military power, already in the field.

Even now, it may not be too late. If the President and the Secretary of State mean what they say, let them call upon Congress to amend the Neutrality Act to authorize the sale of munitions to Spain. Nothing else they could do would have half the effect of this in stopping the aggression of the Fascist powers and in supporting democracy. Nothing else would do more to prevent the arrival of a general European war which would create a real danger for us.

There is at present an agitation in Congress for repeal of the whole Neutrality Act. That would be unwise and dangerous. The people of this country do want to be safeguarded against being drawn into a world war. They do not want to adopt a reckless policy of intervention in distant parts of the world. But they would be perfectly justified in bearing the negligible risk of allowing Spanish democracy to buy the arms it needs. Whether our government is willing to take this action is an acid test of its sincerity in advocating the worldwide defense of democracy against aggression. Is it principles, or investments in China, that really interest Mr. Hull?

Europe Last Week

ON THE SURFACE, things seemed to move with dizzy speed in Europe last week; but in truth, the nations changed their underlying positions little if at all. Trying to correlate the long curves with the day-to-day fluctuations, we find something like this:

Poland and Lithuania.—For eighteen years there have been no diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania—since Poland seized the Lithuanian city of Vilna. Last week, following Hitler's Austrian coup, Poland threatened her little northeastern neighbor with war unless relations were resumed, the border opened and—inferentially—Poland's long-ago seizure of Vilna recognized. The press was filled with stories that Germany and Poland had come to a secret agreement that Poland was to take the port of Memel from Lithuania, that Danzig would then go back to Germany, the Polish Corridor be closed. For the present, the issue has been postponed through Lithuania's abject surrender to the threat of overwhelming force.

Czechoslovakia.—Europe's great question mark this week was whether Hitler would strike next in Czechoslovakia, and if so, when. The Czechs moved to mitigate one possible *casus belli* by giving the German districts a greater degree of autonomy. It was considered an ominous sign that the government-schooled Berlin press began a concerted attack on the Prague regime as being Communist-inspired; a similar attack on Vienna preceded the seizure of Austria. In the crisis Soviet Russia reaffirmed her obligation to defend Czechoslovakia if France does the same, and France asked Great Britain to coöperate.

Spain.—Last week newspaper correspondents were saying that Hitler, in exchange for Mussolini's consent to the taking of Austria, had agreed to send enough men and material to Spain for a Franco victory. The startling temporary success of the Rebels' drive toward the coast, to cut Loyalist Spain in two, seemed to confirm this view. Later, the Loyalists' resistance increased. Their difficulty was shortage of material and nothing else; and it was quite within reason to suppose that this shortage would be made up by friendly powers which fear the triumph of fascism in the Iberian Peninsula.

England and Italy.—Chamberlain continued his negotiations with Mussolini as though the seizure of Austria had never taken place. Commentators suggested that if these talks were successful, Italy might bring Britain and Germany together again. Chamberlain actually appeared to be proceeding on the theory that Hitler and Mussolini would clear out of Spain once Franco had been victorious. With the whole world shouting in his ear that this was not true, that Italy, at least, would stay in Spain and Spanish Morocco and

the Balearics, that Britain's "lifeline of Empire" would be imperiled more seriously after a fascist victory in Spain than before, the British Prime Minister went doggedly ahead on a complicated group of negotiations of which only the bare outline was known. Meanwhile, increasing dissatisfaction at home caused talk to begin of a possible general election, a Labor victory and thereafter a firm anti-fascist line.

France.—The French, gravely hampered by the lack of any government during some of the most critical days, clung to the hope of agreement and joint action with Great Britain in all cases. It became increasingly likely, however, that faced by the danger of fascist encirclement and the possibility of being cut off from her possessions in North Africa, France might do more than she would publicly admit to help the Loyalists.

The USSR.—Soviet Russia, through Litvinov, called for a worldwide conference to embrace all the major powers except the Fascist triumvirate. During the first few days, in any case, there seemed little disposition on the part of any of the great powers to respond favorably to the suggestion. The United States, one of the group to which the invitation was sent, turned a cold shoulder, in spite of the fact that almost simultaneously Secretary Hull had made what the government regarded as an important speech opposing isolationism.

The League.—How completely the League of Nations has lost all influence was shown by the fact that during the momentous events of the past fortnight hardly anyone has even mentioned its existence. Geneva did not appear in the papers even as a date line for dispatches, except rarely. The fact symbolized what everyone must now admit to be true: that Europe has now abandoned even the pretense of organized effort for international justice. It has returned to the system which it never really abandoned, of power politics.

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Rough Seas for the Super-Navy

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES has passed President Roosevelt's super-navy bill, and the measure is now awaiting action by the Senate. Hence this seems an appropriate moment to summarize swiftly the chief features of the so-called triumph of the super-navy faction in Washington.

Owing to the clouds of smoke emitted by proponents of the super-navy bill, a few words should be said about the nature of the bill. The measure authorizes but does not appropriate money for the much lauded super-navy. Nor is it designed to fill gaps in our present naval defenses. It has nothing whatever to do with "adequate defense" of the United States. What is the evidence for this statement?

1. Long before this bill was ever heard of, Congress had already authorized the construction of a number of battleships which the Navy Department has not seen fit to start. Under the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 a four-billion-dollar program was authorized, and the Department is still far behind in carrying it out. In other words, a huge program of naval construction was already sanctioned by law and the actual construction of eight or nine new battleships awaited the action of the Navy Department. The defense of America was already fully authorized when the President sprang his program upon the bewildered nation.

2. On January 21, 1938, seven days before the President exploded his navy scare, the House of Representatives had passed the largest peacetime naval-appropriation bill in the history of the country. It had granted to the Navy Department practically everything that the Department requested and then deemed adequate for the defense of the United States. If the Navy Department believed that America was "defenseless" early in January, why did it not then demand this super-navy?

3. In his testimony on the super-navy bill, Admiral Leahy declared that he would be "happy" to meet any Asiatic navy that was merely equal to ours, in an attack on our shores. Japan's navy is much smaller than ours. Given the present naval strength, to say nothing of ships authorized and not begun, Admiral Leahy informed the country that he could adequately defend it now (Hearings, pp. 56-57).

This super-navy bill is not a defense bill. It is a Roosevelt quarantine bill.

But there is a sting in the President's triumph. The bill has not passed the House without amendments.

It originally contained a provision limiting aircraft and thus reflected that hostility to this new arm of defense which many orthodox naval and military men so deeply cherish. The limitation was stricken out by the House.

Originally, the majority of the Naval Affairs Committee opposed and voted down a proposal stating that the United States would welcome and support an international conference for naval limitation. It was known that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull stood firmly against any such expression of policy. But on the floor of the House, after debate had gone on through the week, Mr. Vinson accepted the once spurned proposal, and the clause supporting a conference for naval limitation was accepted by the House.

On another point the sponsors of the super-navy lost. Section 9 of the bill contained an expression of "naval policy," which, as the minority report stated, "reveals the design of the universal quarantine policy and the interventionist policy in Asia and upholds the obsolete British-Mahan seapower doctrine." In an effective speech, Mr. Maverick of Texas had assailed this section as "preposterous." Mr. Snell made a point of order against it. Mr. Maverick also voiced his protest again and, on a ruling by the chair, Section 9 was eliminated from the bill.

During the debate on the bill, which was conducted on a high level, some significant disclosures were made. Members of the President's own party boldly attacked the program. Still more surprising was the strength of the Republican opposition to the bill. When big-navy Republicans think the country is safe, something has happened in American politics.

There are rumors in Washington that the Republicans may use a new slogan in the coming congressional elections: "We turned the Democrats out during their last war. Let's turn them out this time before they make their next."

So the super-navy bill, modified by amendments and objections, goes to the Senate, with the grinning skull of quarantine and interventionism peering from behind the bland face of "national defense."

No doubt the pressure of the administrative machine on party members in the Senate will be terrific. On March 17 Senator Frazier read to his astounded colleagues telegrams from constituents calling upon him to support the President's reorganization bill in order to assure a continuance of relief in his state. One telegram read: "Please support the President's administration bill, that we have WPA in North Dakota next year." To draw a warranted inference, we may expect the steamroller to go into action when the super-navy bill is taken up in the Senate. The order from on high will be suave enough but it will mean in substance: "Give the President his naval weapons or do without bread." At this beautiful pass the American republic has arrived in the sixth year of the beneficent New Deal.

CHARLES A. BEARD

Austria: First Nazi Annexation

A COUNTRY with an age-old tradition, which for many centuries was the center for a vast empire ruling Central Europe, has lost its independence. Bismarck liquidated Austria's influence in Germany in the war of 1866 and Germany became a Hohenzollern empire under Prussia's leadership. Hitler, however, has done what Bismarck dared not do—sent his troops to Vienna, although Hitler was careful to send “only” Bavarian soldiers.

Austria has a much older tradition than Prussia. There are tremendous contrasts between them, between Berlin and Vienna; differences which will not be obliterated under Hitler's rule. The German word *Gemütlichkeit* is characteristic of Austria and although it is used in Germany it clashes with the spirit of Prussian bureaucrats. The former leader of Austrian Social Democracy, Viktor Adler, used to say about the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, in comparing it with the Hohenzollern dynasty: “We are also living under the dictatorship of an absolute monarchy, but softened by *Schlamperei*.” Such a difference will no longer exist in a Nazi Austria dominated by Nazi Prussia.

After the World War the spirit of “independence” among the Austrian people was not very strong. The majority, especially the workers, wanted the *Anschluss* with the German Republic. This idea was especially popular while the Austrian workmen still believed that the German Republic would become a socialist republic. When the Nazis gained power, the spirit of independence revived considerably among the Austrian people. Catholics and workers did not want to become “coördinated” by the Nazis. Hitler transformed a pro-*Anschluss* majority in Austria into an anti-*Anschluss* majority. But a vast section of the ruined middle class and of workers who had been unemployed for many years had no chance of finding a new economic existence in an independent Austria. The Nazis promised them “work and bread” and they became ardent supporters of the *Anschluss* and of the Nazi invasion.

Enthusiasm about the *Anschluss* will probably not last long even among most Austrian Nazis. Hitler will not grant autonomy to the Austrian people and his domination will have far-reaching consequences for Austria's economic life. Vienna, with over one-third of Austria's population, could become prosperous either as the financial and cultural center of a new empire in southeastern Europe or, closely connected with a prosperous Germany which could relieve Austria's economic strain, as a cultural center for southern Germany. Neither alternative will be possible under Nazi rule. There will be a military centralization with Vienna's cultural life under the police control of Herr Himmler in Berlin. It was symptomatic that Mr.

Seyss-Inquart, after his appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs at Hitler's request, first visited Herr Himmler in the Berlin headquarters of the Secret Police before he assumed his new duties in Vienna. Under Nazi rule Austria is going to be the first colony of the German Empire rather than a part of Germany.

Many Austrian manufacturers were opposed to the *Anschluss* because they were afraid of being swept away by the formidable competition of the big German concerns and trusts. There are many industries in Austria that produce mostly consumption goods. The armament industries are of less importance. In Nazi Germany, only the armament industries prosper. They are supplied with the scarce raw materials generally denied other industries. Branches of industry which are not essential for war production are decaying. This will be the fate of most Austrian industries, which will suffer not only from competition, but also from the same denial of raw materials from which German industries suffer. Furthermore, the geographical position of Austrian industries adds to the unlikelihood of their competing with German industries in the latter's present market.

Austria possesses only a few raw materials. They are mainly iron ore and timber, and to a very small extent tin, zinc and magnesium. The Austrian industrialists want to use the raw materials of their country to improve their industrial position. A typical instance is the Alpine Montangesellschaft. It owns not only all iron mines, but also the only iron and steel mills in Austria. The Alpine Montangesellschaft itself is controlled by the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, the powerful steel trust of the Ruhr under the control of Thyssen. For many years there has been a continuous struggle between the rulers of the German steel trust and the Austrian government, itself under the influence of the Austrian manufacturers. The Austrian government was opposed to the exportation of Austria's iron ores to western Germany and the furnaces of the Ruhr, and to the closing of the iron and steel mills in Austria—which was the aim of the Ruhr trust. The Austrian government compelled the Alpine Montangesellschaft to respect the special interests of Austrian economy. This influence is now removed and the Prussian steel trust has unrestricted control of the Alpine Montangesellschaft.

Austria has to import coal, but during the period of political independence the government could resist the dictatorship of German coal monopolies by encouraging foreign competition in the interest of coal consumers. Imports of coal from Poland and Czechoslovakia enabled the Austrian government to increase exports of Austrian manufactured goods into those countries.

This will no longer be possible. The German coal monopolies have conquered a new market where they can dictate without fearing foreign competition.

German militarism will exploit Austria's only raw-material resources—iron-ore mines and timber. The maximum production of iron ore in any one year has been 1,900,000 tons (1928), or about 9.2 percent of the German imports in 1937. Only a small fraction of Austria's iron-ore production was exported in the past. Exports of timber may become more important. Austria has vast forests—1,150,000 hectares, equivalent to 30 percent of the German forest areas. Göring, in order to obtain the fulfilment of the "Four Year Plan" for armaments, ordered the destruction of 50 percent more trees in German forests than the maximum previously allowed by the forest-preservation program. Austrian forests will probably be devastated in the interests of German armaments and Austrian exports of iron ore and timber will increase while her industries decay.

Another factor is the anti-Semitic wave which Austria is experiencing under the Nazi rule. It will have more serious consequences for Austria than it had for the Reich. The Jews in Austria constitute over three percent of the population, while in the Reich they were less than one percent. There are over 600,000 "half-Jews" who will become victims of the laws against "non-Aryans"—altogether over 10 percent of the population. The persecution of the "non-Aryans" will accelerate the decline of Austrian cultural and economic life which is inevitable under Nazi rule.

Austria will become dependent on the German industrial monopolies and will sink to the status of a "hinterland" for German militarism. Austria is the first German colony, but it is extremely doubtful whether the "conservative" representatives of German imperialism will enjoy the new conquest. The "conservative" generals, for instance, who were recently removed from command, have always opposed a military occupation of Austria. They were not only afraid of the danger of a world war, involving the collapse of German militarism, but they also would have preferred the reestablishment of an Austro-Hungarian monarchy to making Austria an agrarian province of Germany. A new Austrian Empire would have had to follow German imperialism more closely than the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy did. At the same time it would have had more possibilities of penetrating Southeastern Europe to obtain an agrarian "hinterland" for Germany than the German Reich alone.

Annexation of Austria will not remedy the economic difficulties of the Reich. The Reich can hoard foreign currency by exploiting the supply of Austrian timber and iron ore. But this will be more than offset by Austrian deficiencies in foodstuffs and raw materials, which the Reich also must import. Austria is even more dependent than Germany on imported foodstuffs. Austrian imports of grain amount to from 700,

000 to 900,000 tons a year, or 30 percent of Germany's imports of grain last year.

The internal and external weakness of the Nazi Reich help explain the inactivity of the French Army Staff. One cannot simply charge it to the government's crisis in Paris at the time German troops invaded Austria. Any Popular Front government would probably have followed the advice of the General Staff. The army leaders considered any *Anschluss* of Austria with the former Weimar Republic as a *casus belli*. Why did they keep quiet at this time? The answer that they are afraid of Hitler's military power is not satisfactory—especially after the recent "purge" in the German Army Staff. Hitler may bluff foreign democratic governments, but certainly not the military experts of the French and British armies. They know the tremendous internal economic and political difficulties of the Nazis and they are well aware that the German army could not stand the strain of a war against another big power. But most members of the French Army Staff are almost as much afraid of any possible successor to Hitler as of Hitler himself.

The "conservative" generals of the Reichswehr, for instance, always wanted to win Russia as an ally or at least to neutralize her in order to become stronger against the Western Powers. A revolutionary anti-Nazi Germany would naturally also establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. A German military class, on the other hand, which is hostile to the Soviet Union and is compelled to pursue this policy on account of its internal weaknesses, is regarded as being a less dangerous power in case of another world war than either a revolutionary Germany or a Germany under the leadership of the "conservative" generals.

Hitler must have known this, too. Therefore he could have felt sure that no military invasion by the French army would occur. Otherwise he would not have risked his prestige by his ultimatum to Austria.

The workers of Austria with their strong socialist tradition will be an extremely difficult nut for Herr Himmler and his Secret State Police to crack. But on the other hand Hitler has greatly strengthened his personal prestige as Führer. He and his propagandists can announce that Hitler's "strong arm" has freed the "brothers in Austria," and has successfully defied the whole world. This will enable Hitler to raise the spirit of his middle-class followers who were scared by the economic strain and who dislike the Nazi bureaucracy and had begun to protest the cost of the new army.

How long will this newly inspired enthusiasm for Hitler last? Weeks or months—until the economic strain which will become more and more acute will make the middle classes and even many manufacturers ask whether Hitler's successes abroad are worth the suffering they cause. Then Hitler will need another action in the interest of his prestige.

GUENTER REIMANN

In Defense of the PWA

The New Republic has on various occasions in the past criticized the PWA housing program. In the interest of fair play, we are glad to present below a defense of this program by Secretary Ickes.—THE EDITORS

SOME OF THE PEOPLE who have never done anything about low-cost housing and slum clearance except to talk of it are of the opinion that the pioneering accomplishments of the Housing Division of the Public Works Administration do not count for much. No thinking person who takes the trouble or the time to review the record can in good conscience agree with such silliness.

As Administrator of Public Works, I am entitled to present to the public the facts, based upon the record, in order to refute the false allegations, the irresponsible innuendoes and the inspired insinuations which have been directed against the PWA housing program. The editors of *The New Republic* have generously given me this opportunity to state the facts.

My purpose, then, in this article is to give a clear and concise account of the barriers that faced housing in the beginning, what we did about them and what we accomplished before the Housing Division of the PWA was transferred to the United States Housing Authority under the Wagner-Steagall Act.

We find that prior to 1933 the only public housing that existed in this country was on paper. Earnest advocates of the theory of public housing had preached the gospel and had done what they could to further the cause of housing without the benefit of a working laboratory provided by an actual program. The efforts of these apostles of housing bore fruit in the summer of 1933 when seventeen words in Title II of the National Industrial Recovery Act which established the PWA went through with the bill. These words authorized the Public Works Administration, under the direction of the President, to include among projects to be financed the "construction, reconstruction, alteration or repair, under public regulation or control, of low-cost-housing and slum-clearance projects."

This authorization, inconclusive as it was, was surrounded by the restrictions and limitations pertaining to public works generally. It had to follow the public-works theory that such projects should provide relief and employment benefits. Simon-pure housing was made secondary to relief and was to be achieved as a by-product rather than as an end in itself. This initial restriction colored the subsequent program.

Those who profess to have staked a claim on all housing knowledge, such as *The Nation*, the weekly periodical, deal lightly with, if they do not entirely ignore, the practical administrative obstacles which

made development of the program a series of starts and stops. The bitterness and unfairness of some critics are matched only by their ignorance. Even good faith, in some instances, may be questioned.

Our first effort was an optimistic attempt to entice private capital to undertake the job, through limited-dividend-corporation housing projects, backed by government funds and a favorable interest rate. An incredible influx of unworkable schemes and a brilliant misconception of the aims of the program rendered this venture futile. As is well known, only seven projects out of five hundred submitted proved worth undertaking.

We were prompt to recognize the hopelessness of this attempt. Convinced that private initiative could not swing the job, we set up an Emergency Housing Corporation in October, 1933, to build housing wherever cities wanted it and where they were willing to coöperate in the enterprise. The PWA allotted \$100,000,000 to the corporation to start the program. The PWEHC lasted just long enough to get to John R. McCarl, the one-man Supreme Court who was then sitting in Washington *en banc* both trying and deciding cases in the robes of the Comptroller General. This political remittance man, by training and persuasion averse to any and all forward steps, invoked his self-bestowed powers and refused to approve the warrants transferring the PWA's \$100,000,000 to the Emergency Housing Corporation.

Thus, before the law was six months old, two efforts to get housing started on a sound basis were knocked out from under us.

It must be remembered that at the time the PWA began its efforts, housing was so completely a theory—and nothing else—that not one state had on its statute books laws making it possible either for it or for any of its cities to engage in housing projects. This extremely serious obstacle was all too apparent to us in those early days. The power of a city to engage in housing depends upon the powers granted it by law. The states had no such laws, the cities no such powers.

The PWA early set about to help the cities get powers. The first state act was passed in Ohio in December, 1933, and then the Housing Division went to work in New York. As a result of its spadework with the first New York City slum-clearance committee (whose appointment the PWA had suggested) and with the Governor and Legislature, New York followed through and passed its Housing Authorities Law in January of 1934. Immediately thereafter Mayor LaGuardia appointed the first New York City Housing Authority to begin the work outlined for it by the original PWA-inspired slum-clearance commit-

tee. Thus, if the New York City Housing Authority is interested in its paternity, it can trace it directly to the PWA Housing Division, however reluctantly.

It is worth while at this point to take notice of the hue and cry raised by the Cassandras of housing that the PWA ignored the cities in carrying out its housing program. At the time the PWA was endeavoring to get its program under way, the New York City Housing Authority was not even in existence. It was months before the Authority was ready to undertake an actual project, and then only if someone else provided all of the money. The critics may squeak solo or in chorus, but the New York City Housing Authority has never yet been able to finance a large-scale project which it might construct itself, although we were entirely willing to go along on such a basis and make a loan and grant. Nor is it able today to finance a project under the terms then authorized by Congress. Since all of the money that went into a housing project was federal money, we had to spend it ourselves. Housing projects were not "loan and grant" projects as were other PWA municipal undertakings.

By the spring of 1934, two developments had resulted from the PWA's twin effort to get housing started without laws, and at the same time to get such laws established concurrently with the program. Aided by model drafts, and by encouragement from President Roosevelt, Michigan, New Jersey, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, South Carolina, West Virginia and other states had also passed Housing Authority Acts. Even so, there still was no housing authority financially able or ready to undertake the task even of preparing plans or of acquiring land. Meanwhile, in April, the PWA board allotted funds for housing projects to be constructed directly by the PWA as federal projects and administered through the Housing Division.

Still hampered by the lack of a clear-cut, comprehensive law that, free from relief restrictions, was openly intended as an authorization for a comprehensive housing and slum-clearance program, the PWA continued to make allotments for projects in the various cities which had been able to patch together something which approximated an application. Not only was it necessary, in the preponderant majority of cases, for the PWA to undertake the construction and financing of projects as federal activities, but the staff of the Housing Division had to go into the field and help applicant-cities put their applications in order.

Surveys which should have been made by the cities, had they been equipped with technical knowledge and experience, had to be made by the Housing Division. Incapacity of the localities, lack of enabling legislation, absence of everything but a desire for housing in the cities forced the Housing Division to wet-nurse applications, bring them up from birth and carry them through to maturity. There is only one answer for those who decry this as overcentralized control: If it

had not been done this way, there would not have been any housing at all. Moreover, it was federal money that we were spending. We could not give a 100-per-cent grant to one city and deny it to another.

By August, 1934, with the limited-dividend program and the Emergency Housing Corporation out of the way, and the first federal projects authorized, it was possible to undertake a workable program. Additional projects were approved; the personnel was enlarged and developed to provide adequate facilities for the immense amount of planning, drafting, land acquisition and legal services that were necessary; and a general advance was made over a large front as willing cities besieged the Housing Division with applications for projects of any type.

In December, with investigations under way in seventy cities and with twenty-seven projects in motion, the program received another setback from which it did not recover until seven months later. On December 28, pressed by a grim and unavoidable necessity for immediate funds to tide over the administration of relief until congressional action could be had, the President impounded \$110,000,000 of the Housing Division's money. This action virtually stopped land acquisition dead in its tracks, with the exception of those projects which could be completed with the small balances remaining at their disposal. For many months after this, it was possible only to build up data about the cities in which projects could proceed when the impounded money should be released.

If anyone could have suggested a way to buy land and build housing without money, the ensuing delay would not have occurred. Even before funds were finally made available, another delay arose to confront us. This was the adverse decision in the famous "Louisville case" in which a man of neolithic social instincts who then occupied a federal bench held that the United States could not condemn land for housing purposes. This fiat was to have a far-reaching effect and eventually was to swing our program from one of direct slum-clearance to a vacant-land, straightaway "housing" enterprise. It should be unnecessary to enlarge upon the scope of this disaster. This decision was upheld in the Circuit Court of Appeals and created havoc up and down the line of actual and prospective projects.

Eventually, through direct bargain and sale, some sites were assembled. State after state, prodded by the PWA, passed enabling laws which eventually made the present United States Housing Authority program possible. Ninety-five projects, with allotments of \$264,720,000, had been authorized and were under way when the President, recasting his emergency spending again, as a matter of necessity, ordered a curtailment of the program. Deadlines were set for bids for construction to be submitted and for projects to be put into actual building. This involved the complete junk-

ing of the \$264,720,000 program which had been developed up to this point. Fifty-one projects survived.

One final obstacle developed as the last of the projects went out for bids. This was the disposition among contractors unjustifiably to inflate construction prices. On the surface, it appeared that contractors, knowing that the Division must put buildings on the foundations it had erected, were making excessive charges on the theory that the Division had been pushed into a corner. On seven projects the low bids submitted were so far in excess of reasonable estimates for the work that I ordered them rejected. This meant more delays. In many cases the design of the project was changed to effect every possible economy.

Even this prudent procedure brought boos from the gallery, despite the fact that it was undertaken in order to hold rents within reasonable limitations. The situation reached its climax in Detroit where strong indications came to the surface that there was collusion among bidders. Bids were rejected on two projects. On the rebidding, low offers were made to do the work on the two jobs for \$1,373,900 less than originally had been asked. With the breaking of these bad practices in Detroit, further efforts to extract unwarranted prices collapsed. This procedure involved delay, but I have always contended that had we acceded to pressure and hastily put up these projects at the prices asked, public housing would have been set back many years in this country on costs alone. We were establishing a precedent that could be highly fraught with good or evil.

Circumstances beyond our control were not the only causes for the delay in carrying out our program. We made our own mistakes—some of them mistakes of ignorance due to the newness and the vastness of our undertaking and others of them due to errors in judgment. Unable to obtain trained and experienced personnel, we had to take a chance with personnel that we hoped would train quickly. Mistakes here proved costly and there were a number of mistakes.

At an early period we recognized the shortcomings of our equipment and the inadequacies of our powers, and so set the stage for a new law, which would make it possible for cities and local authorities to take up this work themselves. The cold truth is that not one local housing authority was in existence at the time we started a housing program and not one state law was on a statute book. So far as I know, I was the first public official publicly to advocate that the federal government should turn housing over to our municipalities and be only adviser and possible banker. I believe also that I was the first federal official to favor a federal subsidy to local low-cost public housing.

Following up my convictions, I saw to it that as many states as could be persuaded thereto enacted housing-authority laws and that as many cities as could do so set up housing authorities. In going forward with this type of activity while at the same time stimulating

housing demand by the actual production of sound, workable projects that have become overwhelmingly popular in their localities, the PWA paved the way for the enactment of the United States Housing Act of 1937, under which the cities now will have the opportunity to show their mettle. That the present program, so hopefully launched, was made possible largely because of our pioneering, is beyond challenge.

The PWA housing program produced fifty-one sound, workable projects which afforded a total of approximately twenty-two thousand living units. Base rents averaging \$5.65 per room per month had been established on twenty-three of them when the program was transferred to the United States Housing Authority. This figure was the "shelter" rent and an additional charge of \$1.82 per room per month provided heat, hot and cold water, electricity for lighting and cooking, or gas for cooking if that fuel was to be used. At these low figures, former slum dwellers obtained good shelter, ample light and air, modern equipment and generally salubrious surroundings.

The average income of the families in the PWA projects is low, and every family admitted was taken from substandard housing. In one of the Montgomery, Alabama, projects, the average income of tenants is \$12.50 per week. In Techwood, Atlanta, it is \$22.11 per week; in Atlantic City, \$26.46, Miami, \$19.15.

Many unpleasant slums were cleaned out bodily during the program, and attractive communities erected in their place which form valuable municipal assets. None is elaborate, but all are sound and well built, with one notable exception, which the PWA refused to accept from the contractors. The fifty-one projects form a notable step forward in the process of housing our people well.

The housing program, under a new and more comprehensive act, has been placed in the United States Housing Authority with Mr. Nathan Straus as Administrator. When Mr. Straus was appointed, I issued a public statement saying that "while in effect the United States Housing Authority, under the law, is an independent agency, and while the final responsibility for the program rests with the newly appointed Administrator, the Department of the Interior will be glad at all times to cooperate with Mr. Straus to the fullest possible extent."

And, remembering the damage done to the public-housing movement as a result of discrediting and libelous attacks against the PWA Housing Division, I added this observation:

"I hope that Mr. Straus will be given an opportunity to make good before the loudly baying critics give him the benefit of what they don't know about housing. The Administrator will need all the sympathy, understanding and forbearance that self-seeking critics who have harassed PWA housing efforts almost since the beginning will allow him."

HAROLD L. ICKES

A Letter to Stalin

Josef Stalin

The Kremlin, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dear Josef Stalin:

The government of which you are the head has now proposed a conference of nearly all the world powers, except the three chief fascist nations, for the purpose of considering ways of checking the menace of those three. On the assumption that there is still time, and that a major world conflict has not begun while this issue of *The New Republic* is on the press, I, like millions of others, hope with all my heart that this meeting can be held and will prove effective. The fact, however, that your government is issuing such a call makes appropriate a few remarks about the attitude of the outside world toward the USSR and your responsibility in regard to it.

The latest of the famous Moscow trials has ended. Eighteen of the defendants, after pleading guilty with abject self-abasement, have been executed. Three others have received prison sentences averaging twenty years each. Since they are elderly men, it seems unlikely that they will survive their imprisonment, unless its terms are mitigated.

At the same time, the cables from Moscow tell us that fresh purges and additional trials are contemplated. I take it for granted that your heart sinks at this prospect, as do those of millions of other persons throughout the world. No one outside Russia and very likely no one within its borders knows exactly how many individuals have been exiled, imprisoned or executed since that unhappy day when Kirov was slain. Estimates of the total, based upon accounts in Soviet newspapers, range upward from 1,200. The list of well known persons is a staggering one, embracing a former premier, top-ranking commissars, presidents and other high officials of individual Soviet republics, foreign ambassadors and editors of chief newspapers. It must now be true that at least 90 percent of the best known men who made the revolution have lost their places or both places and lives. You yourself have commented on the strain and tension produced within the Soviet Union by the purges of recent months, by the excesses of mistaken zeal. Testimony from many sources indicates that executives hesitate to take responsibility, people are reluctant to be promoted into the limelight and that this is doing the economic program of the USSR grave harm.

It would be natural for you to say that this is nobody's business but Soviet Russia's; such an attitude has been held by many great rulers throughout history. But you are too wise, I am sure, to hold this view. The Soviets are not only a country but an idea, and it is

certainly your ultimate hope that it will spread throughout the entire world. You yourself in your recent letter to a youthful comrade accused of Trotskyism called upon the proletariat of the world to stand by Soviet Russia in case of an attack from the league of fascist powers. You have, moreover, in recent years, sought energetically to make alliances with other countries, whatever their form of government, that might stand with you against the threatened attack. That the public opinion of these other countries is important you have recognized by agreements to refrain from propaganda among their nationals. The proposal a few days ago for a worldwide anti-Fascist conference is only the latest of a long series of developments recognizing the fact that the Soviet Union cannot exist in a sealed vacuum any more than can any other power.

You are no doubt already aware that the series of trials of traitors, spies and saboteurs has had a bad effect upon world public opinion. I question, however, whether you realize just how bad this effect has been. It is in one sense a real tragedy for the world that you, with your remarkable abilities and intelligence, should never have traveled outside the borders of the USSR, and should not be conversant with languages other than your own. If like Lenin you had remained long abroad, in several lands, you might appreciate more keenly the fact that people do live, even in the capitalist countries, by ideas as well as by bread.

In briefest summary, the series of trials in the Soviet Union has had unhappy repercussions in many parts of the world. They have made Germany, Japan and Italy more aggressive. It is not at all impossible that they may, through Japan's grossly overestimating the internal difficulties of the USSR, have helped create the decision for Japan to attack China in 1937 rather than at a later time. They did great harm to the People's Front in France, which for this and other reasons was momentarily impotent at a major turning point in European history, when Hitler went into Austria. They have helped to alienate important and hitherto friendly sections of opinion in the United States, including the President. Perhaps most serious of all, they upheld the hands of the anti-Soviet faction in the British government. In all human probability, they strongly influenced Chamberlain in his move toward rapprochement with Germany and Italy, which in turn gave Hitler his chance to seize Austria, gave Hitler and Mussolini their chance to make a last desperate assault on the Loyalist government of Spain. At a critical moment in the history of modern Europe, it was said throughout the world and believed by many that Soviet Russia had turned to a bloody-handed dictatorship, that a great part of her population was in a

state of potential revolt, that Russia no longer counted and that a new orientation of the powers must be found from which she should be excluded. These statements may all have been false, but a false statement on which people act may be as disastrous as a true one.

What I now urge upon you is a revision of your policy to take account of world opinion. Much has already been lost, but not everything. There may still be time to convince the world not only that Soviet Russia is strong, but that her strength can be counted with the democracies against the tyrannies.

I suggest, first, that in future treason trials, a procedure should be followed more compatible with that of the countries under the Anglo-Saxon or the Roman law tradition. Soviet court procedure in most types of trials is admirable; it is only in these treason cases that the actual trial takes place in the form of long preliminary hearings at which confessions are made under conditions never revealed to the public. It may be unjust of the Americans, for example, to suspect that torture is used in these cases; but in the United States there is a nationwide and long continued tradition of police brutality, of extorting confessions by torture in every sort of case from petty larceny to murder. It is inevitable that this country should look with suspicion upon confessions obtained in secret hearings, however plausible these confessions may be on their face.

My second point is one that will be particularly hard for you to understand, yet it is of high importance. I suggest that in the future you shall not merely present to the world testimony which many people in all countries find incredible, without some attempt to make its credibility apparent. I do not mean by this that it is enough for such testimony to be accepted by your own zealous followers, but that it shall be reasonable and plausible to the great mass of the people who constitute the foundation of that curious phenomenon called public opinion. Repeated experience has proved that, for the reasons given above, it is not enough simply to publish the verbatim text of the open court proceedings: so much of the most important aspect of every trial has been that part conducted in preliminary secret investigation. I suggest that on matters regarding which almost the whole world is skeptical, you should publish every scrap of documentary evidence that is available, including transcripts of all preliminary interrogations. After all, we must not forget that the chief purpose of the public trials is to convince the citizens of the Soviet Union and of other countries that the decisions already made were just and deserved. If these proceedings are not convincing, there is no point in holding them.

My third suggestion arises partly from personal prejudice, partly from recognition that many other persons share my view. It is that you shall abolish the death sentence for these and all other crimes. Your own experience amply proves that it is not a deterrent. It is

not needed for the safety of the state: Soviet Russia's prisons and concentration camps are safe enough. The recurring line in news dispatches from Moscow, "The prisoners were all shot," has done inestimable harm to the reputation of the USSR. They shoot people freely in Germany and Italy, too. For you to abolish the death penalty would do more than any other single thing you could do to prove that the dictatorship of the proletariat is not on all fours with the dictatorships of the fascists.

My fourth and final suggestion will be still harder for you to accept. I propose that in view of the great emergency that now exists you should make an important change in the internal organization of the USSR. My recommendation is that you offer an amnesty to all opponents who have not yet been guilty of any crime under the normal civil code, on a pledge on their part of future good behavior. I suggest further that these elements be organized into a formal and legal Opposition. It is important to remember that most of these opponents, in so far as they can be judged by their own statements, disagree with you only about means, and not ends. While they have repudiated some present policies, very few of them have repudiated Marx and Lenin. By creating a legal Opposition, which would be permitted to participate in parliamentary debate, you would canalize all that disagreement which now finds expression in traitorous acts and comes to an end, in many cases, before the firing squad. I need not underline the difference that would be made in foreign opinion. I need not underline, either, the fact no loyal friend of the Soviet Union could believe that such a development would do harm to the future of the USSR.

There is one other thing you might do. I will not add it formally to the list above, because I realize there is probably no chance of its being accepted, and I do not propose to make my suggestions mere breath in the wind. Many men throughout the world say there is incongruity in your appeal against the dictators because you are yourself a dictator. You could answer them once and finally by withdrawing from the public life of your country for a stipulated length of time, perhaps a year or eighteen months. You would, naturally, first obtain guarantees from your colleagues that during this period no one of them would seek an abnormal degree of influence at the expense of the others. Upon your return I assume you would resume your present degree of importance in Soviet affairs. I am profoundly convinced that nothing you could do for the USSR by remaining in office for that length of time could be as great a service as the demonstration that among 190,000,000 comrades no one is indispensable, that those foreign critics who lump together "Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini" have been and are altogether wrong.

BRUCE BLIVEN

Fiat Justitia, Ruat Coelum

IT WILL BE five years next June 22 since Judge James E. Horton set aside the jury sentence of Haywood Patterson in the Scottsboro case and granted a new trial on grounds that the conviction was not justified by the evidence. Judge Horton paid with his political life and it is not even certain that his soul is marching on in Alabama, but what he did is worth remembering and mentioning every now and then. His act defied an inflamed local feeling, exposed him to all manner of insinuation and abuse, and resulted in his defeat for reelection to the circuit bench the following year. If it endeared him to the social-minded and to liberals throughout the world, there was no great solace for him in that, because he is not very notably social-minded and is a liberal only in the sense of putting the rules of the game above the desire to win.

Judge Horton set aside the jury conviction of Patterson solely because he thought the evidence failed to warrant it. Before the trial opened, he has let it be known, he was inclined to a belief that the Negroes were probably guilty of raping Victoria Price and Ruby Bates, the two white girls, as charged. He instructed his court reporter to be exceptionally careful, in view of this, because in the likely event of another finding of guilt and another death sentence he did not wish any errors to appear in the record. It was only after the evidence had been spread before him that he was convinced of its inadequacy, and when he rejected the guilty verdict he acted not as a friend of the Negro race or the working class but merely as a lover of justice. "*Fiat justitia, ruat coelum*" was a bit of Latin he had learned long before he began the practice of law. He had learned it in childhood and it had become the emotion of his life. "Let justice be done though the heavens fall"—he had no moment of hesitation in doing justice to Haywood Patterson and he was wholly prepared for the inevitable fall of heavens. "Social order is based on law," he declared in an opinion whose style is as precious as a piece of antique furniture, "and its perpetuity depends on its fair and impartial administration. Deliberate injustice is more fatal to the one who imposes it than to the one on whom it is imposed. . . . The Court will decide this motion upon the sole consideration of what is its duty under the law. . . . It has endeavored with diligence to enlighten itself with the wisdom declared in the cases adjudged by the most pure and enlightened judges who have ornamented the courts of its own state, as well as the distinguished jurists of this country and its Mother England. It has been unstinted in the study of the facts presented in the case at bar."

If the facts had not been deemed unprintable, if they and Judge Horton's analysis of them had been of a nature permitting them to be carried in full in the newspapers of Alabama and elsewhere, it is certain that

only those who were willing to have what Judge Horton called "deliberate injustice" done could have wished thereafter for a conviction of the Scottsboro defendants.

He does not look upon himself today as a martyr, and, in fact, he isn't one. He is a happy and successful man, secure in his conscience and pursuing his hobby—which is farming. On his farm near Greenbrier (he and Mrs. Horton have owned farm lands for many years) he grew 431 bales of cotton last year on 443 acres, which is quite a record for Alabama, and in addition 10,000 bushels of corn and 200 tons of hay. It is not in the history books what Cincinnatus managed to produce when he returned to the plough he left to save Rome, but he could hardly have done much better than Judge Horton. Occasionally, because of what his wife modestly calls his "reputation for fairness," he is called upon by neighbors in Athens or nearby to arbitrate disputes which they wish to settle out of court. He is retained also as a consulting attorney for the Tennessee Valley Authority and gives several days a week to this work.

Judge Horton takes life as he finds it and does his part as he sees it. He is a cheerful man, and a philosopher. His philosophy isn't very complicated and it works for him beautifully. He believes in justice. And he believes, too, that a man who is descended as he is from General Daniel S. Donelson, of Tennessee, and who has sons of his own through whom he will become an ancestor himself, owes it to both the past and the future to serve God and his conscience. If he has social-mindedness, it is vertical rather than horizontal, running up and down the genealogical tree rather than around the contemporary lot.

JOHN TEMPLE GRAVES II

Lines Written in Time of Peace

What shall we do with country quiet now?
A motor drones insanely in the blue
Like a bad bird in a dream.
Fear nothing. Hush.
The giant plane roars
Gently as a carrier-pigeon, soon
Drowned in the distance.
What shall we do?
Before the shadows have engrossed the grass
There is a patch of sun to lie upon—
The pale warm thing that summer sheds
When she's ready to be gone.
The peaceful fragrance has not passed
From the fleece that she has worn.
Fear nothing. Hush.
The full bough, the bush, the dreaming vine
Vie with lush greens. To what should sleepy grief
Open its eyes again?
One leaf, blood-bright, stains silence
Like a cry.

BABETTE DEUTSCH

Shoot the Works

How Not to Get Tough About It

IF YOU WERE INTERESTED in promoting fascism in the United States what would you do? It seems to me that you would operate along lines quite similar to those which are being followed by a number of publicists who have taken many opportunities to express their hatred of Hitler. And I haven't the slightest doubt of their sincerity. There may be a handful of persons who are actually paid agents of the Fascist International, but the publicity that they put out is probably neither very important nor very effective. The stuff that promotes the growth of Nazism comes chiefly from naïve men and women of excellent intent.

The mind of the Führer himself may be far from subtle, but among his associates are those who know a trick or two. And any clever propagandist knows that the most effective work for his cause can be done by persons wholly dissociated from the movement in which he is interested. Straight-out eulogies or even mild defenses of the Nazi regime are likely to fall on stony ground as far as the American public is concerned. But Hitler gets a happy break whenever anybody begins to wave his arms around in Red-baiting enterprises.

The success of Adolf in his home land and surrounding territory was built upon his ability to throw the middle classes into a panic about the imminence of a Communist revolution. His sales talk roughly ran: "Whether you like me or not, remember I am your only hope against the onrush of the Soviets." Even his anti-Semitism was a by-product rather than an original impulse. The Jews of Germany became the whipping-boys in the Nazi publicity campaign. Every Jew was either a Red agitator or a dirty grasping capitalist. And so Adolf, with considerable shrewdness, won the middle classes by telling them that they were the unfortunate Pierres who stood in the middle threatened equally by the forces of revolution and reaction.

The suggestion has been made that the Communists of Germany were ill advised in their tactics. Some say that if they had all burrowed underground or come out strongly for the preservation of a democracy founded on the hopes and aspirations of the middle class the onset of Hitler might have been avoided. And in America today there are writers, of a sort, who take the attitude that every Jew should immediately join the Republican Party and the Methodist Church in order to check the tide of anti-Semitism. That seems to me to be too large an order. I don't like the Republican Party.

And as a matter of fact any political, religious or economic group which begins to backwater will not find that the hurricane will temper its force perceptibly in the case of those who retreat. On the contrary, acts of both God and man become more punishing toward those who seem to give way before the blast. The entrepreneurs of such activities are likely to say: "Why look, we've got them on the run. Now is the time to give them both barrels."

It can hardly be denied that the American Communist

Party has been conciliatory in its protestations of its present devotion to democracy. The word "revolution" is seldom employed by any of the orators of the party, and Earl Browder at times has sounded like a slightly conservative cousin of Senator Norris. And the only living lion among the Liberals is not such a bad model at that. Indeed, Norman Thomas has boasted at times that his own particular wing of the Socialists is far more Marxian and radical than the Communists. Personally I take most of the Thomas proclamations with three and one-half tablespoonfuls of salt, since he seems to me strictly a gymnasium fighter. But skip that.

The fact is that the Communists in America have certainly put the "revolution" into the "when and if" category. I see no reason to question their oft repeated statements that they are not speaking of here and now. This policy of working for a united front along the lines of compromise upon problems of immediate necessity has not been wholly successful. The Red-baiters are in more furious full cry right now than ever before. Liberals and progressives have joined the pack. And in doing this, whether they realize it or not, they are most distinctly playing the game of Hitler. If sufficient fear can be aroused among American middle classes there is a golden opportunity for the Fascist demagogue to step in and say, "I'm the boy you need."

And he will not quote Hitler. If he has any sense at all he will and can make quite a convincing dossier for himself out of the words and phrases of Americans who have been known as liberal or progressive. For instance it is a growing practice for the "liberal" speaker to begin his after-dinner address or radio oration by saying: "Now at the outset I want it understood that I am opposed to dictatorship of either the right or the left."

I assume that the man who says this feels that he is doing a distinct service to democracy by pointing out that he is neither Communist nor Fascist in his point of view. But it doesn't work out that way. The question of a left-wing dictatorship in the United States may properly be a question of philosophic discussion. But it is wholly academic. I am certainly convinced that not even the most ardent or doctrinaire Communist thinks of a Soviet America as being a possibility within the reach of the living eye. Or at the very most the question could become pertinent only through very severe economic upheavals. Communist support, aside from the strict party vote, went to Roosevelt in the last national election and not to Landon. To me that seemed a palpable proof of the actuality of the left-wing effort to make a united front with democratic processes in the face of the immediate threat of fascism. From a doctrinaire point of view it might easily have been argued that radicalism will grow faster in the face of reactionary government than under any effort to patch up the social system with New Deal rubber bandages.

Everybody in Washington knows that all the diplomatic representatives of the Soviets lean over backwards in their effort to avoid any contact with radical movements here in America. Practically the last person who gets invited to a party at the embassy is a local leader of the Communist Party.

Of course this could have been done in shorter space, because what I want to say is that Communists are good

guys and Fascists are not and whenever an editor or a columnist begins to go off on a Red-baiting expedition he is most distinctly pouring both oil and water on the wheel of Adolf Hitler and the Fascist International.

HEYWOOD BROWN

Washington Notes

With Love to Adolf

LAST WEEK the administration visibly suffered under its inability to heave a diplomatic cobblestone at Herr Hitler. The more tumultuous became his triumphs in Austria and again in Germany, the greater became the administration's impulse to show that all the world did not agree. But since Austria had been made an integral part of the German Reich, State Department experts appeared stumped in their search for a way of expressing disapprobation. The procedure that sufficed for Manchuria and Ethiopia would not do. It was suggested that the State Department could address future communications to Hitler as "the chancellor of Germany, all except what used to be Austria," but somehow this seemed inadequate. In the case of many officials, their anger at Hitler was heightened by their affection for Mr. E. L. G. Prochnik, the Austrian Minister, whose wife is American and who has spent most of his adult life in this country. In 1917, Mr. Prochnik, then a consul, helped wind up the affairs of the old Austro-Hungarian empire in America; last week he laid to rest the Austrian republic.

The administration's current European policy is a tenuous affair, but one definite factor in it is the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Comintern pact. The United States, according to officials, finds itself in opposition to Japan's actions in China, and is obliged to take into account that Japan—at least for the moment—is linked to Germany and Italy by an alliance the full terms of which have not been disclosed. Officials then explain that, although the State Department has a European policy, it has no tangible means of executing it. Before the Hoover moratorium, we could use the debts to us of the European governments as a diplomatic instrument. We did so to bring about the acceptance of the Dawes and Young plans. We have never been able to exercise military pressure in Europe. Perhaps the nearest we came to it was during the London naval conference of 1930, when the late Dwight W. Morrow almost succeeded in talking Mr. Hoover—by cable—into a consultative pact with England and France.

Even if it were conceivable that we might once more join in a European war after it had broken out, the possibility gives us no present diplomatic leverage. We are limited solely to moral pressure. The timing and content of speeches by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull are as carefully planned as the movements of troops and warships by other powers. Officials say proudly there have been a number of occasions when declarations of faith in democracy have had a discernible effect on Europe. Last week, they say, our influence was an aid to the Blum government in France.

An aspect of the Austrian affair, the implications of which seem so far to have escaped the press, engrossed diplomats here last week. This was the report that the first German troops sent into Austria were shot straight across the country to the Brenner Pass. Austria's frontier with Italy seems to have been seized and occupied by an extraordinarily powerful force long before a single German soldier appeared in Vienna or other Austrian cities. According to the reasoning here, there could have been three possible reasons for Germany to move a great army into Austria: to overawe the Austrians themselves, to threaten Czechoslovakia, to forestall counter-action by Italy. If the first reason were the true one, Germany would have struck for the arsenals, barracks and airdromes of the regular Austrian army. If it had been the second, it would have concentrated its troops in the north of Austria. The fact that Germany's apparent concern was to obtain the Brenner Pass necessarily means that the "Dear Mussolini" letter sent from Linz by Hitler was a fraud, and that Germany's military and diplomatic leaders were not certain up to the final moment that Italy would not mobilize for the support of Schuschnigg, as it did at the time of Dollfuss' assassination. Observers here doubt that the Rome-Berlin axis will last beyond the hour that Mussolini obtains an understanding with Mr. Neville Chamberlain.

Mr. Roosevelt's disavowal last week that he had taken sides in the Pennsylvania Democratic primary was received with skepticism by observers of labor politics. The story they tell—which cannot be confirmed—differs sharply. It has been known for twelve months or longer that Mr. Tom Kennedy of the United Mine Workers and the present Lieutenant-Governor of Pennsylvania would be a candidate for the governorship. With the governorship would go control of the Democratic state organization and the naming of Pennsylvania's seventy-five delegates to the 1940 Democratic national convention. It is the latter function of the governorship that is said to have disturbed Mr. Roosevelt. Whether or not he wishes a third term, he is represented as being determined to name the Democratic presidential candidate. The prospect that the Pennsylvania delegation would be controlled by Mr. Kennedy and Mr. John L. Lewis is said to have caused him sudden misgivings. Mr. David Lawrence, the Pennsylvania Democratic chairman, is supposed to have been instructed to find a rival candidate for Governor. He obediently trotted out the relatively unknown Mr. Charles A. Jones, and clubbed the state officeholders into endorsing him. It must be said that it is difficult to account for Mr. Jones's candidacy except by White House pressure. If Mr. Kennedy had been given the nomination without a contest, a united Democratic Party would have been certain of a relatively easy victory in next fall's elections, even against so celebrated a Republican candidate as Mr. Gifford Pinchot. Politicians do not risk disrupting their party organizations without strong reasons.

If Mr. Roosevelt is in fact responsible for the Jones candidacy, it is by no means sure his venture will be successful. Senator Guffey, after an obvious struggle between his very genuine loyalty both to Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Lewis, is now in Mr. Kennedy's camp. So is Mr. J. David Stern, publisher of The Philadelphia Record and a New

Deal leader. The Pennsylvania WPA, which has the characteristics of an autonomous political machine, seems safely behind Mr. Kennedy. Labor's Non-Partisan League, already strong in the western half of the state, is organizing Philadelphia ward by ward. Among ranking Pennsylvania New Dealers, only Governor George H. Earle, the bond slave of the White House and Mr. Lawrence, opposes Mr. Kennedy. The Kennedy backers predict that Attorney-General Margiotti, independent candidate for Governor, will get more votes than Mr. Jones, and that Mr. Kennedy will beat them both.

In case you have wondered, the climate is not changing. You may take the word of the U. S. Weather Bureau for it. The Bureau agrees that we have been having a spell of unusual weather since 1930, with winters warmer and drier, and severe droughts in 1934 and 1936. The compiled record of the January just past shows temperatures over the country from two to six degrees above average, and there is now a threat of another drought in the Northwest. But, bless you, there is nothing remarkable about this. We had a similar period from 1886 to 1895, complete with fierce dust storms arising from the Kansas dust bowl. And still another warm, dry period in the 1830's, just a century ago. Probably the present spell will last until about 1940, after which it will be colder and wetter, and the Northwest will turn Republican again. The Weather Bureau isn't convinced that the eleven-year cycle of sun-spots has anything to do with the climate. It wishes it were convinced, for forecasting would then be much simpler. The Bureau's records indicate that the climate does move in cycles, but the cycles are unconscionably irregular, ranging from twenty-five to forty years.

Washington

T. R. B.

Other People's Money

What Is the Stock Exchange For?

IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT to exaggerate the gravity of the blow that has descended upon the head of the poor old Stock Exchange. Richard Whitney, its president and spokesman during the most critical period of its history, brought more grief to it as its spokesman because of his utter inability to understand the public, whose opinion had suddenly become important. And now, by reason of his personal disaster, he has almost completed the work of destruction that his inept advocacy brought upon the Exchange.

The Exchange was frightened in 1932. It was again profoundly frightened in 1934. But these men are gamblers. They have an unshakable faith in the permanence of human greed and human credulity. They invariably came out of their terrors feeling that things have always been thus and always will be and the good old earthy Earth will presently get back to its dollar-chasing and its wagering and we shall be on top again.

The failure of the market to revive, the enervation with

which it has been stricken despite the kindly doctoring of the good Dr. Jim Landis and finally the rise of William O. Douglas to power in the SEC, plus the unannounced and unwanted return to the depression—these things have filled the members with the darkest forebodings. Even before Whitney's fall, seats on the Exchange had sunk to their lowest point for the whole depression. The membership was in a hot dither of argument about reform. It was planning to propose a paid executive whose high character would be a guarantee of honest administration. It was looking over the latest styles in sackcloth. There were some gentlemen down there who had begun to ask if after all there might not be a God and maybe he really meant what he told Moses about the Ten Commandments and that maybe there is a devil and a place called hell. Into this disturbed and gloomy world, then, two weeks ago the Whitney edifice, reeking with the odor of sanctity and respectability, came tumbling. The mood of repentance and reformation grew suddenly frantic. The responsible leaders fell upon their knees to the SEC and begged for mercy and existence. They ask now only for the chance to be good. The question is, will they be good?

It is my own view, held for some years, that the Stock Exchange which now exists, the Stock Exchange we now know, will never be good and this for the excellent reason that the price of being good is extinction.

There is a place in New York and America for a stock exchange—a market place, an honest market place where men who wish to buy and sell securities may meet and exchange their merchandise. But this is not what we have. What we have is a great gambling casino. One of the most depressing phenomena I know of in the whole field of pragmatic rationalization is the collection of apologies that have been invented for all the rackets on the Exchange which have been fabricated for it by third and fourth-rate college professors at so much per fabrication.

The commission brokerage business is good only as an essential device for bringing the suckers into the market. It is the suckers, chiefly, who pay the winnings of the broker-gambler members.

I do not draw back in moral horror from gambling. I do not see anything morally wrong in gambling. I merely say that as a practical proposition a professional gambling game which uses great essential industries of this country as the chips in the game is a foolish practice for an intelligent people to permit. I do not believe you can prevent men from gambling. I do not think you can prevent them from gambling in the ownership of industry. What I think you can do is to quit organizing industry, shaping the technique of ownership, mobilizing the banks, disposing of the savings funds of the people to make this easy and then creating a gigantic gambling casino equipped with every kind of mechanism and facility to make security gambling easy and swift. If a man wants to risk his money in a security gamble that is his own privilege. If he wants to buy or sell a security, he ought to be able to go to a broker who is not himself a gambler and he ought to know there is a mart where the orders can be filled which is not run by a bunch of gamblers who are chiefly interested in the inside arrangements they can make in their own interest.

For while I do not object to gambling, I abhor professional gamblers. As a matter of fact, most of them are not

gamblers at all. They are professional experts who flourish on their ability to rig the game, to operate in comparative security, taking their profits out of the real gamblers, the foolish public which thinks it can win from the insiders.

It would be very unfair to say that all the men on the Exchange are gamblers or that they are socially blind citizens. There are some excellent men, honest brokers, who operate their affairs in accordance with sound business. But they are in the minority. The Exchange has always been controlled by the gambler element and that is why it has been impossible to reform it. It is still controlled by that element. When any other element gets control and reforms the Exchange, there will be no need for so many brokers—less than half the number will be able to do the business of the country.

There is a reform movement under way now. It may make some successes. The most it can accomplish is to make the Exchange an honest crap game. I do not think we need an exchange for crap-shooting. We need a market place where men and women who wish to invest their money in the industries of the country can do so without having to shoulder their way in among a horde of crap-shooters and card sharks, can do so with their own money and will be represented by men who can be trusted because they are agents, bound by all the well established rules which everywhere else govern the conduct of trustees.

JOHN T. FLYNN

His Art in Life

My Life in Art, by Constantin Stanislavsky. Translated by J. J. Robbins. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 586 pages. \$4.

ALL OVER THE COUNTRY there are scattered dramatic schools, Little Theatres, summer theatres and stock companies; and in scarcely a one of them is there not somebody who will tell you he uses the Stanislavsky method.

Stanislavsky himself has spoken and written and taught endlessly on the subject, of his researches, experiments and lifelong devotion. He begins with the assertion that in certain parts of the system, like the physiological and psychological, there exist "laws for all, forever, and in all creative processes." They are indubitable, completely conscious, tried by science, and found true and binding on all. These conscious laws exist for the purpose of awaking another and higher superconscious region of creativeness, which is outside our comprehension; we are "helpless in our consciousness when we attain it." It is ruled by inspiration; is the miracle which no true art can be without, and is served by the actor's conscious technique, which, in turn, is what Stanislavsky has tried to establish. The superconscious through the conscious! To arrive at such an end he devised a course of study that was to "give practical and conscious methods for the awakening of superconscious creativeness"; and taught and prescribed all sorts of exercises "for the creation of creative feeling, for the analysis of the role, and the construction of the willed orchestration of the role on the bases of consistency and the logic of emotion."

I have no statistics on the matter, of course, but so far as I know there is not a soul from among all our Little Theatres, summer theatres, and so on, who has practised

Stanislavsky's method. There must have been hours of devoted talk about it, of discipleship too, and, at the worst, of that particular kind of philosophic art argument that is characteristic of small talents especially. But I doubt if there is anybody who has worked hours every day with these exercises, as singers, musicians, dancers or acrobats work to develop and keep a technique going. And if my doubts on this subject are not enough, so that some actor-spirituality, who may or may not have even leg muscles, protests my skepticism, I may say that the master himself has put it more broadly. These "continuous exercises," he states, were at his First Studio conspicuous by their absence, and have never been performed even up to the present day, either by the actors or the pupils. For this reason, he maintains, his system has not shown any of its real results. Many learned to concentrate, but that merely caused them to make all their old mistakes, and made the mistakes only more prominent by perfecting them. The actor feels himself, however, in comfort on the stage in that way; he accepts "this customary incorrectness" of theatrical mood "for the natural living over of the part"; is convinced that he has understood the system and has been greatly helped by it, and is deeply grateful.

With such a permeation of our American theatre mind, especially among liberal or idealistic workers, by this Stanislavsky influence, it is more and more necessary to shake the matter down a bit and try to discover something at least of what good it has done, or can do, and what harm. Most of this Stanislavsky volume just published is already familiar to many readers, but its appearance constitutes just one more inroad, or illumination if you prefer, of that strong and persistent influence, and a fresh occasion for looking into its relation to us.

The subject is baffling but unavoidable. Right now for our theatrical attitude and direction it is dangerously important. A man who preaches, argues and persists, who has a strong, ambitious egotism and a good deal of pose, conscious and unconscious; who has a remarkable gift for teaching, in the form of fables especially; and who through a long life has been restless, achieving, unfulfilled, idealistic and personal! He is by now a record, a veritable mine of theatre history in many of its departments. He has a gift for saying pregnant things, as a rule on the side of the emotional or inspirational: when, for example, he speaks of needing not a new art, that well worn cliché—almost a wheeze—but "a new quest for Art," he expresses an ever recurring truth in all arts. And unquestionably he is stimulating for a great many temperaments. Sometimes he is stimulating mentally, by opening up new fields, theories, propositions; but much more often it is in the realm of feeling, purpose, aspiration.

On the other hand I am convinced that in many cases the Stanislavsky business has done harm. It gets us nowhere to say that if his exercises and course of study had really been followed, and so on. They have not, and we have just seen not only what he has to say about this, but also how irrefutably he states that his system has not yet had any of its real results because it has never been carried out. And I seriously mistrust the influence of his tendency to rely on "true," "inner," "sincere" and similar terms, page after page. Many of his esthetic declarations are true only because the thing he wishes to attack

is handicapped at the start by his description of it—for example, to say that “the noble flights of the human spirit have nothing in common with the exaggerated declamations of stentorian voices, with highfaluting theatrical style, etc.,” is of course true but is really not saying anything at all, a mere obvious banality; it comments on no style or method but merely on bad style or method. “Those who loved false pathos, which they claimed was necessary for tragedy”—but nobody ever made such a claim, not the “false” part of it. Even about “The Sea Gull,” a play he once produced, a part of what he says is helpful, a part mere solemn, pretentious cliché, and a part not even factually exact.

And finally, this time in reading Stanislavsky I was struck more than ever with a sense that many of his most effective, or popular, explanations of some artistic creation or experience were by a man essentially not on the inside. Their entertaining matter has the advantage of an appeal to outsiders that comes from a mind learned, sophisticated,

familiar with the subject, but not fundamentally that of an artist. Not the artist but the midway interpreter and translator is the man to supply the successful literary version of such things. There are plenty of items in this book that come from a man of many admirable qualities and wide experience. But in the whole volume there is not one remark that gave me any sense of the creative surprise, the authentic right, the illumination, that comes from a man inside an art. The numerous photographs of Stanislavsky that adorn the book, in private life and in divers roles, may have other fine traits, but none of them looks like a man of any profound talent. I am only one among many who found him, as compared to several others in the company, not an important actor at all but more like a teacher or illustrator of what would be done in acting the role. His assumption, however, that he is an artist is the starting point for the vast amount of example and counsel that his book offers us.

STARK YOUNG

THE MODE IN THE NEW GERMANY

by Groth



The Bandwagon

Anton Reinthaler, Agriculture Minister in Austria's new Nazi Cabinet, told farmers henceforth they would be expected to provide food for the entire German nation "in good times and bad times." Price fluctuations, he said, will not be tolerated.—*Vienna dispatch to The New York Daily News.*

In the present age of automobile traveling . . . nearly everybody but the heads of big business and property owners can get away for the winter.—*Dr. Logan Clendening, writing in The Berkeley, Calif., Gazette.*

Fascist Italy, militantly alert to the faintest suggestion of communism, has banned exhibition of "The Bride Wore Red."—*From a news item in The Knoxville, Tenn., News Sentinel.*

Tales of the Vienna Woods

Sentimental is the word for Austria. So it remains a refuge for romance in our prosaic age. Go native in Alpine Tyrol, in quaint Vorarlberg, by the laughing lakes of the Salzkammergut.—*From an advertisement in The Atlantic Monthly.*

Driving the Bankers into the Temple

The American public will be asking the question: "Why should Pope Pius XI honor Mr. Morgan, the head of the world-renowned bankers of New York?" My answer is that the Holy Father, from his position as head of the Catholic Church throughout the world, has been able to see more clearly and farther than the ordinary American citizen.—*Msgr. Joseph F. Smith, Pastor of St. John's Cathedral, quoted in The Cleveland Plain Dealer.*

Would That Be Grace Moore?

Science may soon provide birth control and immunity from disease virtually for a song, according to latest developments in the use of "supersonic waves," very shrill musical vibrations.—*From an article by the Science Editor of International News Service, published in The New York Evening Journal.*

No, No, It's Your Turn

Imagine reducing the world of Robert Taylor to "a job and some alfalfa."—*Frank Aston, writing in The New York World-Telegram.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column and \$1 will be paid for each item used. Address The Bandwagon, care of The New Republic.—THE EDITORS

Correspondence

Shall We Tax Matrimony?

SIR: I have long been interested in public finance both on the theoretical and the practical side, and in the last year or two I have had the occasion to equip myself with a general working knowledge of the tax system of the United States. I have, accordingly, read Mr. Groves's articles, "What to Do about Taxes" [The New Republic, December 29, January 5 and 19], with great interest. I have neither the wish nor the qualifications to offer any detailed criticisms of Mr. Groves's proposals, most of which relate to problems peculiar to the American scene. There is, however, one proposal that raises a quite general principle, namely the proposal to abandon separate returns for husband and wife and assess family income as the measure of ability to pay—which seems, if I may be allowed to say so, a retrogressive step.

Of course, that is the principle in operation here; but that is historically a relic from the time when the income of the wife in law *was* the income of the husband—a relic that survives because it would cost the Exchequer too much to abolish the anomaly (which is in fact a tax on marriage) and because such abolition would have no political value from a vote-catching point of view. That is to say, the continuance of the practice of taxing husband and wife together is defended, so far as it is defended at all, on grounds of expediency rather than of principle. Mr. Groves, however, apparently considers it to be justifiable from the viewpoint of taxable capacity. A and B (of the same or of opposite sexes) live together (in the non-technical sense) to save expense: the tax collector is not interested. A and B (of opposite sexes) live together (in the technical sense) without benefit of clergy: the tax collector is still not interested.

A and B marry and live together: the tax collector comes for his rake-off. Why? In my humble submission, "*ex nihilo, nihil fit.*"

A. W. ACWORTH

London, Eng.

The Hundred Best Books

SIR: Speaking of your list "Hundred Notable Books" in The New Republic of January 5, I notice that you list "The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center" but you do *not* list "The Case of Leon Trotsky," Report of Hearings on the Charges Made Against Him in the Moscow Trials (Harpers). Why one and not the other? Your own reviewer declared the latter book, particularly the closing speech of Mr. Trotsky, to be a complete and dramatic reply to the charges contained in the book you listed.

P. KLUGER

New York City.

SIR: About this controversy over the 100 Best Books of the Year—Mr. Johns and Mr. Ludwig have every right to pull their own oars; but we can agree that their books belong on no list of best books whatsoever. They are interesting books, with little tinge of real importance or greatness.

But why did you omit Tarlé's "Napoleon"—the first scientific revaluation of Bonaparte in nearly a century? It is everywhere admitted that this is an important and permanent addition to the history of the French nation—a book of *really* "best" quality.

New York City

GROFF CONKLIN

For Bard College

SIR: Bard College at Annandale-on-Hudson, is in urgent need of funds to carry on its unique liberal-arts program for 1938-39. Those who appreciate the value of educational pioneering must make every effort to support Bard College in this crisis. We realize that its contribution is important as a demonstration that the college student can develop self-direction, social responsibility and critical thinking. Bard's fundamental point of view and its technique aim toward individual growth based on individual capacities and interests without the traditional pattern of unrelated courses prescribed for mass education. Closer relationship with the faculty is effected through personal conferences, and opportunity to keep in touch with the realistic activities of the outer world is offered during a six-week period of self-directed experiences.

Can we afford to ignore the appeal for \$50,000—a relatively small sum which will enable Bard College to fulfill its significant role in the educational scheme? We who are deeply concerned with the education of our youth should accept the responsibility and privilege of providing the necessary funds. Make checks payable to the Bard Emergency Fund, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson.

New York City

ESTHER GRAY

So It Is

SIR: Although I haven't the complete Auden texts by me, I am certain that the actual phrase which Miss Borgenicht attempts to quote in her review of "Starting Point" [The New Republic, March 9] is "the intolerable *neural* itch," not "the intolerable neutral itch."

New York City.

LOUISE BOGAN

Mr. Borsodi's New Housing Project

SIR: Public interest has been focused on governmental housing through the FHA, the PWA and the Wagner acts with their subsidies and indirect taxation, but small attention has been given to the ideas behind the steadily growing independent housing project at Suffern, New York. Here Ralph Borsodi, economist, housing expert and author, has broken professional custom by not only preaching what private enterprise should do, but himself showing how to do it. He has built a privately financed, non-profit residence community without a penny of taxes or an inch of federal red tape.

Borsodi believes in the small estate on productive land, close enough to the metropolis for the wage-earner to commute to work, far enough away so that his land will give him the uses and pride of ownership. In such a creative home, gardening, canning and poultry raise the family's annual income and standard of living, give the salary and wage-earner more freedom to accept or reject employer's terms through reducing his dependence on cash, and render the housewife using modern equipment a productive partner of her husband rather than an apartment-house clerk.

Ten individually designed homes, each with about two acres of land, have been occupied for a year or longer. A bank accountant, a research psychologist and a landscape architect are among the residents. With four more homes now building, the pioneer development has closed, but another, with sixty-six home sites, has sprung up spontaneously nearby in West Nyack. A thrifty, carefully scheduled system of all-weather building replaces the seasonal haste of speculative contractors. Fourteen men have been employed uninterruptedly over two years on an economy-sharing plan. Their annual wages are higher than local earnings for either union or non-union labor. Two workmen are building their own homes, soon to be rent-free for the first time in their lives; four more are making plans. Construction

costs are 15 percent under the market level. Profit has been eliminated from land purchases, financing and building; yet each family is wholly independent, the only coöperative feature being land tenure. Non-philanthropic, the community is rooted solidly in local finance. It is self-liquidating, and will soon be self-administering. Multiply Suffern all over America, and good housing and steady employment become realities.

Suffern, N. Y.

GEORGE WELLER.

To Help Spain's Children

SIR: Thousands of Spanish children are concentrated in the refugee depots of Valencia, Barcelona and other Spanish towns whose civilian character makes them military objectives of the Fascist invaders. These children can be removed from unceasing bombardment directed against them only by the support of Spain's democratic friends, enabling the maintenance and expansion of the children's colonies. These centers are located high in the hills, as far as possible from the ill defined theatre of war.

To these colonies are sent the homeless, orphaned children who have trudged weary terror-ridden miles to reach the depot. In the colonies Marie, José and Pedro enjoy the companionship of other youngsters, the love and supervision necessary for their emergence from this conflict unwarped by terror and horror.

Twenty-five cents a day ensures the maintenance of the child! A group of twenty-five people paying a cent a day, five paying a nickel apiece, or one paying a quarter will guarantee a Spanish child a reasonably normal life, a sight of sun, moon and stars, and lighten the tragedy before his eyes. A pledge by a group or individual to support the child for a year enables the foster parent to select his child from the files of the Foster Parent Plan for Children in Spain. Letters are exchanged between parent and child, and administrative bulletins from the Plan's Spanish agents are issued from time to time.

The Foster Parent Plan, organized in England by John Langdon-Davies, has met widespread support there. It is sponsored in America by Dorothy Parker, Ernest Meyer, Frances Farmer, Harold Lund and others who realize the great need of the Spanish children. The children of Spain must live to echo the password of the twentieth century, "*No Pasarán!*"

Inquiries and contributions may be addressed to Room 212, 381 Fourth Avenue.

New York City

ERIC O. MUGGERIDGE, Secretary,
Foster Plan for Children in Spain.

Fascism in Brazil

SIR: The interesting article on Brazil by Mr. Jerome Davis in your issue of February 9 contains some statements which are true, combined with so many distortions and omissions that the effect on the mind of the reader is likely to be misleading. . . .

Mr. Davis correctly says that "since the Brazilian monarchy was overthrown in 1899, dictator has followed dictator in establishing paper democratic forms of government." In other words, the Presidents were selected, as in many other countries, by business men, coffee growers, capitalists and politicians. What Mr. Davis fails to add is that Vargas has done more to establish schools and supply education to the masses than all his predecessors put together. And he is the only one of these President-dictators who has fostered old-age-pension laws, sick benefits, socialized medical attention, the right of collective bargaining, unemployment insurance and protection of workers against arbitrary dismissal by their employers. As a result, the coffee barons are generally against him and the plain people are generally for him. The only revolution so far attempted against his regime was sponsored by conservatives.

When the Republic of Brazil was set up in 1899, its Consti-

tution was patterned on our own. It may be argued that, for a small population mainly illiterate and untrained in self-government and scattered over an area greater than that of the United States, this was a mistake. The Republic of Chile has a Constitution which provides for no state legislatures or elected state Governors, but confers on the President the power to appoint Governors of the state or provinces. When recently the state legislatures of the twenty-one Brazilian states were abolished, and the flags of those states ceremonially burned in Rio, as mentioned by Mr. Davis, Brazil was simply adopting the Chilean system. It threw a vast number of local politicians out of their jobs, and saved a correspondingly large amount of money which the people had been forced to pay, and from which they received no benefit whatever. If a multitude of counties and county governments in this country could be abolished, it would be a blessing, but such a reform would no doubt be resisted as an attack on our democratic form of government. . . .

Winter Park, Fla.

CHARLES HYDE PRATT

SIR: Whatever Mr. Vargas has done for the schools, he has left some 80 percent of the people illiterate, and there remains no freedom to teach the truth on social issues. The social legislation mentioned is thus far largely a dead letter so far as I could discover, and I talked with a Vargas-appointed labor director. Furthermore, I was told that even these paper laws were forced on Vargas because he wanted to get the support of liberal elements following the revolt of 1932. If the reader will turn to the report of the Foreign Policy Association for March 13, 1935, on Brazil, he will find it there says the "insurgent movement enlisted the support even of the federal interventor and the whole of the state of Sao Paulo." In the face of this revolt Vargas undoubtedly made some liberal gestures! However, independent trade unions have been practically wiped out, strikes prohibited and such social measures as have been taken are not out of harmony with fascism. Much more revealing is the fact that there is complete censorship of the press; all political parties are prohibited; no meetings are allowed except by permit, and a recent decree promulgated by Vargas provides that juries which do not bring in verdicts in "accordance with the weight of evidence" can be imprisoned.

As far as the abolition of states' rights is concerned, why cite Chile? Chile still has a measure of democracy and permits even a People's Front movement, with the Communists taking part. Furthermore, Chile is only one-eleventh the size of Brazil. Brazil is as large as the United States with an additional state the size of Texas thrown in. To have an area of this size ruled by the fiat of one man may not be fascism, but it is certainly antithetical to democracy. To talk about the abolition of county governments as justification for this is ridiculous.

Chicago, Ill.

JEROME DAVIS

Why Not?

SIR: The recent issue of your paper contains a book review which some of your readers belonging to the musical fraternity consider unfair to the author. I am referring to Angna Enters' review of "World History of the Dance," by Curt Sachs [The New Republic, February 23].

It is not so much the review itself which I consider unfair, but the assignment of a work of erudition for reviewing to an artist. Let me remark again that I have no bone to pick with Miss Enters who is recognized as a fine artist in her own right; but do you think that a new work on the history of the violin should be sent to Mr. Menuhin for reviewing, or a volume dealing with the origins of Elizabethan drama assigned to Mr. Barrymore for critical appraisal? . . .

New York City

PAUL HENRY LANG

From The New Republic Mail Bag

Dr. Taraknath Das of New York City endorses a proposal, made by John T. Flynn in his March 2 column, that a peace conference be called "between Japan and Secretary Hull." Dr. Das makes the "definite suggestion that the United States Foreign Relations Committee should ask the Secretary of State to take the necessary steps for opening negotiations for an arbitration treaty, in line with the so-called 'Bryan Treaties.'" . . . Henry David Aiken of Cambridge, Massachusetts, writes that the recent reprehensible acts of the "peace-loving" powers indicate that our attitude towards the suggestion that the United States play a crusading role in world affairs should be one "of polite but unyielding skepticism." . . . Oskar Lange writes from Berkeley, California, about the courageous opposition a strong minority of Polish professors in the universities of Warsaw, Wilno, Poznan and Cracow have expressed against the introduction of ghetto benches for Jewish students in several of the Polish colleges. Their protests are reaffirmed by large numbers of students, workers and peasants, by trade unions and by the Socialist and Peasant Parties.

H. N. Harper of Victoria, British Columbia, writes that although the doctrine of collective security is "dead and buried in Europe," its supporters still believe that in the Far East it is a method to "restore order and profits to broken-down capitalism." . . . Labor's support to such pleadings should be of the variety advocated by Lenin—the hangman's rope." . . . Ben Bauman of the Teachers' Interest Committee, New York City, tells of the study of overcrowding in the high schools of that city which has been conducted by committee members of the DeWitt Clinton High School. . . . We have received a copy of an interesting new poetry magazine, Sing Democracy, the official organ of the Young Labor Poets, with offices at 2 East Twenty-third Street, New York City.

The Medical Bureau and North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, 381 Fourth Avenue, New York City, sends a most urgent appeal to New Republic readers for funds to buy ambulances. There are over one hundred ambulances now available in Paris if only the Loyalist supporters can raise the necessary money. In the meantime hundreds of Loyalist soldiers are dying for lack of immediate medical care.

What's on the Air?

President A. D. Henderson of Antioch College discusses "Why Go to College?" Saturday, March 26, 2:15 P.M., CBS.

A symposium by members of Harvard University on "The Austrian Crisis," Saturday, March 26, 3 P.M., CBS.

Representative Hamilton Fish speaks on "The South and the New Deal Cotton Policy," Wednesday, March 30, 7:30 P.M., NBC-Blue Network.

Dr. Roland Hall Sharp speaks from Mexico City on "News and Views of Mexico," Friday, April 1, 6:15 P.M., NBC-Blue Network.

Musical programs of the week include the NBC Symphony Orchestra conducted by Howard Hanson, Saturday, March 26, 10 P.M., NBC-Red Network; Gregor Piatigorsky, soloist with the Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New York, Sunday, March 27, 3 P.M., CBS; Rochester Civic Orchestra, conducted by Guy Fraser Harrison, Monday, March 28, 3 P.M., NBC-Blue Network; Philadelphia Orchestra conducted by Eugene Ormandy, Monday, March 28, 9 P.M., NBC-Blue Network; BBC Symphony Orchestra conducted by Julius Harrison, Tuesday, March 29, 3 P.M., Mutual; and the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra conducted by Fabien Sevitsky, Saturday, April 2, 9:30 P.M., Mutual.

All times given are Eastern Standard Time.

Books in Review

The Maugham Enigma

THERE IS a Somerset Maugham enigma, one that has always puzzled me. Why has he never written another book that was half so good as "Of Human Bondage"? Since 1897 he has been a professional writer, since 1907 a successful playwright, since 1916 a famous novelist. On the flyleaf of his latest book is a list of thirty-eight that preceded it—best-selling novels, short stories, travels, plays that were smash hits in London, New York, Berlin—and these are only the books he wants to remember; there are half a dozen others he is willing to forget. More than a collection of separate works, he has produced a unified body of work, an *oeuvre*, something that very few living writers have achieved in our language. Yet there has been a suspicion among critics that the *oeuvre* was artificial and the production of a second or a third-rate artist. The critics have usually been unjust to Maugham; they have neglected his great achievements as a craftsman. He has never fallen so low as Arnold Bennett at his worst or Sinclair Lewis at his third-best. Even when writing for the sort of public he despised, he was upheld by the strict morality of the prostitute who told him years ago that she was proud of always giving honest value. Still there were times when his heart wasn't in the work. Why did he write one book that was full of candor and human warmth? Why did he never climb back to the same level?

In "The Summing Up"¹ he gives a partial and indirect but still a convincing answer to these questions. Of course that wasn't his aim in writing the book. Having reached the age of sixty-three, he wanted to take an inventory—"to sort out my thoughts on the subjects that have chiefly interested me during the course of my life." He didn't propose to write an autobiography or a book of confessions—"I have no desire to lay bare my heart, and I put limits to the intimacy that I wish the reader to enter upon with me." But without being frank, in the cant use of the word, he intended to be personal and completely truthful; and the result is the most interesting book he has published for twenty years. Incidentally it tells us a great deal about the sources and the psychological effects of his one great novel.

"Of Human Bondage" was written when Maugham was forty years old; his literary apprenticeship was over. He had learned four languages and studied masterpieces in all of them; he had worked to develop a prose style; he had written several novels, most of which were pure technical exercises; he had enjoyed the rare experience of having four plays running during a single London season. But in the midst of his success as a popular playwright, he began to be obsessed—the word is his own—by the teeming memories of his past life. "It all came back to me so pressingly, in my sleep, on my walks, when I was rehearsing plays, when I was at a party, it became such a burden to me that I made up my mind that I could only regain my

peace by writing it all down in the form of a novel. I knew it would be a long one and I wanted to be undisturbed, so I refused the contracts managers were anxious to give me and temporarily retired from the stage."

Novels written after such an apprenticeship and out of such a necessity are almost certain to be good novels. But why didn't Maugham produce others of the same rank?

There are at least two answers and one of them is purely psychological. The clue to it lies in his use of the word "obsessed." Maugham was obsessed, haunted by the past—by his mother, kind and beautiful, who died when he was eight; by his lonely boyhood in the vicarage at Blackstable; by his schoolmates jeering at his stammer (which was the psychological equivalent of Philip Carey's clubfoot); by the suffering humanity he saw at St. Thomas's Hospital; and finally, I should guess, by a love affair as prolonged and unhappy as Philip Carey's love for Mildred. He was under a compulsion to tell the whole story, to perform the rite of public confession and so receive absolution. "The book," he says, "did for me what I wanted, and when it was issued to the world . . . I found myself free forever from those pains and unhappy recollections. I put into it everything I then knew and having at last finished it prepared to make a fresh start." He would never again return to the material that was closest to his heart.

But there is a second answer that lies in a field between the psychological and the social. The coldness and externality of Maugham's later novels was partly a result of his success—"the greatest danger that besets the professional author":

Success . . . often bears within itself the seed of destruction, for it may very well cut the author off from the material that was its occasion. He enters a new world. He is made much of. He must be almost superhuman if he is not captivated by the notice taken of him by the great and remains insensible to the attractions of beautiful women. He grows accustomed to another way of life. . . . How difficult it is for him then to move freely still in the circles to which he has been accustomed and which have given him his subjects! His success has changed him in the eyes of his old associates and they are no longer at home with him. They may look upon him with envy or admiration, but no longer as one of themselves. The new world into which his success has brought him excites his admiration and he writes about it, but he sees it from the outside and can never so penetrate it as to become a part of it. No better example of this can be given than Arnold Bennett. . . .

But Maugham himself is another example of the author separated by success from the circles that gave him his best subjects. They were not the upper-middle-class circles with which his later books have dealt. He was born into the upper middle class—his father was solicitor for the British Embassy in Paris—and he will die in it too, but he has never felt at home with its members. Except in a few early plays like "Jack Straw," he has always observed them as a faintly hostile stranger. His best subjects were the poor people he met when he was a down-at-the-heels medical student and a starving writer.

¹The Summing Up, by W. Somerset Maugham. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 310 pages. \$2.50.

There is a story here with which his future biographer will have to struggle. My own idea is that when Maugham left Paris at the age of ten, an orphan speaking broken English—when he was neglected by his uncle the vicar and tormented by his schoolmates because of his timidity and his stammer—he became psychologically alienated not only from church and school but from his own class in English society. A few years later, at St. Thomas's Hospital, he met the people who lived in the Lambeth slums and all hostility vanished. Philip Carey had the same experience in "Of Human Bondage"; he found that "he was less shy with these people than he had ever been with others; he felt not exactly sympathy, for sympathy suggests condescension; but he felt at home with them."

At this point the path of the hero diverged from that of the novelist. Philip Carey fell violently in love with a waitress, lost her and married a seamstress instead. After becoming a doctor he chose to practise in a poor fishing village, partly because it was his first opening but also because he liked the people and they liked him in return. Somerset Maugham, as soon as his plays made money, bought a house in Mayfair, but only because he liked the neighborhood as a symbol of success; he was irritated by the people. And that, I should guess, is the trouble with his work during the last twenty years. He has been writing stories—accurate and workmanlike and dramatic stories—about a class from which he has been spiritually alienated, and about people with whom he doesn't care to live. One reads in his character an impulse toward generosity and fellow-feeling that he hasn't given himself much chance to display. The faintly disagreeable aftertaste in his books can be defined in half a dozen words. It is the milk of human kindness, half-soured.

MALCOLM COWLEY

The Faith and Works of A. E.

A Memoir of A. E. (George William Russell), by John Eglinton. New York: The Macmillan Company. 291 pages. \$2.50.

The Living Torch, by A. E. New York: The Macmillan Company. 394 pages. \$4.

JOHN EGLINTON's is not a life of A. E., but a memoir. That means that it is not exploratory as a biography has to be, but a description made out of memories, John Eglinton's own mainly but with others joined on, and with communications from A. E. to his friends, all arranged to give an orderly account of his career and activities. John Eglinton was never a disciple of A. E.'s, but he was an associate, and he knew him in those early days when he was writing his first lyrics and steeping himself in Madame Blavatsky's Secret Doctrine. Like A. E., John Eglinton was an Ulsterman of Presbyterian upbringing living in Dublin, and their connection and divergence must have given Eglinton a good deal to think about with regard to the strange, bearded young man who was clerk in a Dublin department store and an apostle of Theosophy.

His approach to this figure is primarily through his interest in him as a believer, as one who has made a spiritual affirmation. "It is the men who have believed who are ultimately best remembered," he declares in the first sentences of his preface. "The sincere assent of any mind to a

religious interpretation of life is a memorable point in human records." And this is a good way of approaching A. E., for his poetry and his painting, his economics and his editorial work, came out of his life as a believer. His belief in the livingness, in the divinity of the earth, in men as the strayed heaven-dwellers wrestling with chaos, was not one that came to him through Theosophy, although Theosophy gave this youthful dreamer a structure for his belief ("The unnamed Diotima of the Old Philosopher's wisdom is, however, certainly the authoress of The Secret Doctrine"). How did a boy reared in the North of Ireland reach to such a belief? Apparently by a sudden conversion. "I began to be astonished with myself, for, walking along country roads, intense and passionate imaginations of another world, of an interior nature, began to overpower me."

At the beginning of A. E.'s career came his association with Yeats in the Dublin Art School. This young poet with his intellectualism, his nationalism, his artistic background, must have been a tremendous influence on the young man from the north who was entering the world of poetry, painting and speculation. All through his life A. E. was more aware of Yeats than he was aware of anybody else in the world. On his deathbed he is waiting for a letter from him. Yet A. E. and Yeats were at odds for a while. John Eglinton supposes that A. E.'s closeness to George Moore after Moore had quarreled with Yeats estranged them. But I think more went into this estrangement than A. E.'s association with George Moore. A. E., for a time anyway, believed that Yeats was becoming emptied and external-minded, reflecting writers whom he disliked, like Arthur Symonds. Then, as is bound to happen where there are two inspiring personalities, the Dublin intelligentsia fell into two congregations; those who got tired of A. E. went over to Yeats, and those who got no support from Yeats, went over to A. E., and the letter to George Moore regarding Yeats which John Eglinton publishes is by A. E., the leader of one of the congregations. But there was never a formal break between them, and Yeats and A. E. were able to collaborate in the later years.

How fortunate it was for Ireland that two such men were there to provide different foci for a country striving towards an intellectual discovery and discipline! The influence of two such men could never have been predicted; they were leaders whose thought was unassociated with the thought of the bulk of their country-people. In the Art School of a city where there was but the slightest demand for art production two students came together who were known less for their painting than for other activities. The combination that they made had more power than either could have had. Then a Theosophical lodge gave them a nucleus of a public. From poetry one went into agricultural organization and then into editorial work. But Yeats and A. E. would have been isolated figures if there had not been a popular awakening in the country. The Gaelic League under Douglas Hyde and the Agricultural Organization Society under Horace Plunkett—both Protestants—made the platform from which the two could influence public opinion.

The glow which we miss in Eglinton's memoir is evident in the eighty-page introduction which Monk Gibbon gives to his assembly of editorials and passages from editorials, "The Living Torch." It is a harvest from A. E.'s

seven-years' editorship of *The Irish Statesman*. Briefly and pointedly, as an editorial writer deals with subjects, A. E. covers the literary, philosophical, economic, artistic and personal events of the day as they reveal themselves in an Irish center. But we are reading the utterances of an editorial writer who has gone into meditation, who is aware of the fundamental unity underlying all these interests, who is able to bring wisdom and often humor into what he covers. "The Living Torch" is a most companionable book—it has the whole range of A. E.'s ideas, and it has his intonation, his very way of speaking. We are listening to a great talker as we go through these pages. Indeed the reading of "The Living Torch" is like a series of visits with A. E.: we are in his office in the Plunkett House when some public affair brings a discussion to the philosophy of politics or the spiritual significance of civics; we are in his house on a Sunday night, and with pipe between hand and mouth, he tells the company about men and women who were his friends; or, the others having gone, we stay late into the night and listen to him upon Blake, or Plotinus or Leonardo. As we listen we are informed, not merely by the words said but by the impact of a deep and integral personality. This is the book that people who did not know him will go to, to have made credible for them the legend of A. E.'s personality. PADRAIC COLUM

Funeral March

The Caissons Roll, by Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 348 pages. \$2.50.

The French War Machine, by Shelby Cullom Davis. New York: Peter Smith. 221 pages. \$2.25.

IN "THE CAISSONS ROLL" Mr. Baldwin, the military expert of *The New York Times*, presents a complete and at times terrifying picture of what is probably the most important political development of the last two years—world rearmament. In a sense his book attempts to do with the physical set-up of modern armies what Dr. Alfred Vagts did with the doctrines and philosophies of the military profession in his brilliant and caustic "History of Militarism." Unlike that work, Mr. Baldwin's book, though long on facts, is short on ideas.

As a foreign correspondent of wide experience, Mr. Baldwin unquestionably knows his facts. "The Caissons Roll" gives you every conceivable statistic regarding the armed forces and rearmament plans of the major European powers, and for that it is an admirable work. But one wishes that the author had adopted more of the viewpoint of the historian. Mr. Baldwin states briefly, for example, but does not attempt to analyze, the fundamental conflict between the idea of mass and the idea of mobility. The experience of the World War produced a fetish of mass armies—the natural outgrowth of the doctrine of the nation at arms. The development of tanks, airplanes and motorized units has produced a corresponding fetish of mobility. Yet the bigger an army, the less mobile it can be. The doctrinal conflict, says Mr. Baldwin, "betrays again the confused state of military thought."

The author thinks the next war will come, not in 1939 as many predict, but probably in the 1940's, since the rearmament programs of the major powers will not all be

completed until 1942. He considers the French army the best in the world, chiefly, one gathers, because of the efficiency of its 30,000 highly trained officers. For the fighting prowess of the dictatorship nations he has less respect. He thinks that while dictatorships have the advantage of unified control of their military forces and civilian population, they suffer from the disadvantage of inflexibility. "The Germans' very military efficiency," he writes, "is their very military weakness; they are an inelastic, inflexible, stiff-necked people with a fatal miscomprehension of other peoples' psychology. . . ." Moreover, he points out that wherever the thoughts of a people are tailor-made by their government, as in Germany and Russia, the necessary initiative and spirit of inquiry are seriously curtailed.

The colossal expenditures for rearmament—fifteen billion dollars by Great Britain, three billion a year by Germany, uncounted billions by Russia and Italy; the regimenting of whole populations; the tremendous economic waste in preparing for a war that will inevitably ruin both victor and vanquished alike are facts that would be ludicrous if they were not so tragically true. The chief value of Mr. Baldwin's book is the reminder it gives us of just how mad the world has gone.

Supplementing Mr. Baldwin's general survey of Europe is Mr. Davis' uninspired analysis of French preparedness in "The French War Machine." Its cataloguing of statistics, many of them trivial, makes the book dull, except for passages dealing with the political background of army events. But it is valuable as a clear and complete account of the evolution of French military policy since the World War.

WILLIAM A. LYDGATE

Voyage Down a River Novel

The Pasquier Chronicles, by Georges Duhamel. Translated by Beatrice de Holthoir. New York: Henry Holt and Company. \$3.50.

DUHAMEL's new five-part, 846-page story is what the French call a "river novel" (*roman-fleuve*), and in this case the term seems peculiarly appropriate. Not only is "The Pasquier Chronicles" as long as a French river—the Seine or the Garonne—but it has the same sort of course, slow, easy-going, sinuous and flat. And since the reading of it, the voyage from source to estuary, takes several days, I thought of giving my reactions in the form of a travel diary.

March 7.—Duhamel has always been known for his interest in the "average man"—that is, for him, the lower middle class. The Pasquiers, whose life passes in a desperate struggle to better their social status, are quite typical of this class as it was in France in the nineties. They are a rather crowded family: three sons—one of them, Laurent, is the narrator—and two daughters. Mme. Pasquier is the ideal, self-sacrificing mother, whose only thought is for her brood; M. Pasquier is vain, tyrannical, endowed with a great capacity for work. His gods are science and progress; after forty he decides to become a doctor; and having to start from scratch, he studies at nights to prepare for his numerous examinations. The story of this family is told with ease and tenderness. At least the first section of the book is fairly pleasant reading.

March 8.—Compared with two other authors of river novels, Martin du Gard (the recent Nobel prize-winner) and Jules Romains, Duhamel finishes a poor third. Of the three only Martin du Gard succeeds in achieving real artistic objectivity and penetrating into the inner life of the period he describes. Jules Romains judges it from the outside, from the vantage point of his cool and classifying mind; but even Jules Romains' coolness seems preferable to Duhamel's overflowing sentimentality. There is not a character in this novel that does not feel the effects of the author's gentle, ironical, indulgent compassion. And, like love or hatred or disgust, compassion simplifies and caricatures. It is not, as Duhamel seems to believe, the same thing as creative identification. Instead of giving birth to characters developing according to their own inner law, Duhamel evokes shadows by the fireplace.

March 9.—As the river broadens, its pace slackens. A strong spring of interest animated the first part: there was a legacy dangling before the Pasquier household, and some of their tense expectation was communicated to the reader. Beginning with the second part, the plot breaks up into several interwoven stories. The children grow up, become engaged in their own pursuits. One son, a calculating materialist, will become a successful business man; another has the soul of a mediocre bureaucrat; and the third, Laurent, already shows signs of his future vocation as a writer: sensitivity and idealism. The two sisters are very beautiful, and one of them, a pianist of genius, consoles the often afflicted family by her inspired performances. New characters appear. There is a sensational *coup de théâtre*: M. Pasquier turns out to be, under his highly moral exterior,

a vulgar libertine and an essentially restless man, unable to persevere in any enterprise. Until the middle of the fourth part, the story revolves around the old man's escapades, the children's efforts to shield their mother, and their inner struggles caused by the loss of an idol.

March 10.—Decidedly, nothing is so obtrusive as placidity. Duhamel's charming personality is absolutely everywhere, and there is no way of escaping his tranquil humor, his comfortable contempt for the machine age, his nostalgia for the good old days and his wistful wisdom. In the fourth part of the book, the author obviously strives to bring his several characters to the realization that the only worthwhile thing in this world is human warmth, the bonds of love and friendship; and in the fifth part he treats a counter-theme: the slow disintegration of friendship. With a group of young writers and artists, Laurent goes to live on a sort of collectivist farm. The experiment ends in failure and, as the river slowly, very slowly, reaches its estuary, we hear the eternal bourgeois lament voiced by Justin: "Man is incapable of living alone, and he is just as incapable of living in a group." But the author is not really a pessimist: Justin does not lose faith in the essential goodness of mankind, and he will try again, sometime.

As regards Duhamel's nostalgia for the good old times—well, in those days the novelists were able to pack as much human material and more human emotion into half the space he uses.

NORBERT GUTERMAN

Politics and the Race Myth

Heredity and Politics, by J. B. S. Haldane. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 202 pages. \$2.50.

ALL SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES involve some assumptions concerning the nature of man. If the assumptions made by everyone are the same, the pressure to examine them may not be great, but if they are different they cannot be neglected, as they will lead to special characteristics in the theories erected on them. Owing to the fundamental role of racialism in certain contemporary political theories, it is not possible to understand some features in politics without studying the biological qualities of man.

Nazis claim they are biologically superior to Jews; many white men believe themselves superior to colored men, etc. After these major beliefs, there are a series of minor ones, such as the belief that certain classes in any nation are biologically superior to others. As the investigation of the degree of scientific truth in these beliefs is now of great political importance, it is receiving more attention from the ablest biologists. Professor Haldane has made a brilliant survey. He explains that, while big innate biological differences between individuals probably exist, little exact scientific knowledge of them is yet possessed, because the separation of the effects of innate characteristics from those of environment is difficult.

During the Middle Ages, when the Moors had an advanced culture in Spain, one of their scholars, Said of Toledo, wrote that the northern Europeans "are of cold temperament and never reach maturity. They are of great stature and of a white color. But they lack all sharpness of wit and penetration of intellect." Said's views were as

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James T. Shotwell, William B. Spofford, Marion M. Miller.

well founded as contemporary views on the inferiority of Negroes and Jews. In his time the Moors of Toledo were studying trigonometry, while the scholars of Oxford had not yet got through the first book of Euclid.

Errors of the same type are seen today. In the case of the State of Washington v. John Hill, Judge Holden said that "... John Hill pleaded guilty to the crime of grand larceny. The theft was of a number of hams, which he took by stealth because of his impoverished condition; their value, however, being more than \$25, he was guilty of grand larceny, and subject, under our indeterminate law, to not less than six months', nor more than fifteen years', imprisonment in the state penitentiary. ..." He was advised to be sterilized by surgical operation and agreed, and judgment was suspended. Professor Haldane asks whether he would have agreed so readily if he had been advised by someone who had not the power of sending him to prison for fifteen years. Judge Holden sentenced a burglar named Chris McCauley to compulsory sterilization. He observed that "This man, about thirty-five years of age, is subnormal mentally and has every appearance and indication of immorality. He has a strain of Negro blood in his veins, and has a disgusting and lustful appearance." Professor Haldane comments that at least one cinema star appears "disgusting and lustful" to him, but he does not suggest that he should therefore be sterilized.

The exposure of bad science offered as an excuse for various political activities is one of the chief duties of the scientist who has a social conscience, and Professor Haldane has given a splendid example of how this should be done.

J. G. CROWTHER

New Books: A Reader's List

INTERMISSION IN EUROPE, by Vernon Bartlett (Oxford, \$2.75). Versailles and after. Memoirs of a British correspondent whose human understanding of international developments does not confuse him into acceptance of dictatorship or rejection of democracy. Written with unusual penetration, wit and modesty.

FATHER COLDSTREAM, by Julian Duguid (Appleton-Century, \$2.50). The struggle of the Jesuits, the Spanish Crown troops and the Mamelukes for control of Paraguay in the eighteenth century, just before the Society of Jesus was temporarily dissolved by the Pope and ousted by the King. An absorbing and dramatic novel, depending on the clash of philosophies and character rather than on romance for its drama, but somewhat suspect in the matter of authenticity.

HOPE OF HEAVEN, by John O'Hara (Harcourt, \$2). A short novel about the brighter set in Hollywood; O'Hara at his second best. His dialogue is superb, truer than life. But why couldn't he find a better plot than the one about the girl who doesn't mind going to bed with the hero but absolutely refuses to make an honest man of him?

A PURSE OF COPPERS, by Seán O'Faoláin (Viking, \$2). Stories of Irish life by a great talent for the exact atmosphere of churches, pubs, bogs, and the poor land under its cold twilight—also for the way these things affect people, seeping into their bones. Portrait of Ireland as an old man, bedeviled with his sins, religion, poverty and gusty tempers.

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- How is sexual sensitivity increased—or reduced—in the mate?
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- What are the causes and preventatives of impotence?
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Sex Desire—Origin Development
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Sexual Stimuli
Erogenic Zones, Male & Female
Explicit Procedure for Husbands
Differences in Male and Female Sexuality
The Sex Factors
Arts of Love-making for Male and Female
Advice for Women
Sex Excitation—Sex Power
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THE MORTAL STORM, by Phyllis Bottome (Little, Brown, \$2.50). The tragedy of a German family, closely knit in affection, but divided in politics and race, during the growth of the Nazi Party. The characters are somewhat typed, but the book is convincing in background and emotion.

DEATH IN THE MAKING, by Robert Capa (Covici-Friede, \$2.50). The Spanish war in photographs—attacks, air raids, hospitals, daily life behind the lines—a story presented more vividly by the camera than by even the best of war correspondents.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, by Marjorie Clark and S. Fanny Simon (Norton, \$2). A handy short history, from an A. F. of L. viewpoint, adding little to work already done in this field. Although fair to the CIO, the authors slight basic A. F. of L. failures.

THE RIVER, by Pare Lorentz (Stackpole, \$2). The narration and main thesis of Lorentz's film, run in with photographs enlarged from the frames of the original—not too well chosen or reproduced. A souvenir of a beautiful movie.

WOODROW WILSON: DISCIPLE OF REVOLUTION, by Jennings C. Wise (Paisley Press, \$3.75). Wilson, according to Colonel Wise, was merely a tool of Colonel House, who slinks through these pages as an agent of international revolution and a sinister forerunner of the New Deal. Endorsed by the very best reactionaries.

TWO SOLDIERS, edited by Wirt Armistead Cate (North Carolina, \$2.50). A close-up of the Civil War in the campaign diaries of two brave soldiers—major and captain, Johnny Reb and Yank. The Johnny Reb was a candid and picturesque writer. He captured the solid Yank and his stolid diary at the battle of Atlanta.

SAN DIEGO: A CALIFORNIA CITY, prepared by the San Diego Federal Writers' Project (sponsored and published

by the San Diego Historical Society, 50 cents.). A readable guide of 138 pages, handsome without being flashy; printed on coated stock; maps and good photographic illustrations; bound in paper. The make-up has the professional touch throughout.

Contributors

GUENTER REIMANN is a German economist now living in New York City and the author of a book, "Germany: World Empire or World Revolution?" published in January in England.

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LECTURE

"WAR CRISIS IN EUROPE" lecture by Harry Martel, Saturday afternoon, March 28, 2:30 P. M. Workers School, 35 E. 12th St., 2nd floor., Adm. 25c.

What Do Americans Want?

WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR of the American people in the third month of the year 1938? Do they believe the military struggles already under way in Spain and China are likely to prove the prelude to a general conflict in the near future? If so, what policy would they have the American government pursue? Do they wish the United States to join in efforts by the democracies to suppress the fascist powers? Or do they prefer that we shall attempt to remain aloof from any future struggle?

There is no doubt that the people of this country fear another general war, and with good reason. They have been informed over a long period and by a multitude of witnesses what are the chief danger spots. For years, both Japan and Germany have all but openly boasted their intention of attacking Soviet Russia, and for this purpose they now have a third, though most untrustworthy, military ally: Italy. It is also clear that Germany has designs upon Czechoslovakia, which have become the more insistent because of the recent seizure of Austria. France has lately indicated, rather half-heartedly, her intention of coming to the aid of Czechoslovakia if she is attacked by arms. France and Soviet Russia have also had an understanding, though it is uncertain at present just how seriously it is to be taken. The European situation is made more pressing by a series of Nazi successes of a cultural and economic character in the Balkans and the Danube basin. Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece are all in varying degrees indoctrinated with fascist philosophy. Several of these countries are buying arms from Germany, are engaged in other commerce with her and are imitating various aspects of German life. Of the Little Entente, so painstakingly built by France for her own safety after the Great War, only Czechoslovakia remains loyal, for obvious reasons of self-interest. Poland, once the zealous friend of France, has lately been trying to walk the precarious chalk line of impartiality.

England, in recent weeks, has been seeking to come to an understanding with Hitler and Mussolini—a development made far more difficult by Hitler's Austrian coup. If she does so, the consequences may be grave indeed. It is difficult for independent observers to believe, however, that any terms can be found permanently satisfactory to both Italy and England in regard to the Mediterranean basin. Not so long ago these two countries were on the very brink of war, and this may happen again, no matter what arrangements Chamberlain and Mussolini may now conclude.

The response of the American people as a whole to these developments has without doubt been an intensi-

fied desire to stay at home and mind their own business. There can be no question but that Americans are bitterly disappointed and disillusioned with the results of their adventure overseas in 1917-18. They have learned that the principles of democracy for which they supposed they were fighting were not the real issue, that they were tricked and deceived by skillful propaganda, that secret engagements made before the United States entered the War—engagements to the details of which President Wilson deliberately closed his eyes—made a just and lasting peace impossible. They saw \$11,000,000,000 of their money (principal and interest) loaned to the Entente, of which only a small part has been repaid while the rest is gone forever. (Few of them realize that the economic policy of our own government during the twenties made repayment impossible even if the European debtors had wished to do so, which they did not.)

Since then, the Americans have seen the League of Nations, for which such high hopes were once held, lose nearly all its prestige and influence. They have seen France's effort to crush Germany and keep her crushed thwarted by the enforced abdication of a responsible, democratic German regime and the rise of a group of gangsters who are not only getting back by threat of force most of the things taken away at Versailles but are going much farther and hope to achieve the most ambitious of the Kaiser's dreams of world hegemony. Twenty years after the end of the war to end war, they see wholesale slaughter going on in Spain and China, while the so-called civilized nations are spending up to 50 percent of their national budgets on the preparation of arms.

There are, certainly, some Americans who continue to desire this country to play an active part in international affairs. One group, of which Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of State, is fairly typical, believes that this country is in a peculiarly good position to take the lead in demanding that treaty obligations be maintained. Mr. Stimson recently set forth his views in a letter to *The New Republic* (published in our issue of December 29) and they need not be repeated here. As all the world knows, he was rebuffed by the British when he sought to put these principles into practice after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

Another large group is that supporting the League of Nations, of whom the Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, with its participating organizations, is fairly typical. These individuals are for the most part unreconstructed Wilsonian idealists. They refuse to be disheartened regarding the efficiency of the League or the ultimate power of the League idea. They believe that if the United States had only entered the Geneva

body eighteen years ago much of the world's unhappiness in recent times might have been avoided. They would still have the United States take the lead in some sort of collective action, though they have undoubtedly been greatly disturbed by Eden's resignation and the new British line.

Among the advocates of collective security a group that is unusually vocal in proportion to its numbers is the American Communists. They repudiate the charge that they are trying to get the United States either to go to war as Russia's ally, or even to carry the burden instead of the Soviet Union, and insist that they are seeking only the sort of united action by the democracies against the fascist powers that would make war impossible—would indeed be the only thing to prevent it. How many persons are influenced by the Communist argument, it is impossible to say. Numerically, the party is not very important, having recently reached a total membership of about 75,000 after an intensive drive—a figure that can be compared with something like 68,000,000 Americans eligible to vote.

There is good reason for believing that all the advocates of collective security, of all types, do not constitute more than 25 or 30 percent of the total population. This is proved by repeated polls of the Institute of Public Opinion which, in recent weeks, have shown majorities of 65 or 70 percent against collective action of any sort. The persons consulted (who constitute, in general, a cross-section of American public opinion) voted that neutrality was the wisest course for the United States, by 69 percent. The Ludlow Resolution demanding a popular referendum (except in case of invasion) before the country went to war, was endorsed by 70 percent. War loans to either Japan or China were opposed by 95 percent. A majority of 70 percent was in favor of withdrawing American citizens and our military and naval forces from China. Even a private boycott of Japanese goods was supported by only 37 percent. The remaining 63 percent were either opposed to a boycott, though they were against Japan, or were neutral. Only one percent favored Japan.

Particularly striking is the vote of 64 percent against sending any arms to China. This was accompanied by a declaration of 59 percent in favor of China, 40 percent neutral and only one percent in favor of Japan. In other words, those who participated in the poll sympathized with China, but were not willing to have that sympathy expressed in the form of active aid, lest the United States become embroiled in conflict. Seventy percent, incidentally, stated that they believed American participation in the last war had been a mistake. The Institute for Public Opinion, summarizing the views of those it queried, expressed their policy as follows:

1. Build a larger army and navy for national defense.

2. Make no entangling political alliances with foreign nations or with the League of Nations.

3. Keep our nationals out of countries at war.

4. Leave declaration of war up to the people themselves.

It is a notable fact that the strongest sentiment in favor of active participation in international affairs comes from the North Atlantic states, where the munitions industry is concentrated, as is most of the control of banking and finance. The Middle West is markedly more in favor of isolation and so is the Pacific Coast, except for a special interest in the Orient. This division between the internationally minded East and the isolationist West was also characteristic of the period before we entered the Great War, in 1917.

Another bit of evidence of the popular mind is the passage of the Neutrality Act. This law was passed at a time when President Roosevelt was enormously popular, and when few measures were being adopted by Congress that were not of his initiation. In spite of this, pressure from the public was strong enough to force the act through Congress, though it is well known that both the President and the State Department were bitterly hostile to any neutrality law at all. They used great pressure to modify the proposal so that a large degree of presidential discretion was maintained. By so doing, they made it possible to invoke the act in regard to Spain and to prevent its being applied in the Orient, where an international war is assuredly going on if there ever was one.

Most startling of all is the history of the Ludlow amendment. It is whispered in Washington that Mr. Ludlow himself did not take his amendment any too seriously, and it was sent to committee in the House with the intention of permitting it to die there. But then Congress began to hear from the back country. So numerous and vociferous were the supporters of the measure that to the amazement of everyone in Washington, the necessary 215 signatures were found for a petition forcing the measure out of committee for a vote. Mr. Farley used all his political skill to prevent passage; the President went to the unprecedented length of writing a letter in opposition to the plan, a letter made public on the day that the vote took place. In spite of all this, and in spite of the fact that everything humanly possible had been done to head off discussion, both in Congress and the country, the Ludlow amendment came within eleven votes of passing the House, being defeated by only 209 to 188. Of those who voted against it, fifty-five had signed the petition to force it out of committee. Fifty-two of them were Democrats, and it is reasonable to suppose that they yielded to terrific pressure from the party whips. Supporting the resolution were a majority of all the progressive Republicans and Democrats, the entire delegation of eight Progressives from Wisconsin and

all five members of the Farmer-Labor Party. There seems to be little doubt that the Ludlow amendment will eventually come up again, and that it will be adopted.

Although the Americans are so overwhelmingly opposed to foreign war, this does not mean that they have accepted the philosophy of the pacifists. Certainly, they do not believe in non-resistance. Side by side in the records of the Institute of Public Opinion you will find a 75-percent majority in favor of keeping out of the Orient and a majority of the same size answering Yes to the question, "Should we have an army and navy adequate for our defense?" To be sure, this is something of a trick question, since everything depends on what you define as "adequate." You could probably get an equal majority on the other side by asking, "Should we waste a lot of money on more big battleships just for the benefit of the shipyards and armament makers?"

This attitude is, to be sure, a simple emotional response which easily breaks down before a complicated situation. We doubt that most Americans who hold this view have made up their minds, for example whether defense of the United States implies defense of the Philippines or of the whole Caribbean area. They are certainly not clear as to what obligation we should assume in regard to the protection of South America. The American attitude includes a good deal of xenophobia, which is perhaps the same as the inferiority complex. We believe, most of us, that foreign diplomats are smarter than ours and will trick us if we have anything to do with them. It has been driven firmly into the American consciousness that before we entered the Great War, propagandists for both sides came to this country and engaged in a battle for public favor, in which the Allies were successful. Ask that mythical character, the man in the street, and he will probably tell you that one cannot trust the newspapers, the radio, the motion picture or any other instrument of education or entertainment, because they are exploited by sinister influences. It is easy to include in this picture the idea of spokesmen for foreign powers deceiving the Americans once again as they were deceived before 1917.

The uncertainty and unhappiness of most Americans regarding our foreign policy in recent months has been increased by several factors centering around the President and the officials of the Department of State. There is ample evidence that large numbers of Americans believe the President wishes to formulate, in secret, policies of which most of us would not approve if they were made in public. This is not to say that there is widespread suspicion of the President's good faith, or that he is not acting in what he believes to be the best interest of the whole country. The feeling is that by instinct and long training, he practises secret rather

than open diplomacy, that he hopes to bring the country to his point of view instead of basing his actions on what the country believes, that he is willing to take risks for which many of his fellow countrymen are not prepared. In all these things he sees eye to eye with officials of the State Department who have always had an aristocratic tradition of their own which is inclined to regard Congress as a pack of plebeian meddlers and who want to play the game of diplomacy as it is played in the courts of Europe. They do not draw the corollary conclusion that the European game of diplomacy has never ended in anything but disaster for the common people.

It is this feeling of vague uneasiness which caused such numerous, vociferous and widespread protests against the administration's emergency naval bill which would authorize expenditures first reported as \$880,000,000 and afterward in varying amounts up to \$1,250,000,000. Few of those who protested would continue to do so if they could be shown that these expenditures were really necessary for defense and were not a possible basis for a diplomacy of force in distant parts of the world. The administration, it must be recognized, made an extremely bad job of its attempt to set these fears at rest. The expert witnesses from the Navy Department were confused and contradictory, advancing reasons at various times that were incompatible with each other and, some of them, incompatible with common sense. Secretary Hull did not help matters by his continued insistence that the basis both of our foreign policy and of our naval program is the effort to maintain the sanctity of contracts and law and order in all parts of the world. Nor was much reassurance gained when a hasty amendment was tacked onto the Vinson bill saying that all this money was to be spent for purely defensive purposes; no one can recall any military expenditure in any country at any time that was not so described.

In the midst of all this uncertainty, and with the dark outlook presented by the international picture, what policy should American progressives pursue? Should they dedicate themselves to gallant adventures abroad on behalf of democracy, as we did in 1917, without weighing the probable chance of success? Or should they build a policy upon such certainties as are to be found in a changing world? What improvements of conditions at home may fairly be described as essential elements in a policy of national defense? What sort of army and navy do we really need to protect our shores against any conceivable enemy or coalition of enemies? Is there anything we can do to ameliorate the world situation, and if so, what? Assuming an effort to stay out of the next war, just what would it cost us, and what is the likelihood that Americans would be willing to pay this price? These are some of the questions this supplement undertakes to answer.

Internal Strength

THE COST of the new naval program is to be \$1,120,000,000. This is a dizzying sum, and if, as Admiral Leahy has solemnly testified, Mr. Roosevelt wants to build a two-ocean navy, the cost will be a great deal more. The new warships constructed with this money will give advancement to navy officers, and will provide fine subjects for news-reel photographers, but just who else among us will benefit? If we should build a great navy, great enough to overawe Japan—provided England helps—the administration has tacitly promised that peace and stability would result in the Orient. That would benefit business corporations with Far Eastern interests. In point of fact, a big American navy would be as likely to precipitate war as to bring peace, but let us assume that the administration's promise has substance. Do the voters wish to divert \$1,120,000,000 from the nation's income to achieve better business in China? There is no sign that they do. As they demonstrated in the elections of 1932-34-36, the dangers about which they are gravely alarmed are unnecessary sickness, bad housing, waste of soil fertility, illiteracy. The sum of \$1,120,000,000 would go a long way towards conquering these enemies within our own frontiers.

The danger of an attack on our shores by an evil aggressor nation is relatively remote. But again let us suppose the alarmists of the administration are right. It would still be doubtful wisdom to put the sum asked for by Mr. Roosevelt into new warships to the neglect of essential social services. There are a hundred theories of what makes a nation great in war, but all of them include national morale. There is no intention here to dig up the question of what unloosed the World War, but one factor unquestionably was the knowledge among the German military chiefs that a revolt against English rule had broken out among Irish tenant farmers, and that the Russian economic system was reeling under the tyranny and incompetence of the Tsars. The same domestic problems about which the voters of this country are alarmed, bad health, slum housing, rural poverty, lack of educational facilities, all constitute military weakness. A nation with the miraculous industrial technique of the United States can, in time of crisis, turn out airplane engines, plate armor, tanks, submachine guns at will, but without healthy, educated, loyal citizens cannot call itself a virile country, and cannot win wars. To conserve natural resources, health and morale is the first business of a program of defense, whether against internal scourges or foreign enemies.

Below is a list of projects that would make this a better country, whether for war or peace. They do not form a unified program of national development. They

are merely projects that happen to have been examined and approved by governmental authorities. Nearly all of them could be started in a few days or weeks.

The South.—Before we start, one general observation should be made. If our purpose is to create national morale, the place to commence spending money is the South. The remainder of the country has its sore spots, from the slums of its big cities to the desolation of the Dust Bowl. But it is the South that has the highest rate of preventable disease, has almost all the country's illiteracy, has the most perilous soil erosion, has the greatest lack of highways, bridges, hospitals, etc.

The hopeful thing is that the South is now lifting its standard of life more rapidly than any other section. Most of this advance is being made at the expense of dispossessed sharecroppers and \$6 and \$7-a-week textile workers. Nevertheless, it has begun, and for this reason money spent in the South ought to show quick results. It would be money spent on a going enterprise.

The federal government, just because it is a federal government, normally drafts plans for the country as a whole. The only important federal project designed purely for the South is the TVA. In its four years of existence, the TVA has gathered experts on nearly every conceivable subject. They have created brand-new industries. They have worked out new ways of farming. By developing electric community refrigerators, where farmers may store their produce at low cost, they have made possible a startling advance in farm marketing. They have revolutionized the manufacture of phosphates, vital for war as well as for soil fertility. All their miracles, including the great program of dam-construction, have been accomplished with less than one-fifth of the amount Mr. Roosevelt has asked for naval building. In no year has the TVA's appropriation equaled the price of a battleship.

If asked, the TVA experts could turn out overnight plans for strengthening the social and economic structure of the TVA area. They know the Tennessee Valley as a priest knows his rosary. The first thing that a country genuinely concerned about its security would do would be to tell these experts to go ahead. The second thing would be to enact Senator Norris' bill for regional authorities, and then order the proposed Mississippi Valley Authority to carry out another TVA program along the Mississippi's lower tributaries.

Maternal and Infant Mortality.—It happens that at the precise moment experts of the Navy Department were laying out Mr. Roosevelt's \$1,120,000,000 naval program, experts of the United States Public Health Service were finishing the first great survey of health.

This is the most authoritative document about health we have ever had. By its findings, the ratio of frequency of illness to family income (families with incomes of \$3,000 or more being taken as 100) is as follows: relief families, 157; families with less than \$1,000, 117; families with \$1,000-\$2,000, 104; families with \$2,000-\$3,000, 101; families with \$3,000 or more, 100. The administration has as yet no general plan for meeting the intertwined problem of sickness and poverty, although it is known that a number of administration officials are eager to introduce a national system of socialized medicine, similar to that of England. During the last few months, however, a technical committee, representing various federal departments, has been conducting an inventory of existing public-health facilities. Its report, just issued, contains a schedule of partial solutions, all of which are of great urgency.

Each year this country has more than 2,000,000 births. At least 75,000 babies—or potential soldiers and army nurses, if you like—are stillborn. Another 69,000 die either at birth or in the first month of life. About 12,500 mothers die as a direct result of pregnancy or childbirth, and another 15,000 from associated complications. Here is an army of dead, numbering more than 170,000. Half of them, at least, could be saved.

This is particularly a Southern problem. Arizona has the highest infant-mortality rate, 91. South Carolina is next with 90, about four times the rate in Sweden and 40 percent higher than that for the United States as a whole. According to the PHS survey, in nearly 13 percent of births among relief families in small Southern cities, mothers are unattended by either doctor or midwife. Only five percent receive hospital care.

This grisly state of affairs could be remedied for less than a quarter of the cost of the proposed new navy. Since the states and local communities could be counted on for contributions, the federal government could perhaps manage its share for the price of a single major warship. The government's Technical Committee on Medical Care recommends, first of all, the recruiting and training of additional public-health nurses. There ought to be one public-health nurse for every two thousand citizens, a standard now attained in only five states. For the whole country there are now only 18,000 public-health nurses; there should be 65,000.

There also ought to be a great increase in pre-natal and child-health centers. In 1937, there were 2,900 pre-natal centers in 33 states, serving 500 counties, and 5,300 child-health centers in 36 states, serving 740 counties. These should be expanded to blanket the country. A third important step would be the addition of obstetrical specialists to the public-health personnel in all states. These specialists would be available for consultation with the family doctors attending poor mothers. Such a service is already provided by two states, and arrangements are being made to have it offered by seven other states.

Medical Care for Adults.—The new PHS survey presents tables to show the relation between family income and the amount of medical care received. According to its tables, the ratio of physicians' calls per case (relief families being taken as 100) is as follows: relief families, 100; families with less than \$1,000, 118; families with \$1,000-\$2,000, 118; families with \$2,000-\$3,000, 131; families with \$3,000 or more, 146.

The government's Technical Committee on Medical Care points that, although hospital facilities are none too adequate for the poor of the big cities, they are horrifyingly insufficient in rural areas. Its report thus states the need for a hospital-building program:

Professional standards of adequacy indicate a need for general hospital facilities in the ratio of 4.6 beds per 1,000 persons, *nervous and mental* hospital facilities in the ratio of 5.6 beds per 1,000 persons, and *tuberculosis* hospital facilities in the ratio of 2 beds per annual death for this disease. In this country today, over two-thirds of the states fall below these standards in general hospital facilities, nine-tenths are below the standard for mental hospitals and three-fourths of the states fall below the standard for tuberculosis hospitals. For general hospitals, even a minimum standard of 2 beds per 1,000 persons for areas (mostly rural) which are 50 miles beyond a large hospital center, would require substantial additions to existing facilities. A total of 31,000,000 people now live in areas with less than 2 general hospital beds per 1,000 persons. Nearly 1,300 (42 percent) of the counties in the United States have no registered general hospitals . . . [which] means that there are 18,000,000 persons who are living in counties with no local hospital facilities. . . . The United States has about 1,100,000 beds in general, special, mental and tuberculosis hospitals. According to the minimum professional standards of good care, about 1,500,000 beds will be needed by the end of the next decade. This means a deficiency of about 400,000 beds. Measures to fill this need would include the construction of at least 500 hospitals of 30-60 bed capacity in rural and sparsely settled regions.

It may be added that if the administration is definitely bent on national defense, its first concern should be, not warships, but a cure for flat feet. From the military point of view, flat feet are the national scourge. Nothing else remotely rivals it. In the World War, flat feet caused 39 percent of all rejections for military service, while venereal disease caused only 5.8 percent, and tuberculosis only 5.4 percent.

Low-Cost Housing.—After five years of devoted propaganda by housing enthusiasts, there is no need to describe the sickness, crime and social degeneration caused by slums. In the extremely improbable event that an enemy bombing fleet could reach this country, the slum areas along the Atlantic Coast, with their dense population, would be almost impossible to evacuate. They would be fire hazards of immense danger, and a grave military liability. Low-cost housing lies in a different realm from public health,

where the problem is still partly in the stage of debate. In the Wagner-Steagall law, enacted a year ago, we have an official housing program that Mr. Nathan Straus, as administrator of the United States Housing Authority, is rapidly carrying into effect. The question is whether or not it is adequate.

The most authoritative statement of the need for housing is that made a year ago for the report on the Wagner-Steagall law by Miss Catherine Bauer, then secretary of the Labor Housing Conference, and Mr. Coleman Woodbury, director of the National Association of Housing Officials. According to their estimate, in 1937 there was an actual shortage of 2,397,000 home units. Moreover, they pronounced 10 percent—a very conservative figure—of the then existing housing to be unfit for habitation, and ready for destruction. This made a total shortage in 1937 of 5,663,000 units. They next considered future building needs. For the years between 1937 and 1950, they estimated that 6,389,000 new units should be built, together with another 4,245,000 units to replace homes that would become obsolescent. This gives a grand total of needed building before 1950 of 16,297,000 units.

Among government experts, there are differences of opinion about the income level at which a family should receive government-subsidized housing. At least 30 percent, however, of the 16,297,000 home units that need to be built before 1950 should be built as low-cost projects with government money. Perhaps as many as 50 percent should be. If the lower percentage is taken, it means that the government should subsidize approximately 375,000 units a year until 1950; if the higher percentage, that the government should subsidize 625,000 units. Under the present law, the USHA has resources to permit the construction of only about 165,000 units yearly, and its life is limited to three years. Its life ought to be extended, and its program doubled, even tripled. If the entire billion dollars that Mr. Roosevelt plans to spend on the navy were to be dumped into low-cost housing, we still would not meet the need.

Soil Conservation.—When the New Deal began its attack on the problem of soil erosion in 1933, it was usually stated that 3,000,000 tons of topsoil were being washed or blown away each year. This is now thought to be too low a figure. In 1937, careful measurements were taken in the Mississippi Valley, and a loss of 2,300,000 tons of topsoil was established for that region alone. This is a far greater injury than an evil aggressor nation, in years of warfare, could inflict.

Testifying a few days ago before the special Senate Committee on Unemployment, Mr. H. H. Bennett, chief of the Soil Conservation Service, itemized the destruction caused by erosion. Approximately 50,000,000 acres of once fertile farm land have been ruined, and are now abandoned. Another 50,000,000 acres are

in nearly as desperate a condition. On 100,000,000 acres, the topsoil has washed away. On another 100,000,000, erosion has definitely started. This gives a total of 300,000,000 acres, or about one-ninth of the area of the United States.

In its five years of life, the SCS has set up demonstration projects on 528 privately owned farms. Each project has been a teaching center, where farmers for miles about could study erosion control. They have also served as stations for continuous experimentation. Some of the practices now being used by the SCS are wholly new in the history of farming. More than 8,500,000 acres are now being farmed under SCS methods.

The next step to be taken, according to the SCS, is the adoption by state legislatures of its model soil-conservation-district law. This law has now been enacted in twenty-two states, and thirty soil-conservation districts have been set up, one of them of a million acres. The law, in effect, provides for rural zoning. Under it, farmers can vote that all land sloping so-and-so many degrees must be terraced, and that all land of a lesser slope be cultivated in contour strips. These regulations then become legally enforceable on all landowners within a district. A district is empowered to assist farmers in building relatively costly projects like check-dams, and to own heavy machinery for terracing, etc., which can be used by the farmers in rotation. In this aspect, it is an erosion coöperative.

The SCS foresees an acute shortage of engineers with which to staff the proposed soil-conservation districts. Soil-conservation engineering is a new profession, and, in the opinion of the SCS, offers one of the most promising careers now open to youngsters. Federal funds might well be spent to train them.

An extremely serious obstacle to soil conservation is provided by marginal land, especially land held by absentee owners. The SCS reports that the majority of farmers show an immense eagerness to coöperate with it. But where land has little value, owners either cannot or will not take the measures needed to check further erosion. This is especially troublesome in the Dust Bowl, where soil from unprotected land will blow for great distances. A program for the purchase of marginal land is now in progress under the Department of Agriculture.

Sharecropper and Tenant Farmer.—A country jealous of its national virility should not tolerate the running wounds of farm tenancy and sharecropping. The Farm Security Administration has an official program for ending tenancy. It has \$10,000,000 a year, about the cost of a submarine, with which to lease land on long term to aspirants to farm ownership. During the present fiscal year, about 2,300 farms will be given out. Besides this, the FSA has about \$90,000,000 a year with which to make small loans to sharecroppers and tenants for tools, seed and livestock. In all, about

600,000 families have been aided with loans. This program is admittedly inadequate. Federal officials say it may take forty years to solve this problem.

Because a country that cannot cope with its tenancy problem cannot call itself prepared for either war or peace, special importance attaches to a magnificent research job, "Technological Trends in Relation to Agriculture," recently completed by the National Resources Committee in coöperation with the Department of Agriculture. It is an attempt to establish a basis for agricultural planning. Its vast and somber implications explain, perhaps, why it has remained curiously unnoticed. It recites the extraordinary advances made in farming technique. Within the last few years, improvements in seed were: a variety of wheat resistant to bunt, or stinking smut; hybrid corn, which has brought a 20-percent increase in yield; a new kind of rice, on which the California rice industry is founded; a new sugar beet, immune to curly-top; sugar cane that is resistant to mosaic. Similar miracles have given increased productive efficiency in dairy herds, beef cattle, hogs, poultry. Much space is devoted to farm machinery, where the astounding possibilities of cheap electricity for farms are explored. The mechanical cotton-picker is discussed at length, and the prediction made that any considerable increase in cotton-raising will see its introduction on a great scale.

Against this proud record of technological advance, however, is placed the disturbing fact that in 1929—a good year for the farmer—less than one-half of the nation's farms raised nearly 90 percent of all agricultural products sold and traded in. On the remaining farms, more than 3,000,000 in number, the commercial production did not average \$1,000. Moreover, the first group of farms, by a slight increase in efficiency, would have been able to produce 100 percent of all farm products, making the second group altogether unneeded.

Technological unemployment has become a more formidable problem in agriculture than in industry. It is true that one-third of the nation is ill nourished, but it does not follow that with a greater national income the consumption of food would mount. In "Technological Trends," this is specifically denied. It is predicted that the poorest third would eat different food, but that the volume would remain approximately the same. The consumption of clothes might be increased greatly, which would aid the cotton planter, as would an expansion of our exports. The industrial use of farm products might help. But in general, the brutal fact is that some 3,000,000 farmers at present have no legitimate function in the economic system.

Illiteracy.—The Office of Education gives the total of illiterates in 1934 as 3,675,000, or 4.89 percent of the adult population. Here is a manageable problem, which the expenditures of federal funds can cure with

reasonable speed. Within the last few days, the President's Advisory Committee on Education has presented a six-year program for federal grants to the states, rising from \$70,000,000 in the next fiscal year to \$199,000,000 in 1944-45. These grants would not only wipe out illiteracy, but would make possible the rehabilitation of rural education. The Committee recommends the continuation of the National Youth Administration, under whose jurisdiction it would place the CCC camps. It will be recalled that Mr. Roosevelt has already reduced the CCC by one-third, in order to save less than the price of three cruisers. A cut in the NYA is also feared. This is utterly mischievous economy.

The Six-Year Plan.—The National Resources Committee's great program for the development of our water resources, the six-year public-works plan, was described in *The New Republic* of February 16, and has since been laid before Mr. Roosevelt. Based on 127 engineering surveys, it includes about 10,000 projects, covering every section of the country. They include bank and coastal erosion control, drainage, flood control, generation of electric power, irrigation, navigation, recreation, soil conservation and forest development, waste disposal and pollution abatement, wild-life conservation. They are divided into three categories. The first comprises additional engineering studies, to cost about \$20,000,000. In the second are construction projects for which the need is urgent. They call for initial appropriations of \$1,727,000,000, and \$600,000,000 more for completion. The third group consists of necessary, but postponable, projects. They would require a first appropriation of \$1,024,000,000, and \$400,000,000 later.

One project deserves special notice. That is the proposed hydro-electric development in the international section of the St. Lawrence near Niagara, with an installed capacity of 1,640,000 kilowatts, and an estimated cost to the United States, including improvement in navigation, of \$265,000,000. Within the territory of a suggested power grid based on the St. Lawrence project is one of the hungriest markets for electricity in the world. The project would require the adherence of Canada. Why Mr. Roosevelt does not spend his enthusiasm for foreign affairs on this end, instead of on doubtful adventures in the Orient, remains inexplicable.

Highways.—It happens that the first comprehensive plan for a national highway system is just now nearing completion. Under the Cartwright Act of 1934, 1.5 percent of all federal road-building funds was segregated for research. The information now being assembled has never before been available. In his report of 1937, Mr. Thomas H. MacDonald, chief of the Bureau of Public Roads, points out that our high-

ways, for the most part, were designed a generation ago, when road-engineering standards were far lower than today. In his expert judgment, "much of the early construction . . . is unsafe for modern traffic."

For the coming year, Congress has authorized \$200,000,000 for roads, of which only \$125,000,000 is for through highways. Mr. Roosevelt some weeks ago asked that the \$200,000,000 fund be cut in half as an economy measure. The postponement of highways that would help reduce the present 35,000 deaths a year from automobile accidents seems a dubious saving.

Senator Bulkley has placed before Congress a proposal for a network of express highways covering the country, to cost \$8,000,000,000 and to be financed by tolls. The Bureau of Public Roads, some months earlier, suggested a more scientific program. Instead of marching from boundary to boundary, as Senator Bulkley's roads do, the Bureau proposes its "special-service highways with limited access" for areas where traffic counts have shown existing facilities to be overburdened, and where the new highways would soon pay for themselves. They would not only be self-liquidating public

works, but national projects of the soundest kind.

The Inter-American Highway is a unique road project. In 1934, a grant of \$1,000,000 was made by the PWA. By an understanding with Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, steel for nine bridges was bought in the United States, while each republic undertook to provide for the piers and approaches of bridges lying within its territory.

Jobs.—At the bottom of most of the projects discussed above, and especially the possible improvement of our national health, lies the problem of controlling the business cycle. A third of the nation is likely to stay ill nourished, ill clad and ill housed while unemployment continues. The administration has before it many hundreds of projects to end the current depression, most of them calling for large expenditures of money. But on none of them—unless it is one for the rumored subsidizing of private home-building—does the administration appear prepared to act. In our preparations for war and peace, this is the undefended bastion.

For Impregnable Defense

The danger of military attack on the United States from abroad has been greatly exaggerated by persons seeking an unreasonable increase in our armed forces. Among these persons are armament makers and others who stand to profit by such action. The majority of the American people want an adequate military establishment, but believe that it should be of a strictly defensive character, intended only to guard our own shores and our nearby possessions against armed attack. If the improbable danger should become real, they would want merely to make our present adequate defenses completely impregnable.

We have invited Major George Fielding Eliot to discuss in this supplement the character and cost of an impregnable defense. Major Eliot was an infantry officer with the British forces in the World War and a Captain and Major in the United States Military Intelligence Reserve between 1922 and 1930. He is a frequent magazine contributor on military subjects, and co-author with R. Ernest Dupuy of "If War Comes."—THE EDITORS

THE MILITARY POLICY of a state which harbors no aggressive designs, but seeks only its own security, should be based primarily on the geographical and political conditions (1) of the state itself; (2) of its immediate neighbors; (3) of other states which might conceivably wage war against it. Next it must take account of the military strength of other states, and of the resources at its own disposal.

Finally it must be brought into consonance with the other branches of state policy—diplomatic, commercial and domestic.

Military policy must be flexible; for though geographical conditions do not change, the other factors mentioned are subject to fluctuations. It must provide defense against aggression; but it must not go beyond this need, lest it arouse the fears of others and also impose a needless burden on the treasury. Above all, military policy should be directed on the basis of cold, calm realism. It is not a department of government that can afford to indulge in illusions.

It is in this spirit, then, that we propose to examine the basic features of sound military policy for the United States.

The principal geographic fact with which this policy begins is our isolation from other great military powers by two oceans. The only direct passage between those oceans is in our hands. In both oceans we have certain outposts which add greatly to our military strength; those in the Caribbean area cover the eastward approaches to the defile of Panama, those in the Pacific cover our western seaboard.


By land, to the north, lies Canada, a country with which we have maintained unbroken friendship for over a century. Her defense forces are extremely weak. To the south is Mexico, a country with which our relations have not always been good; but she has practically no navy, and her army is deficient in modern equipment.

This weakness of our neighbors may, however, be a source of peril to us, since they may be unable, if we are at war, to prevent a hostile power seizing in their territory a base for operations against us.

Below Mexico, the six republics of Central America lead us down to Panama; beyond is the great continent of South America. For more than a century, we have been committed to the defense of all this territory against foreign aggression; a policy now being transmuted into one of mutual defense, to which at least three of the countries in question can make substantial naval and military contributions. This policy is sound. It contributes to the security of the Western Hemisphere, serves to allay Latin American suspicions of our ultimate aims, and will increase our prestige and influence among our neighbors while diminishing that of European and Asiatic powers, to our unquestionable benefit. Here we have a striking example of the manner in which military, political and commercial policy go hand in hand.

Since any serious menace to our security must come across one or the other of the oceans, it follows that our navy is our first line of defense; our military policy must, therefore, be initially concerned with bases for the support of our fleet. In the truest sense, bases mean ships: no navy can function in war without bases for repair and supply, without secure harbors where it can find shelter behind guns and minefields, and from which it can issue forth to perform its various tasks. The essential features of a naval base are described by Admiral Mahan as strength, resources and position; a navy possessed of adequate bases can within a given theatre operate successfully with a smaller actual force in ships than one not so situated.

A naval base itself, however, and the forts which defend it, are only of use as a point of support for the fleet which operates from it. The fallacies that have grown up in this country around the term "coast defense" are based on a misconception of this principle. "Coast defense," in the true sense, is the business first



THE CARIBBEAN AREA

The central position at Guantanamo dominates the Caribbean Sea. A fleet based here can cover the whole area. To the eastward the islands of Puerto Rico, Culebra and St. Thomas form an outpost which watches the sea-lane from Europe. Note the strategic importance of Key West, which controls the Gulf of Mexico. There are two small foreign naval bases in the Caribbean—at Kingston, Jamaica (British), and Fort-de-France, Martinique (French). Bermuda is also a British base.

The reader is especially invited to observe how Guantanamo and its eastern outpost absolutely command all approaches to the Panama Canal from the Atlantic.


The improvement in our position to be obtained from acquisition of the Bahamas may be readily observed on the map. The suggested acquisition of Bermuda and Barbados looks to more distant objectives, for the full understanding of which this map should be compared with a map of the Western Hemisphere.

of all of the navy, supported by its bases. The actual operations of the fleet in defending the coast may take place hundreds of miles away. The farther the enemy can be kept from our shores, the better has the navy performed its functions.

Our North American seaboard possesses two principal naval bases, those of Norfolk and New York; a fleet of adequate power operating from these bases can dominate the whole of the waters from Newfoundland to the Straits of Florida. Secondary naval bases on this coast are at Portsmouth, Boston, Philadelphia and Charleston; Narragansett Bay (which is strategically part of the New York base), New Bedford, Portland and Savannah possess harbor defenses.

As we reach the tip of Florida we approach the most important strategic area of our Atlantic Coast—the Caribbean Sea, with the great landlocked basin of the Gulf of Mexico behind it. The Caribbean is the antechamber to the Panama Canal; it is vital to us to possess naval dominance in this area. The principal entrances to the Caribbean from the Atlantic are the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti, through which moves our enormous intercoastal traffic via Panama, and the Anegada Passage to the eastward of the Virgin Islands, carrying most of the European traffic for Panama. The Windward Passage—and indeed the whole Caribbean Sea—is dominated by our base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where we are established by treaty; this central position has as outpost the position Puerto Rico-Culebra-St. Thomas, which watches the Anegada Passage and, lying a thousand miles to seaward, flanks any European approach to our eastern seaboard. Guantanamo is not a defended port; but it has an excellent and commodious harbor, and—by car-ferry from Tampa and the Cuba Railway—can be amply supplied from the continental United States. There are no seacoast fortifications at Puerto Rico or St. Thomas. Key West (whose fortifications are on an inactive status) watches the Straits of Florida; within the Gulf of Mexico is Pensacola, with fortifications and a great naval air base. Finally there are the formidable defenses of the Panama Canal itself, backed by mobile troops, aircraft and submarines.


Our position in the Caribbean, though strong, is susceptible of improvement to the point of impregnability, if political considerations could permit us to acquire certain additional positions now belonging to the British Empire—say in exchange for a reduction in the war debt. This is a very complicated question and may present insuperable obstacles: it is mentioned here merely as a suggestion. First, Bermuda, lying well out in the Atlantic, is not now but may become in the near future within squadron bombing range (500 miles) of our Atlantic seaboard; it is defended, but might fall into the hands of an enemy. In our hands it would afford an excellent flanking position, in advance of St. Thomas, for operations against any enemy ap-



THE PACIFIC AREA

Here the central and dominant position is that of Hawaii, which lies on the flank of all approaches to our West Coast and dominates them by means of the fleet. Note the "great circle" route, the customary short line from Japan to Seattle and Vancouver, to appreciate the value of a base in the Aleutians.

proaching our Atlantic Coast. The Bahamas, with their numerous landlocked lagoons, might afford a base for enemy seaplanes or submarines operating against our commerce in the Straits of Florida or the Windward Passage; in our hands they would cover both those channels and form a strong outer support to the Guantanamo position. From St. Thomas, the operating range of a fleet (2,500 miles, at the extreme—2,000 miles if the requirements of maneuvering must be considered) will hardly reach into the South Atlantic; if we held Barbados, such operations as we might have to undertake in support of our Pan-American mutual-defense commitments would be much facili-



The fleet operation limits will make it clear how impossible it would be for our fleet to operate in Japanese waters without a well equipped base in the Western Pacific. An Aleutian outpost is necessary to prevent the seizure by Japan of one of the large harbors in this area for use as a base in our own waters.

The map makes clear how the suggested outpost in the Marquesas fills in the Hawaii-Panama gap.

tated. It would not be necessary to keep any of these islands but Bermuda in a permanent state of defense.

In any case, the fortifications of Key West should be increased and placed on an active status; Guantanamo also, as the key point to the whole area, should have permanent defenses. As for the other outposts, they could be quickly reached by Marine Corps base-defense and anti-aircraft artillery from Quantico or Parris Island. This is a much more economical and flexible system than the permanent maintenance of considerable garrisons at every point. A small increase in the Fleet Marine Force—two battalions of base-defense and two of anti-aircraft artillery—would be advisable.

Also observe how the distance between the Pacific exits out of the Nicaragua and Panama Canals makes it impossible for both to be blockaded by the same force, while on the Caribbean side the two are close together, thus enabling our fleet, if compelled to debouch in the Pacific against opposition, quickly to avail itself of an opportunity to destroy a blockading fleet in detail.

The key position for our West Coast defense is Hawaii. Here we maintain a large garrison, navy and army air forces, strong seacoast defenses and the major part of our submarines. The naval base here is capable of repairing battleships. Two thousand miles to the northward, the Aleutian chain runs out in a long finger pointing toward Eastern Asia. Here a naval and air base should be placed; it requires defenses against raiding cruisers, and facilities for repairing and supplying planes and small vessels. This position commands the "great circle" route from Asia to America. Our little outpost at Samoa is too far distant to be part of our defense chain; the 4,500-mile inter-

val between Panama and Hawaii might better be covered by an outpost in the Marquesas Islands, now French, if this could be arranged. The Galapagos Islands, belonging to Ecuador, would also afford excellent facilities for covering the Pacific approaches to Panama.

Behind this outer line, our Pacific coast has naval bases at Puget Sound, Mare Island and San Diego; of these only Puget Sound is a first-class naval arsenal with facilities for repairing the largest ships. The eventual construction of a major naval base on San Francisco Bay should be considered. Portland and Los Angeles (San Pedro) are defended ports.

The Philippine Islands form a salient in our defense line—an enormous salient, stretching five thousand miles across the ocean from our main advanced position at Hawaii. These islands, in the opinion of most military authorities, could not be defended against Japan; the difficulties of making war over such distances, commanded as they are by the Japanese mandated islands, would be all but insuperable. When Philippine independence becomes a fact, sound military judgment dictates the withdrawal of our garrison and naval shore establishment. Ships necessary for the protection of American lives and property in the Far East can be maintained there without a base, as for many decades before the battle of Manila Bay.

On the whole, then, it may be said that our maritime frontiers are readily defensible, indeed, all but unassailable: provided—and it is an all-important proviso—that to the positions are added a sufficient fleet to command the adjacent seas, extending to the southward to include the Panama Canal.

This brings up the question of possible antagonists. It takes from three to four years to build a battleship, two to three years to build a cruiser, at least eighteen months to build a destroyer. Hence a watchful eye on what other people are doing should afford us adequate knowledge of what naval force might be brought against us. We may assume that we are not likely to be at war with the British Empire or France. The Soviet Union has no high-seas navy. There remain, as possible foes, but three major naval powers: Japan, Italy and Germany. All of these nations have within recent years committed acts of brutal aggression against other states. The world is still echoing with the thud of Nazi boot-heels on the pavements of Vienna. Hence it is by no means unreasonable or unjust to regard these three countries with suspicion. Furthermore, these three nations have an agreement among themselves, passing under the name of an anti-Communist pact, but which there is some reason to suppose constitutes in fact a military alliance. Finally, with Japan, at least, our relations are decidedly strained because of events in the Far East.

We may, therefore, consider that our immediate

Pacific defense problem is that of security against Japanese aggression being extended to our own vital defense area, defined by the basic points Dutch Harbor-Hawaii-Panama. The core of such aggression would be the Japanese battle fleet, which has a present strength of ten battleships, six aircraft-carriers, twelve eight-inch-gun cruisers, twenty-three light cruisers and a formidable flotilla of destroyers and submarines (including many of the latter type which can cross the Pacific and return without refueling).

About the new Japanese naval program there is considerable mystery; details have been carefully shielded. It probably includes three or four battleships of 43,000 tons (10,000 tons heavier than anything at present in our navy) plus a number of vessels of other types.

Our problem comes down to this: how large a fleet should we need, based on Hawaii, to prevent the incursion of this Japanese fleet into waters in which dominance is essential to our security?

The answer must be based on battleship strength, since, in oceanic operations especially, the battleship is the very foundation of naval power. The best proof of this is that all the major navies are building them—and many are nations which have no money to waste on expensive luxuries.

Weighing carefully all factors, it seems certain that a 20-percent superiority over the Japanese in battle strength should afford a very comfortable margin for the defense of our Pacific waters. Just now the twelve battleships of our main fleet are sufficient; the completion of three more ships by Japan would require us to add four. This is based on the theory that the aggressor will strike with concentrated force at his selected moment, which may be when certain of our ships are in dockyard hands, or otherwise not immediately available. If we could make sure that this would not be so, the distance factor would make an even number of battleships sufficient.

We should, then, base our battleship program on a strength of sixteen ships for the Pacific. Our cruiser-and-destroyer program should look to the orderly replacement of obsolete craft now on the Navy List. Our submarine force ought to be very considerably increased, not only in long-range fleet submarines but to provide stronger local-defense flotillas for Hawaii, Alaska, Panama and our West Coast. Finally, the experimental fund provided in the present naval estimates should be at once used for the development of new types of small craft to support these local-defense flotillas—notably small, fast motor torpedo-boats, mine-layers, mine-sweepers, net-layers, and also escort vessels for the protection of merchant convoys. The convoy of our huge intercoastal traffic through waters infested by enemy long-range submarines would certainly be a feature of any Pacific war, as would also the convoy of vessels engaged in the supply of our distant island bases.

In so enormous a water area as the Pacific, long-range patrol planes will play a great part, linking up our bases and patrolling the vast seas between them. We have 323 of these planes on hand or on order; the number will doubtless be increased out of the 1,000 additional planes provided for the navy. Other types will also be needed, such as scout planes for the cruisers, fighting planes and bombers for the carriers. One or two additional carriers may be required; experience with those now completing will be the best test of this.

So much for the Pacific area. There remains the Atlantic, where we must reckon on the possibility that Germany or Italy, or both, vitally in need as they are of raw materials, may attempt some form of Latin American adventure at a time when we are having trouble with Japan. The exact form which this might take it is needless to examine here; it is sufficient to observe that a mutual-defense pact imposes mutual obligations; if we are called upon we must be prepared to support our associates.

The German navy today has two battleships completing, three under construction; there are also three "pocket battleships," which are really heavily armed, long-range, fast armored cruisers; there are six cruisers ready, and five, plus two aircraft carriers, under construction, together with smaller craft. Italy has two battleships in commission, two more undergoing modernization, two new ones launched which may be ready late this year or early next, and two more projected. She has seven heavy cruisers, twelve light cruisers, and a strong force of flotilla craft.

This makes a formidable combined force; but it is going far indeed to assume that it could all be sent out of European waters. Germany could not afford to leave the Baltic a Soviet lake, nor could Italy denude the Mediterranean of naval defense. Of the total of thirteen battleships ultimately available to the two powers, it is difficult to see how more than half—say seven—could ever be employed so far away from home. If we had five battleships in the Caribbean area, plus the proper proportion of other ships, the operations of such a force in South American waters would be impossible. This is not to say that we need sixteen battleships for the Pacific and five for the Atlantic. These proportions can be reduced because—and only because—we are in possession of the Panama Canal, giving us the inestimable military advantage of interior lines. If we have two battleships in the Atlantic with the Training Squadron, they can be reinforced by three from the Pacific within a reasonable time; and this will still leave us thirteen in the Pacific, a strength which can be attained for active service by quickly completing for sea such vessels as are undergoing overhaul.

It may be asked why an inferior force in the Atlantic will give us security while in the Pacific we

need at least equality and preferably a 20-percent margin. The answer is geographical. Any force menacing us in the Atlantic, or contemplating operations in South American waters, must in the first instance drive our fleet from the Caribbean Sea; otherwise our positions there will outflank any raid against our coast and will threaten the communications of any force moving into the South Atlantic. A European enemy would not have the vast reaches of the Pacific in which to maneuver for favorable position and opportunity; it must concentrate its effort on a single area. An attempt to conduct operations in South American waters without driving our fleet out of the Caribbean would be sheer madness.

Thus we require, not two fleets, but one, with its core a force of eighteen battleships, of which two or three may be in the Atlantic while the main force should for the present be concentrated in the Pacific. The Atlantic will also need a few cruisers, a squadron or two of destroyers, and very strong local-defense flotillas made up of submarines and of the special types to be developed by experiment. These should be stationed at New York, Norfolk and at Key West or one of the Caribbean bases.

As to battleship replacements, too great haste seems unwise. If, for example, Japan is not really building 43,000-ton ships, we will not find it sound policy to build such ships, which would have to be designed on rather unsatisfactory lines from a sea-keeping point of view to pass through the Panama Canal. Also we might watch the possibility that Japan may (as suggested recently in the press and as predicted by a British naval authority, Sir Oscar Parkes, two years ago) be building fast armored cruisers armed with 12-inch guns; in this case—since such ships would be able to run away from our battleships and sink our cruisers, and would offer a most formidable menace to our commerce—we might have to convert some of our battleship funds into the building of small battle-cruisers which could run down and destroy this type of ship. The German pocket-battleships are the forerunners of this type. In scrapping older ships, also, we might well follow the lead of our potential enemies instead of anticipating it.

All of our construction should be gradually systematized on a basis of sensible annual replacements. Much of our present heavy expense might have been avoided if we had not, during the years 1922-29, become obsessed with the idea of "disarmament by example" and stopped practically all construction while other powers went merrily ahead. For example, during those years the British laid down every year one complete flotilla of destroyers of nine ships. Each group, as a result of actual experience at sea with preceding groups, presented many little improvements in design. This is common-sense naval building. For our part we kept our huge fleet of wartime destroyers on the Navy List

until now they are obsolete all at once and must be replaced as rapidly as possible with another big batch of destroyers which will also become obsolete all at once at some future date. As for airplanes, it is much better to build a barely sufficient number of the latest types and to keep experimentation with pilot models up to the minute and production keyed to experiment, so that at need new planes can be turned out rapidly. Of course this must not be carried too far, as we did in the World War, when we spent so much time in search for the ideal that in the end we were not, despite the millions poured out for airplane production, actually able to put a single American combat plane into France.

Everything should move in the direction of an economical, carefully worked out, progressive replacement program for the purpose of keeping up a fixed establishment of predetermined strength; an establishment subject to alteration only if some unusual spurt of foreign building not yet in sight makes it seem necessary to do so, and capable, on the other hand, of progressive reductions if foreign building falls off, or if a new naval disarmament agreement can be concluded.

This sort of expenditure, far-seeing and wisely directed, avoids the imposition of a needless financial burden and leaves funds available for other purposes which in the end may be found to make substantial contributions to the national defense.

What seems essential is that our naval building policy should have a definite and rational aim, taking as long a view as possible and based on sound appreciation of all contributory factors. Due to certain past follies of our own and certain present brutalities of others, immediate economies seem impracticable if not dangerous: but as system and foresight replace vacillation, very great economies indeed can and should be effected, without impairing the temper of our armor.

Our naval security would be further enhanced by increased facilities for passage between the two oceans—to be precise, by the construction of the Nicaragua Canal, estimated to cost \$400,000,000. This would also have many commercial advantages, shortening the distance between New York and San Francisco by about 700 miles. The defense problem in the isthmian area would be increased, but not doubled.

Our fleet, then, is our primary defense instrument; it defends our shores, but its bases, essential to its operation, must be defended by the army. This is the army's No. 1 task. The present budget strength of the army is 12,590 officers and 165,000 enlisted men. The officer strength is to be built up to a total of 14,650 by means of annual increments. Behind the regular army is the National Guard, of which the authorized strength is to reach 210,000 next year. There are also some 110,000 reserve officers, for whom the principal source of increment is the ROTC at our colleges.

The size of our army does not need to be based on the size of foreign armies. It may be quite otherwise estimated. First, the necessary garrisons to make Hawaii and Panama secure. Hawaii must be able to defend itself against the heaviest possible attack, in the absence of the fleet, for a period of time sufficient for the fleet to reach it from the Atlantic Seaboard—if for any reason the fleet should be called there. Panama must be ensured against surprise above all things; the units here should be at full war strength, and there should be powerful long-range bombing planes to deal with any possible attempt to establish an enemy base in neutral territory nearby. The Hawaiian garrison (18,000) is probably sufficient for immediate needs; that at Panama (13,000) requires a modest increase, say 2,000 men. A beginning should be made in erecting and manning harbor defenses at Guantanamo and an Aleutian base; 1,000 men each, mostly coast artillery, would be needed. Further development could be left to experience.

The continental United States requires first of all adequate harbor defenses, to protect our fleet bases and also to prevent an enemy fleet entering any of our principal commercial harbors, say in the ocean in which our fleet was not present at the moment; either to establish a base there or to destroy the harbor works and perhaps lay one of our cities under bombardment. Adequate harbor defenses release the mobile land, air and sea forces from responsibility for the defense of these positions, to perform their true functions; thus it is a highly economical program from a military point of view, and also from the view of the Treasury, as such defenses, once constructed, are inexpensive to maintain. A five-year program for the modernization of the defenses of the Pacific Coast harbors and those of Hawaii and Panama was determined upon by a congressional committee which visited those places in 1936; the cost, \$15,000,000 over a period of five years. Similar modernization of the Atlantic defenses is estimated at \$34,000,000.

Both plans should be pushed to rapid completion. The harbor forts have many guns that are still serviceable, but need additional long-range guns, a large number of anti-aircraft guns, and modern searchlights, range-finding equipment, fire-control installations and cover from air bombs. The forts should be permanently manned by coast-artillery garrisons sufficient to care for both gun and mine defenses; many of them now have no more than artillery caretaker parties, or are garrisoned by infantry. This will mean the bringing of the thirteen harbor-defense, railway and tractor-drawn coast-artillery regiments to an active status instead of the mere cadres that many of them are at present. For anti-aircraft artillery, some \$8,000,000 is included in the new estimates; this is but a beginning of our requirements in this respect, which

no one can call aggressive. We have good anti-aircraft guns and probably the best A.A. fire-control equipment in the world; but we need many more guns, and must develop a type of automatic gun firing a small explosive shell, which has proved highly successful in Spain, to supplement the work of the A.A. machine-guns. At least three additional A.A. regiments should be created. Not less than 25,000 officers and men will be required by the coast artillery in the continental United States for manning all this defensive armament.

The air corps ought not to be scattered in little detachments around our coast (save a few planes for artillery-spotting), but held in concentrated force to be hurled at any threatened point; its characteristics of range, speed and flexibility support this policy. The General Headquarters Air Force is a step in this direction. The present objective is for about 2,400 planes in operating squadrons; it is doubtful whether it would be economical to build much beyond this point at present. Pilots and trained enlisted personnel take much longer to produce than planes; the air corps in the continental United States ought to have a total of 20,000 officers and men. Air attacks on our great cities are impossible unless the enemy can bring his planes in carriers (which is a matter for the navy to deal with in the first place, and our air corps in the second) or unless he can establish a shore air-base within flying range. If this base is to be established on our own coasts, it comes within the discussion below of attempted invasion; if on the coast of one of our neighbors, it must be within range of our own air corps, and its communications are open to interruption by our fleet. Finally, the suggested increase in anti-aircraft artillery will provide local defense. Unless a successful invasion is accomplished, our cities need at worst fear nothing more than a "tip-and-run" air raid.

Our huge industry could quickly turn out more and better planes than those which could be brought against us. However, adequate legislation to iron out the kinks in our industrial-mobilization plans, for instance in the way of permitting "educational orders," would help both the Air Corps and the Ordnance Department.

Finally we come to the question of the mobile army. This ought to be adequate to deal with any enemy force which, if the navy be defeated or in the wrong ocean, can by any conceivable combination of resources and shipping be transported to our shores. Again weighing all the factors, it is difficult indeed to see how a greater initial force than 200,000 men could be brought here and landed. This is stretching the probabilities a long way, but let us be absolutely safe. Let us suppose that the enemy has established an air base to cover his landing (an absolute prerequisite), has gained local and temporary air superiority at the point of landing (no more extensive command of the air

will be possible in modern war), has contrived to deal with the submarines and light craft of our local-defense flotillas, has sent ashore landing parties which have taken from the rear the forts defending one of our harbors and thus obtained facilities for landing his heavy guns, tanks and other equipment (another absolute prerequisite).

Here are a great many obstacles which must be overcome. But if all this be done, we must then face invasion by an initial force of not more than 200,000 men. This we may fix by the fact that such a force would require 800,000 tons of shipping to transport the troops, plus about 1,500,000 tons for guns, stores, ammunition and essential supplies, plus not less than 200,000 tons at the very least to keep even the barest essentials of supply coming across the Atlantic (twice as much across the Pacific). This works out to 2,500,000 tons. The total combined merchant tonnage of Italy and Germany is less than 7,000,000 tons, of which not more than one-third is in ships suitable for transatlantic traffic. Japan has something over 4,000,000 tons, of which a somewhat higher proportion—say one-half—could be employed to cross the Pacific. Of course it is ridiculous to suppose that every available seagoing merchant ship of any of these nations could be diverted to such an expedition; all of them are too dependent on imports for their daily needs. But again, let us be absolutely safe and say invasion by 200,000 men.

If we were able to put into the field within forty-eight hours an equal force, or even one 75 percent as strong, fully equipped in all respects with the latest types of armament, and able, by reason of our magnificent road and rail net, to be quickly assembled at any threatened point on either coast, then the advantages of the defensive against a landing from the sea are such that we might indeed feel secure. This cannot be done today. For the purposes here discussed we need a fundamental change.

The continental United States is divided into nine corps areas, each possessing, in theory, a similar reservoir of military population. Let us presume that in each corps area we establish one complete division of the regular army. This would require twenty-seven regiments of infantry; there are twenty-eight available. It would also require nine divisional and six corps regiments of field artillery, and there are twenty available (on paper). But it would demand the establishment of the "inactive" battalions and batteries of these units. The actual strength of the new type of division is not yet fixed. Assuming it to be 13,000 (which is a fairly close approximation), we may say that in time of peace each regular division should have 8,000 men. This would permit infantry rifle and machine-gun companies to have two full-strength platoons, adequate for training purposes; it would allow full firing batteries and fire-control parties to the field

artillery. The National Guard now provides eighteen divisions, plus certain corps and army troops: that is, two divisions in each corps area. Reduce the number of National Guard divisions to nine, but provide each division with twice the number of component organizations of a regular-army division—thus each National Guard division should have six regiments of infantry instead of three, and two regiments of field artillery instead of one. Link each pair of National Guard regiments with a regular-army regiment. Make the regular-army colonel responsible for the training of his National Guard units, using his own officers and replacing them with National Guard officers called for temporary active duty. In every way emphasize the close connection among these units. This is an adaptation of the British plan, which has worked excellently in practice. On mobilization, draw on the linked National Guard units to bring the regular regiment to war strength. The men for this purpose should be earmarked in time of peace, should be instantly ready. Half the remaining National Guard regiments would then be used to build up nine National Guard divisions when and as recruits could be absorbed and trained; the other half would be used as depot units to train replacements for both the regular and National Guard divisions. In time of peace, the National Guard should be maintained at half war-strength.

Thus, on mobilization, a National Guard division of 13,000 men would furnish 5,000 trained men to bring its regular division to war establishment, would have a half-strength National Guard division of 6,500 men still in being which could be built up by recruits within from thirty to sixty days, and would have left over a depot cadre of 1,500 men to train replacements. The additional nine National Guard divisions are suggested as an extra factor of safety; they might be needed in case, say, an enemy tried to establish a base of operations in Canada or Mexico and we had to send an expeditionary force to dislodge him; or if a second increment of the invading force eventually reached our shores. The existing National Guard harbor-defense, mobile coast artillery and anti-aircraft regiments should be maintained.

The regular army will need two divisions of mechanized cavalry. These should be kept at or very near full war-strength, as this type of unit is still in the experimental stage and would be gravely disorganized by the influx of even partially trained recruits. Corps and army artillery and combat and specialized engineer units should be linked with National Guard units as above suggested; engineer general-service regiments, trains, medical units, etc., can support a higher proportion of National Guard or newly recruited personnel than can the fighting arms. A small reserve of specially selected technicians and key-men for the regular army would be advisable and economical.

On the above basis, the regular army works out as follows:

Nine divisions	72,000
Coast artillery	25,000
Two cavalry divisions, say	12,000
Three groups of Corps troops	15,000
Air Corps	20,000
Army troops, say	4,000
Overhead (to be cut to the bone)	12,000
Total continental United States	160,000
Hawaii	18,000
Panama	15,000
Outposts	3,000
Depots for overseas garrisons	4,000 (10%)
Total overseas garrisons	40,000
Total regular army	200,000

Since the present authorized strength of the regular army is just under 180,000 officers and men, this represents about a 10-percent increase; but this will be compensated for by a reduction of the National Guard, as follows:

Present contemplated establishment	210,000
Suggested establishment:	
Nine double divisions at one-half war strength	117,000
Coast artillery	25,000
Corps troops	15,000
Army troops	6,000
Air Corps (observation squadrons)	2,000
Total suggested establishment	165,000
Reduction	45,000

The above figures are subject to slight fluctuation when the establishments of the new division and cavalry division are finally fixed. The principle involved, however, will not be affected.

The mobile force available on forty-eight hours' notice would then be:

Nine divisions	117,000
Two cavalry divisions	12,000
Three groups of Corps troops	30,000
One group of army troops (including 1,000 reservists)	11,000
Total	170,000

One or two other suggestions as to the army may be pertinent. Steps must be taken to build up the dwindling ammunition reserves; the wartime stocks are going fast. A satisfactory anti-tank gun must be developed and issued to the infantry. As rapidly as possible, the infantry of both the regular army and National Guard should be rearmed with the new semi-automatic rifle.

Expansion of officer personnel should be obtained from an increase in the young college-trained reserve officers now proving so satisfactory on admission to the regular army under the Thomason Act, and by opening wider channels for the promotion of capable enlisted men. The broadening effect of such elements on our officer corps cannot but be beneficial, though the

majority should continue to be West Point graduates. The Officers' Reserve Corps seems adequate to provide the additional officers needed on mobilization; unfit officers should be rigidly eliminated, and more training facilities provided for the remainder.

The human needs of the soldier should not be forgotten. The pay of the army's enlisted personnel should be placed on the same basis as that of the navy, including the pay of warrant officers. The number of warrant officers should be increased, and a corps of line warrant officers built up who (as in our navy or the French army) could perform the duties of subalterns. This will enable the army to obtain a more satisfactory class of recruit, and to keep good men in the service. In a small army, the quality of the personnel is all-important—especially in modern war, which makes such demands on the initiative and self-reliance of individuals. Only by adequate pay and adequate opportunities for promotion and for retirement at a living wage can this ideal be attained in a volunteer service.

It must be realized that the suggested military establishment is one not capable of indefinite expansion. We could not build up, on this basis, a great overseas expeditionary force. The suggestions made are based on the theory that our military policy should be concerned with our own defense, and not for participating in any scheme of "collective security" or for the fighting of wars on other continents.

The suggested program does not require the extreme type of national regimentation of all activities suggested in the May bill, which, it seems to this writer, presents perils to our institutions quite as formidable as those to be anticipated from a foreign enemy. Some form of selective service is economical and wise, even for a small mobilized force; industrial mobilization is essential to modern war, but should be organized by obtaining the voluntary support of the industrial community. Waste and extravagance can be eliminated by greater administrative efficiency. In the end it is the coöperative effort of a free people on which we must depend for victory.

In conclusion, it may be suggested that an establishment similar to that of the British Committee of Imperial Defense might be worth considering, for the coöordinated study of national-defense problems as a whole. This committee might have the Vice President as chairman and should include representatives of the State, War, Navy, Treasury and Commerce Departments as well as of the fighting services. It should be advisory only, without executive authority; a National Defense College, attended by selected officers of all branches, should be provided to work out its problems. This would do a great deal to inspire public confidence, to determine suitable defense policies, to coördinate army and navy activities and to effect needed economies.

GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

Immunity from Foreign War

THE POLICY DESIRED by a majority of the American people—that is, avoidance of any serious risk of going to war in order to protect foreign investments or trade, and abstention from participation in the quarrels of other nations—is often called by its opponents "isolation." Isolation is then interpreted to mean a futile attempt to build a Chinese wall around the United States, and the cessation of all foreign trade and communication. The conclusion is drawn that since isolation is impossible, this country is certain to be drawn into any world war, and consequently it must take a full part in the diplomacy and hostilities of Europe and Asia in a precarious effort to prevent such a war. All these conclusions are reached without any careful study of the specific measures that would lessen the chance of our being involved in a foreign war, or of the cost of such measures.

Yet it is possible to adopt devices that reduce the risk of participation in war without being completely "isolated." A better term to describe this policy is striving to achieve immunity from infection by war contagion, rather than complete isolation. The Neutrality Act of 1937 is the expression of just such an

endeavor. A committee of experts¹ sponsored by the National Economic and Social Planning Association has made a study of measures of this type, in order to assess their effectiveness and their cost. Their report, published as the November-December number of *Plan Age*, indicates that while measures aimed at non-participation in a general European war would be difficult, they would probably be far less difficult or

¹ The Committee acted under the chairmanship of George Soule of The New Republic in New York City, and A. F. Hinrichs of the United States Department of Labor in Washington. The Committee members were N. R. Danielian, Federal Communications Commission; J. Frederic Dewhurst, Twentieth Century Fund; Arthur D. Gayer, Columbia University; Philip C. Jessup, Columbia University; Oswald W. Knauth, Associated Dry Goods Corporation; Arthur M. Lampert, A. M. Lampert and Company; Raymond T. Rich, Raymond T. Rich Associates; Horace Taylor, Columbia University; Louis Bean, Department of Agriculture; Thomas Blaisdell, Social Security Board; E. J. Coil and George B. Galloway, National Economic and Social Planning Association; Roy Veatch, Department of State; and Benjamin B. Wallace, United States Tariff Commission.

Each group is indebted to its secretary, to William W. Lockwood Jr., in New York; and in Washington, to James W. McNally.

The members of the Committee differed as to the fundamentals of foreign policy, and no member of the Committee assumed responsibility for all the conclusions of the report.

costly than the measures sure to be necessary if we became involved in such a war. Much of the material in this section is based upon the above report.

The situation immediately confronting us, however, is not a European but an Asiatic war. The Neutrality Act was intended by Congress to be applied immediately on the outbreak of war anywhere. It automatically goes into effect when war is declared. When war is not declared, discretion is left with the President to proclaim that a state of war exists. The President has refused to exercise this discretion in reference to the hostilities in China, obviously because he does not want the Neutrality Act to be enforced. We believe that this is a mistaken and dangerous choice on his part, and one that evinces a tendency contrary to the desires of a majority of the people. It therefore is pertinent to inquire what invocation of the Neutrality Act would mean, in the present situation.

If the act were invoked, it would be illegal to export from the United States to any of the belligerents, or for their use, arms, ammunition or implements of war. It would be illegal for American ships or planes to carry these things to belligerents, wherever they were bought. It would be illegal for American citizens to travel on the ships of belligerents. It would be illegal for loans or credits, other than ordinary short-term commercial credits, to be floated for either of the belligerents in this country. These are the principal mandatory sections of the law. It will be seen that they do diminish the danger of our involvement, but are far from complete isolation.

We are now selling munitions to both China and Japan. This trade is profitable to those participating in it; but it is so small in proportion to our total exports that cutting it off would not materially affect the total economy. Nor would stopping it greatly affect the chances for victory of the respective warring nations. If China is to receive substantial amounts of war supplies, she will be compelled to get most of them from Soviet Russia. Japan could, and in our judgment would, enforce a blockade against such shipments from the United States if they became large enough to make an appreciable difference. Such action would, of course, involve us in still more disputes with Japan, and we could not hope to safeguard our arms shipments without serious threat of naval action in Asiatic waters. Japan herself is dependent mainly upon her own manufacturing resources for her munitions. We could, by applying the act, therefore, diminish the causes of possible friction without much loss to ourselves and without greatly affecting the status of the war.

The embargo on loans and credits would involve little loss. Neither belligerent is a good credit risk. Japan is now trying to enlarge her credits in this country, ostensibly for the development of Manchuria. If she succeeds in doing so, we shall in fact be abetting

her aggression and will be buying unsafe investments. Sound national policy would dictate forbidding such expansion by application of the law.

The law also authorizes the President to take further action, at his discretion. If exports of goods other than arms, munitions and implements of war involve a danger to our peace, he may forbid the carrying of these goods to belligerents in American vessels, and may decree that in so far as they are bought by belligerents in this country, they must be paid for in cash before they leave our shores. Such action might be taken in reference to commodities often regarded as contraband, such as cotton, oil or steel. Imports of these things are important to Japan, which has a shortage of natural resources. Application of the cash-and-carry plan would not stop trade in them, but might somewhat hamper Japan in her conduct of the war. It would have little effect on China.

Application of the Neutrality Act to the war in the Far East is therefore perfectly feasible. If supplemented by withdrawal of American citizens from China and removal of American warships from Chinese waters, it would greatly reduce the danger of friction. It would not prevent the United States from seeking damages for injury to property, or from joining in any future negotiations concerning peace, or the status of China, or our rights and interests there. It would, however, serve formal notice that we do not intend to participate in the war. It is probable that the President does not desire to invoke the Act because he wants to be free to make threats, direct or veiled, of such participation. Traditional diplomacy is based on the belief that power to affect the action of other nations is dependent ultimately on the possibility of employing force against them. The President and the Department of State, in other words, want to be free to take sides in the Asiatic conflict—a policy recognized as dangerous and undesirable by the people, whose main interest and desire is not to participate in foreign war.

A further point is that application or non-application of the Neutrality Act is an important precedent for a possible world war. If the Act becomes a dead letter, we may again, as in 1917, intervene in Europe. If it is applied now, the inference will be that we shall do our best to stay out of the next world war. What, as a matter of fact, would the latter course involve?

First, of course, the embargo on munitions would prevent the growth of the profitable munitions trade which arose during the last war, but is of little importance in peacetime commerce. As a matter of fact, most European nations which might become belligerents are well equipped to manufacture their own weapons. The embargo on munitions would help to keep us out of trouble, but would involve little economic or political loss.

The main problem is concerned with export of raw materials and manufactured or partly manufactured

products that are not classified as munitions. These things normally make up the major part of our exports to Europe, and even under war conditions would be of far greater importance than munitions themselves. Our experience proves that two kinds of danger of involvement arise from war trade of this sort. One is that virtually all essential supplies are regarded as contraband, and belligerents will take forceful measures to prevent their enemies from receiving these supplies. If we try to protect our right to deliver such exports, we get into trouble with powers that control the sea—as we did after 1914, first with Great Britain, and later with Germany and her submarine campaign. The second danger is less dramatic but perhaps more insidious. Belligerents are likely to enlarge greatly their purchases of these goods in this country. Thus an unhealthy war boom is created. We find that our prosperity, the employment of our wage earners and the welfare of our farmers come to depend largely on sales to belligerents. These sales are increased to the utmost on the basis of expansion of loans to foreign nations. But eventually their credit resources reach a limit. Then our government is faced with the alternative of either joining the war and placing its own credit behind the purchases of belligerents, or seeing a sudden and disastrous slump develop in this country. Such a situation was outlined in a famous letter from Ambassador Page to President Wilson early in 1917. Enormous economic interests become dependent on our entrance into war. It is desirable to avoid the boom and the subsequent danger of reaction even if these interests do not lead us to fight.

A complete embargo on exports to belligerents has been suggested, but would be so drastic as probably to defeat its own end, in a general war. That would be indeed a disastrous and impractical isolation.

The sensible aim, as far as avoiding a war boom is concerned, would be to maintain during the war an amount of exports normal to peacetime, but to prevent its enlargement on account of war. For this purpose a quota system has been suggested, limiting exports to each nation to that quantity bought in a previous normal peacetime period. Such quotas could be calculated statistically. They were applied in certain cases during the last war, to prevent transshipment of contraband to enemy states through purchases by neutrals. The administration of such a system would, however, be extremely complicated and difficult. No such provision is embodied in the present Neutrality Act. This device should be borne in mind as a possible resort, but is not to be recommended unless it becomes necessary.

A more feasible method of control is already in part provided by the Neutrality Act through the mandatory embargo on loans and credits to belligerents. This would mean that they could buy here only to the extent that cash purchasing power was available to them. Such cash could be derived from their exports to us,

from gold shipments, from their bank balances in this country, and from sale of securities already owned in this country by nationals of the countries at war. What possibilities are open for financing a war boom from these cash resources?

It is not likely that nations at war could greatly expand their exports to us, and we could readily control gold shipments. Use of bank balances and sale of securities already held in this country would furnish the main source of cash. We could, when war broke out, establish control over the liquidation of the foreign-owned securities, to the end that not enough should be sold in any one year to do more than finance the normal peacetime volume of trade. Orderly liquidation of these securities would be advisable on other grounds as well, and probably would be desired by belligerents themselves, if they anticipated a long war. By use of bank balances a certain expansion of trade could be financed, but that boom could be limited by the control of the sale of foreign-owned securities.

In 1936 foreign long-term investments in the United States were valued at about \$6,108,000,000, and bank-balances and other short-term funds at about \$1,530,000,000. These figures vary from time to time, but there is little doubt that these funds would be sufficient to finance at least the normal amount of exports to belligerents for a war of two or three years' duration.

It is interesting to see how the ownership of these foreign investments in the United States is apportioned among the nations. At the end of 1934 the percentages were—and no great change has occurred since—Canada, 23.1 percent; United Kingdom, 29.8 percent; Netherlands, 16.3 percent; Switzerland, 8.0 percent; France, 5.2 percent; the rest of Europe, 5.4 percent; the rest of the world, 11.3 percent. Not one of the chief aggressor nations—Germany, Italy or Japan—has enough of this potential purchasing power to finance much war trade. The lion's share is controlled by Great Britain and Canada. Next come nations that either will be neutral or victims of German aggression—the Netherlands and Switzerland—followed closely by France. There is not the slightest chance, under this plan, of starving or much hindering the "great democracies" who, we fear, will be compelled to defend themselves from the Fascist dictators. On the other hand, the potential aggressors could buy relatively little.

So much for the prevention of an unhealthy war boom. How about interference with our shipments at sea? The Neutrality Act forbids our ships and planes from carrying munitions. As for other materials, the application of the discretionary cash-and-carry provision would ensure that no goods in transit to a belligerent would be American-owned. Our interest in them would cease at our ports, where ownership would be transferred. And American ships would not be carrying them. This means several things. We should at one

stroke avoid most of the kind of trouble we had with both Great Britain and Germany before we entered the last war. It would be up to each of these nations—and the others involved—to protect their own supplies and ships against the depredations of their enemies. And if the “great democracies” control the seas, as it seems probable that they will, at least in the Atlantic, we should really embarrass them much less than we did before 1917. Any goods or ships consigned from our ports to Germany or Italy could be confiscated by the British or French without the slightest interference on our part, and without loss to our shippers.

There would of course still remain puzzling difficulties. There would be questions about transshipments through neutrals, and about American shipping engaged in neutral trade. Our merchant marine would be much restricted. But the losses and possibilities of friction would be trivial compared with those that eventually made the American government believe that it was compelled to take sides in the last war.

Not the least of the benefits of such a policy is that it makes it unnecessary for us to develop a huge and uneconomic merchant marine designed to compete in foreign trade carrying, or a huge and expensive navy designed to protect that trade in time of war. We could have a navy designed rather to protect our own territory against attack.

It is sometimes contended that such restrictions on trade in time of war will make nations less anxious to trade with us in time of peace, that it will force them rather to strive to be self-sufficient. Thus, it is said, this policy of immunity really does lead in the direction of isolation in peace as well. But this argument overlooks one important fact. The ability to buy here in time of war, under the cash-and-carry plan, depends on the existence of cash purchasing power here in the hands of the would-be purchasers. It depends, in other words, on the existence of large exports to us, and of bank balances and securities owned here by the countries in question. How are such resources built up? Of course, by active trade. It is noteworthy that the nations that have the largest reserves of cash purchasing power here—Canada and the United Kingdom—are just those with which we enjoy the largest peacetime trade. Therefore the policy of extending peacetime trade and discouraging attempts to maintain self-sufficiency fits admirably with the cash-and-carry policy in time of war.

Another aspect of the limitation of war trade is the need of the United States for imports from abroad. Our necessary imports are not large in value, and for many of them domestic substitutes can be found. Nevertheless there are certain raw materials which are essential to us, even though we do not need much of them, and which we should have difficulty in replacing, at least completely, from domestic sources of supply. The War Department has listed the more important

materials likely to cause a procurement problem, if we should be completely shut off from imports, as follows:

Ferrous Alloy Metals: Manganese, chromium, nickel, tungsten.

Other Minerals: Tin, antimony, mercury, platinum, mica, nitrates.

Rubber, Fibers and Hides: Rubber, silk, jute, Manila fiber, sisal, wool, cattle hides.

Miscellaneous and Foodstuffs: Camphor, iodine, nux vomica, opium, quinine, shellac, cocoanut shells, coffee, sugar.

It would be desirable that the government build up, in advance of war, stocks of enough of these materials to see us through a crisis. It has been estimated that as little as \$100,000,000 would be sufficient to safeguard us from serious shortages for a period of two years. And of course it is probable that even during a world war we should not be completely cut off from such supplies. We could undoubtedly, for instance, continue to receive sugar from Cuba, coffee from Brazil, nitrates from Chile, sisal from Yucatan.

Having taken these broad measures to prevent the growth of too large a war boom or too great a shortage of supplies, we should still have to deal with internal dislocations caused by a shifting of demand, with its effects on prices, costs, profits and incomes. Some industries would prosper abnormally, while other would suffer. Such distortion was observed in the last war. A combination of profits taxes, price controls, relief and special programs to encourage production in slack industries would be indicated. Such controls would undoubtedly meet resistance, but we already have a certain amount of familiarity with them on account of our contest with depression, and they certainly would be less drastic than the controls that would be necessitated by participation in war. It would be well to begin at once careful study of the possible needs in this direction.

There is a specific measure which might well be taken at once as a means to bolster our defense, discourage aggressors and aid our internal economy. One of the most essential materials for the manufacture of munitions is scrap steel. The United States is the greatest source of this material in the world. Demand for it from abroad has been so heavy during the past two years that its price has become abnormally high. This affects the price of domestic steel and so inhibits construction and revival in this country. A complete embargo on exports of such scrap steel, enacted now, would have a number of desirable effects. It would be easy to enforce. It would hamper the foreign aggressors—especially Japan—in building up and replenishing their armaments. It would conserve an essential war resource. It would scarcely affect employment in this country, since few are engaged in the industry—it is really a by-product. It would help to reduce prices

of the important items like structural steel and other capital goods that are now too high.

We might also consider seriously an embargo on exports of petroleum to nations at war, provided other large petroleum producers would join us in this action. Petroleum is essential to modern hostilities. It is an exhaustible resource and should be conserved. None of the potential aggressors has petroleum resources of its own. If such an agreement could be reached, embracing the United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, Mexico, Rumania and a few minor nations, Japan could not long continue her aggression, and other potential aggressors would be warned of the impossibility of winning a war of any duration. Such an embargo has long been advocated by those who uphold "collective security," applied to aggressors alone. But it could be applied to all nations at war, without violating neutrality, but with much the same effect. It would at the same time help to render this nation impregnable against any conceivable attack.

So much for an economic program that would minimize the losses of remaining at peace while the rest of the world was at war and so would diminish our objective motives for participation. There remains, of course, the psychological problem involved in natural sympathies and enmities, in the widespread human impulse to take sides in a fight, in propaganda and pressure. There is no way to avoid danger of involvement from these sources, but the danger is at least

diminished if they are not strongly reinforced by materialistic motives. We have a better chance of dealing with them by analysis and reason if the preservation of the values of peace at home is made the goal of a constructive policy such as is outlined in this defense program.

The immunity part of this program therefore makes desirable the following measures:

1. Invocation of the Neutrality Act in the Asiatic war.
2. Removal of American citizens and American armed forces from the war zones.
3. Immediate embargo on all exports of scrap steel.
4. Negotiations with other petroleum-producing nations looking toward international embargo on export of petroleum and its products to nations at war.
5. Building up, by the national government, of reserve stocks of essential imported materials.
6. Application of the Neutrality Act on the outbreak of any European war.
7. On the outbreak of war, prompt adoption of further measures to normalize foreign trade and to compensate for war dislocation, such as:
 - a. Control of liquidation of foreign-owned securities and properties in this country.
 - b. Necessary controls to compensate for disturbance of prices, employment and production in various industries.

Toward Economic Appeasement

IF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS so laboriously created after the War have largely broken down, it is at least partly because they made too little provision for peaceful change in a dynamic world. Their primary aim was preservation of the status quo and enforcement of international law with all its inherent injustices. Had more attention been paid to eradication of the roots of war, the League and kindred institutions might today be firmly established.

One need not be a Marxist to confess that one of the basic causes of international tension is economic. Just as maldistribution of income creates serious discontent at home, so the disparity in national wealth subjects international relations to constant strain. It is not necessary to cite reams of statistics to prove the obvious fact that some countries are poorer in national resources than others. The urge to improve standards of living is so strong that few countries will reconcile themselves to relative poverty. While many of the "proletarian" nations are too weak to take the law into their own hands, others are powerful enough to press aggressively their demands for new territories, larger markets and sources of raw materials.

If peace is to be assured, each nation must be given the means to live, and differences in national incomes must become less pronounced. Boundary changes offer no adequate solution. In almost every case they would violate another people's right of self-determination. Nor would reallocation of colonial territory provide a remedy. All colonial possessions together produce only five percent of the commercially important raw materials, and they contribute significant proportions only of tin, rubber and certain vegetable oils and seeds. The real, but rather prosaic solution lies in the extension of international trade and economic collaboration. International exchange offers countries the opportunity to make the best possible use of their natural resources and abilities. It enables them to concentrate on the production of those goods they can turn out with maximum efficiency. By opening up extensive markets it furnishes the poorer nations with the purchasing power they need in order to obtain those raw materials and commodities lacking at home.

During the post-war period, and particularly since the advent of the depression, the channels of inter-

national trade have become clogged with all sorts of obstacles. To tariffs have been added quotas, foreign-exchange restrictions, clearing agreements and similar devices for regimentation and restriction of trade. The fear of war, the desire to "insulate" domestic economic life, the pressure of vested interests—all inspired the erection of ever higher barriers. Countries with limited home markets and resources suffered more acutely from this trend than those with extensive territorial domains and ample natural wealth. Their raw-material difficulties became increasingly acute as markets for their own products contracted. It mattered little that cotton, copper, rubber, oil and other primary products were selling in the world market at rock-bottom prices when countries like Germany had no foreign exchange with which to buy them.

The United States was one of the principal offenders in this gradual process of strangling international commerce. As the largest single market and a large-scale producer of raw materials and foodstuffs we had an obligation to ourselves and others not to curtail our economic ties with the rest of the world. As a leading creditor nation, we should not have obstructed repayment of our loans and investments abroad. Yet three times since the War—in 1921, 1922 and 1930—we raised our import tariffs to unprecedented heights. For a time we lent enough money to enable foreigners to continue buying, but when we ceased lending, a collapse in international purchasing power became inevitable.

Today American policy has changed. Realizing the need of relieving the economic tensions making for war, Secretary Hull has embarked us on a liberal trade program. In 1934 the President obtained congressional authorization to lower import duties by 50 percent in return for concessions by other countries. Already seventeen reciprocal trade agreements have been concluded; the more important with Canada, France, Cuba, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia. Negotiations are in process with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Venezuela, and with Canada for the extension of the agreement already in force. The sixteen countries with which trade accords are now in effect accounted in 1929 for 37.3 percent of our exports and 37.7 percent of our imports. The agreement with Czechoslovakia has been signed recently—on March 7. Under the most-favored-nation principle concessions made by the United States in individual agreements are automatically extended to all countries which guarantee equality of treatment to American trade. In this way we avoid the resentment that would be engendered by discriminatory tariffs and ensure ourselves the benefit of concessions made in commercial treaties to which we are not a partner.

The Hull program has made the first real breach in our tariff wall. In 1936 our exports to countries with

which we had agreements in force rose 14 percent over the previous year, as against an increase of 4 percent in our trade with other nations. Last year saw a further rise of 41 percent as compared with 34 percent. Imports from "trade-agreement countries" rose 22 percent in 1936, while purchases from the rest of the world increased but 16 percent. In the following year, however, this trend was reversed because a combination of the drought and economic recovery produced an extraordinary demand for foodstuffs and raw materials which for the most part could be obtained only from countries with which we had not yet concluded agreements.

On the whole the results so far achieved have been modest. Much remains to be done before the United States can be said to have a really liberal tariff policy. Of about 3,200 items in our tariff schedule our government has made reductions on only 411, to which concessions granted in the Czechoslovak agreement must now be added. Nor have the tariff rates been lowered on an average much below the levels of 1922, when they were already quite high. Under pressure from the vested interests that have grown up behind the tariff wall, the State Department has often been compelled to keep its concessions within narrow bounds. Frequently duties have been reduced only on limited quantities or quotas. Such has been the case with imports of cattle, dairy cows, calves, cream, lumber and timber from Canada. Similar limitations have been imposed on the duty concessions benefiting Cuban cigars and wrapper tobacco. Imports of Cuban sugar are restricted to a quantity far below that purchased in the late twenties, so that American consumers are still paying millions of dollars in tribute to domestic cane and sugar-beet growers. In the agreement with Czechoslovakia we have granted tariff reductions on shoes ranging up to 50 percent, but we have reserved the right to raise the duty whenever imports exceed 1.25 percent of the preceding five-year average domestic production of all types of shoes. Usually the State Department also defines the product on which a concession is made in such a way as to minimize the benefit which other countries might derive from it under the most-favored-nation principle.

The real test of the Hull program will come with the conclusion of a trade agreement with the United Kingdom which is generally expected this spring. Britain is our best customer, taking about 16 percent of our exports in 1937; and the second largest source of imports, supplying 6.6 percent of our requirements last year. One-third of our agricultural exports go to the United Kingdom. The negotiations cover about 500 items in our tariff schedule, including a wide variety of manufactures on which duties have always been extraordinarily high. The concessions we make will measure the sincerity of our intentions. If a comprehensive, far-reaching agreement is achieved, it may

"start the ball rolling" toward more universal liberalization of trade. It will mean modification of the mischievous British imperial-preference system, to be followed by further agreements between the United States and the various British dominions.

If international economic appeasement is really our goal, the trade-reciprocity program should be pushed with great vigor and accelerated wherever possible. Even after conclusion of the British agreement only about half of our foreign trade will be with countries with which we have trade pacts. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are among the more important South American countries still having no agreements with us; and, singularly enough, the three nations we have been accustomed to call "have not" powers—Germany, Italy and Japan—remain "outside the pale." Italy and Japan at least enjoy the benefits of the most-favored-nation principle, but Germany, whose treatment of American trade is considered discriminatory, has even been deprived of this advantage. While an agreement with Japan is obviously out of the question so long as fighting continues in the Far East, the State Department faces a serious quandary in its commercial policy toward the two fascist powers in Europe.

The German problem is particularly acute. The Reich is anxious for a trade pact, especially now that an American agreement with Britain is expected; but the State Department has hardly proved receptive. The Department's reluctance is partly attributable to political factors. It realizes that any arrangement with Germany would provoke determined opposition among certain sections of the American people. Some officials also dislike aiding the Reich economically so long as the German government pursues an aggressive foreign policy that might end in war. Yet, can we afford to make our commercial concessions dependent on political conditions when we are not prepared to share in the political responsibilities of maintaining peace in Europe? Do not Britain and France conclude trade arrangements with Germany irrespective of political considerations?

Perhaps more important are the economic obstacles to German-American agreement. Germany has developed an elaborate system of controls over foreign trade which offers countless opportunities for concealed discrimination and tends to force commerce into uneconomic, bilateral channels. It thus runs directly counter to the State Department's desire to obtain equality of treatment and foster free, multilateral trade. Germany wants controlled and planned foreign trade; the United States strives toward a condition of trade emancipated as far as possible from restrictions. In the end a compromise should be found. We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that controlled and planned national economies of the communist or fascist type will continue to exist side by side with freer

economies. Exchange of goods between them is not impossible. Already the United States has an agreement with the Soviet Union whereby the latter undertakes, in return for receiving most-favored-nation treatment, to buy during one year American goods valued at \$40,000,000. A similar accord could be made with Germany as a preliminary step toward reviving the mutually profitable trade which has fallen off so sharply during recent years.

The trade-agreement program would be far more effective if the high basic rates of the 1930 tariff schedule were revised by unilateral action. American consumers must be made to realize that a lower tariff making possible greater competition on our market is one of the most effective checks on monopolistic prices. Our farmers should know that their interest as a group lies in expanding foreign outlets for their exportable products rather than in supporting tariffs which will only raise the cost of the things they have to buy. The majority of manufacturers must recognize that their efficient industries would profit from freer international trade, while the laboring masses should be reminded that wages in tariff-protected enterprises are generally lower than in those working for export.

Supplementing the Hull program, we should strive in other ways to remove obstructions to world trade. We should foster reductions in trade barriers on a regional basis in Europe and elsewhere by refusing to invoke the most-favored-nation clause in such cases. We can assist in the removal of foreign-exchange restrictions, one of the greatest banes of international trade. Countries cannot abandon such controls if they do not possess a sufficient supply of gold or foreign exchange wherewith to keep their currencies stable. The United States could cooperate, perhaps through the agency of the World Bank, in providing such countries with credits which would tide them over a transitional period until their exports bring in an adequate amount of foreign exchange.

Attention must also be devoted to international currency stabilization, without which foreign trade and investment become hazardous. While the rigid gold standard need not be restored, cooperation among the monetary authorities of various countries should be further developed. Since September, 1936, we have the tripartite agreement whereby the United States, Britain and France seek to restrict currency fluctuations as far as possible. Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands subsequently adhered to this accord. Although further progress can hardly be realized until conditions in France become more stable, the next step should be an undertaking to keep exchange rates within certain predetermined limits over a fixed period of six months to a year. While international monetary stability is being realized, efforts should be made to revive foreign

investment. As a preliminary step a final settlement of the war-debt question must be essayed. No one would recommend an "orgy" of foreign lending such as that in the twenties. Yet under proper government supervision—and perhaps ultimately under international auspices—investments abroad can be made to serve a useful purpose. Financial assistance in the development of resources in countries poor in capital will often yield a good return, raising their standards of living and increasing their purchasing power for foreign products.

Progress in the direction of economic appeasement

will inevitably be slow. Success will not, after all, depend solely on the efforts put forth by the United States. So long as countries are haunted by the fear of war they will be loath to abandon their plans for greater economic self-sufficiency, even though these mean lower standards of living. The task of creating conditions of real political security in the world rests primarily on powers other than the United States. Meanwhile we can do our share in providing peace with the necessary foundations of economic justice and equality.

Progressive Defense Plan

On the basis of the preceding considerations, the editors of The New Republic offer the following summary of a sound defense policy.

THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES are rightly alarmed at the existence of war and the threats of future war. They believe in democracy and are willing reasonably to cooperate in peaceful measures with friendly countries. At the same time a large majority of our citizens are not ready to incur any serious risk of going to war in order to protect foreign investments or trade, and they do not wish their government to take sides in the quarrels of other nations. They want a sufficient naval and military establishment to earn the respect of international trouble-makers. But they do not want this establishment to be a factor tending to draw us into foreign wars; they want it rather to guard against any possible invasion of our own peace.

Our people are no less alarmed at the losses and wastes in our own country that are even more devastating than any damage that could possibly be done by a foreign enemy. That nation is best prepared for war which has the greatest reserves of natural resources, the most vigorous and effective men, women and children, the most efficient industry and agriculture. If we are ever to be called upon to repel armed aggression, we ought first of all to look to our internal strength rather than to our military weapons. It is pure folly to spend money on additional munitions as long as millions of tons of our best topsoil are being forever lost by erosion, as long as millions of our families are being weakened physically and in spirit by unemployment, malnutrition and preventable disease, as long as bad housing conditions sap the vitality of our citizens. While attack by foreign armies is remote and unlikely, the ravages of these internal enemies are day by day threatening national security. Let us make better preparation both for international trouble and for peaceful living by declaring war to the bitter end against these domestic scourges, and engaging all our resources in the conflict.

I. INTERNAL DEFENSE

There are a large number of public projects, already thoroughly investigated, planned for and approved by executive officials, that are being postponed in order to hold down governmental expenditures. Work on them could be begun promptly if funds were available. To undertake them would increase employment and stimulate recovery. They are not, however, mere devices to make work and provide unemployment relief. They are essential undertakings of permanent, constructive value. Let us get busy with enlargement of the much needed projects under the following heads:

- Public health and medical research
- Soil conservation
- Flood control
- Low-cost housing
- Regional planning
- Forestry
- Highway construction
- Miscellaneous public works such as sewage disposal, etc.

2. EXTERNAL DEFENSE

While these projects are held up or stinted for lack of funds, Congress is asked to sanction a program of naval expansion that will cost more than \$1,200,000,000. Our present and authorized navy is comparable in size and power to that of Great Britain with her far-flung empire; it is adequate for ordinary police duty in any part of the world, and is more than sufficient to repel an attack by any nation foolhardy enough to attempt to cross thousands of miles of ocean, land expeditionary forces on our shores, and keep open lines of communication. The navy contemplated by the Vinson bill would be from 50 to 60 percent larger than the present one and twice the size of the Japanese. It can be intended only to provide an overwhelming superiority in foreign waters. If we really do fear a danger of invasion, and wish to render invulnerable the defenses of this country, the proper plan is not to build such a navy but to adopt the sort of plan outlined

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


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in these pages by Major George Fielding Eliot. This would not only be more effective, but would be, at least in the long run, less expensive than the administration plan. (It must be borne in mind that even if the Vinson bill is passed, action under it will be slow, and it can be altered at any time in favor of a better policy.)

3. IMMUNITY FROM FOREIGN WAR

In order to immunize ourselves against involvement in foreign war, Congress has passed the Neutrality Act, limiting exports of arms, the use of American shipping in trade with belligerents, and the extension of loans and credits to warring nations. This act must be applied to the existing war in Asia, before the hostilities spread further.

American nationals, ships and soldiers must immediately be withdrawn from the war zones, to prevent war-breeding "incidents."

Additional measures are required as well. Aggressive and militaristic nations are at present drawing upon American resources to build up their military equipment. Foremost among these materials is scrap steel. So great has been the demand for scrap steel that its price has risen rapidly, and is a factor in the high price of steel in this country. The high price of steel tends to discourage investment in housing and in industrial plant and equipment. By placing an embargo on the export of scrap steel we can stop aiding foreign militarists and at the same time conserve the supply for domestic use.

Petroleum is an essential for modern war. The United States is one of the chief petroleum-exporting nations. We are rapidly exhausting our own resources of this precious mineral, while we abet war in other parts of the world. We advocate an embargo on the export of petroleum and its products to nations at war, provided other nations producing large quantities of this commodity will take similar action. Without petro-

leum no nation can carry on aggressive war, and none of the present or potential aggressors has petroleum resources of its own.

Such embargoes could readily be enforced, since it would be almost impossible to "bootleg" shipments of bulky materials like scrap steel, oil or gasoline.

At the same time the United States government should build up adequate reserves, against possible war conditions, of those few essential and non-perishable commodities that cannot be produced in this country. A list of these commodities has been prepared, and quantities sufficient to maintain a normal supply for several years could be purchased for about \$100,000,000. The Neutrality Act should likewise be invoked immediately upon the outbreak of a European war. It would diminish the chance of our becoming involved, but would not favor the aggressor as against the democratic nations.

4. EXTENSION OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION

We favor every reasonable effort to extend normal and peaceful trade with peace-abiding nations, such as the reciprocal trade treaties negotiated by the Department of State. We favor every effort to remove arbitrary trade barriers, to stabilize currencies and exchange throughout the world. Some progress has already been made in this direction, and more is possible.

The best way to prepare for war is to prepare for peace. To prepare for war in any other way is not only to invite war but to invite defeat. We need not be afraid that those nations which are sapping their strength by excessive armament and an adventurous foreign policy, while ignoring the primary needs of their own populations, can long seriously menace the world. Their menace can affect us only if we are foolish and criminal enough to follow their example.

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A SURVEY to determine the relationship between the political intelligence of voters and the periodicals which the voters read was made by Professor Seba Eldridge, of the University of Kansas. The voters tested were readers of thirty-four magazines. Readers of *The New Republic* ranked highest.

THE Bureau of Educational

Research of the College of Education of Ohio State University made a survey to determine the quality of various magazines. For purposes of the investigation, the quality of a magazine was defined in terms of its readers: the better the readers the better the magazine. "Better" was determined by three tests: for scholastic aptitude, proficiency

in English and knowledge of contemporary affairs.

Using *Saturday Evening Post* readers as average, with an index number of 100, *New Republic* readers were found to have an index number of 265. This was the highest score made by readers of any of the thirty-nine magazines included in the survey.

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